Client-supplied URI scheme trusted without transport verification in bandit
## Summary Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated transport-state spoofing on plaintext HTTP connections. 'Elixir.Bandit.Pipeline':determine\_scheme/2 in lib/bandit/pipeline.ex returns the client-supplied URI scheme verbatim, ignoring the transport's secure? flag. HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request targets (e.g. GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1) and the HTTP/2 :scheme pseudo-header are both attacker-controlled strings that flow through this function. Over a plaintext TCP connection, a client can declare https and Bandit will set conn.scheme = :https even though no TLS was negotiated. Downstream Plug consumers that branch on conn.scheme are silently misled: Plug.SSL's already-secure branch skips its HTTP→HTTPS redirect, cookies emitted with secure: true are sent over plaintext, audit logs record requests as having arrived over HTTPS, and CSRF/SameSite gating may make incorrect decisions. This issue affects bandit: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.0. ## Configurations The vulnerable system must be accepting plaintext (non-TLS) HTTP connections, either directly or via h2c. Deployments that exclusively use TLS are not affected.
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-39807US | — | — | ||
Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated transport-state spoofing on plaintext HTTP connections.
'Elixir.Bandit.P… | ||||
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