CVE-2025-62518

Security update for python-uv

Security update for python-uv

## Summary Versions of `astral-tokio-tar` prior to 0.5.6 contain a boundary parsing vulnerability that allows attackers to smuggle additional archive entries by exploiting inconsistent PAX/ustar header handling. When processing archives with PAX-extended headers containing size overrides, the parser incorrectly advances stream position based on ustar header size (often zero) instead of the PAX-specified size, causing it to interpret file content as legitimate tar headers. This vulnerability was disclosed to multiple Rust tar parsers, all derived from the original `async-tar` fork of `tar-rs`. ## Details ### Vulnerability Description The vulnerability stems from inconsistent handling of PAX extended headers versus ustar headers when determining file data boundaries. Specifically: 1. **PAX header** correctly specifies the file size (e.g., `size=1048576`) 2. **ustar header** incorrectly specifies zero size (`size=000000000000`) 3. **tokio-tar** advances the stream position based on the ustar size (0 bytes) 4. **Inner content** is then interpreted as legitimate outer archive entries ### Attack Mechanism When a TAR file contains: - An outer entry with PAX `size=N` but ustar `size=0` - File data that begins with valid TAR header structures - The parser treats inner content as additional outer entries This creates a **header/data desynchronization** where the parser's position becomes misaligned with actual file boundaries. ### Root Cause ```rust // Vulnerable: Uses ustar size instead of PAX override let file_size = header.size(); // Returns 0 from ustar field let next_pos = current_pos + 512 + pad_to_512(file_size); // Advances 0 bytes // Fixed: Apply PAX overrides before position calculation let mut file_size = header.size(); if let Some(pax_size) = pending_pax.get("size") { file_size = pax_size.parse().unwrap(); } let next_pos = current_pos + 512 + pad_to_512(file_size); // Correct advance ``` ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability depends on where `astral-tokio-tar` is used, and whether it is used to extract untrusted tar archives. If used to extract untrusted inputs, it may result in unexpected attacker-controlled access to the filesystem, in turn potential resulting in arbitrary code execution or credential exfiltration. See [**GHSA-w476-p2h3-79g9**](https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/security/advisories/GHSA-w476-p2h3-79g9) for how this vulnerability affects `uv`, `astral-tokio-tar`'s primary downstream user. Observe that **unlike** this advisory,` uv`'s advisory is considered **low severity** due to overlap with intentional existing capabilities in source distributions. ## Workarounds Users are advised to upgrade to version 0.5.6 or newer to address this advisory. There is no workaround other than upgrading. ## Timeline | Date | Event | | --- | --- | | Aug 21, 2025 | Vulnerability discovered by Edera Security Team | | Aug 21, 2025 | Initial analysis and PoC confirmed | | Aug 22, 2025 | Maintainers notified (privately) | | Aug 25, 2025 | Private patch and test suite shared | | Oct 7, 2025 | Text freeze for GHSA | | Oct 21, 2025 | Coordinated public disclosure and patched releases | ## Credits - **Discovered by:** Steven Noonan (Edera) and Alex Zenla (Edera) - **Coordinated disclosure:** Ann Wallace (Edera)

Versions of astral-tokio-tar prior to 0.5.6 contain a boundary parsing vulnerability that allows attackers to smuggle additional archive entries by exploiting inconsistent PAX/ustar header handling. When processing archives with PAX-extended headers containing size overrides, the parser incorrectly advances stream position based on ustar header size (often zero) instead of the PAX-specified size, causing it to interpret file content as legitimate tar headers. This vulnerability was disclosed to multiple Rust tar parsers, all derived from the original async-tar fork of tar-rs. For additional information see [Edera's blog post](https://edera.dev/stories/tarmageddon).

The archive reader incorrectly handles PAX extended headers, when the ustar header incorrectly specifies zero size (`size=000000000000`), while a PAX header specifies a non-zero size, `tokio-tar::Archive` is going to read the file content as tar entry header. This can be used by a tar file to present different content to `tokio-tar` compared to other tar reader implementations. This bug is also known as `CVE-2025-62518` and `GHSA-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx`, as those crates share a common ancestor codebase. The `tokio-tar` crate is archived and no longer maintained, we recommend you switch to an alternative crate such as: - [`astral-tokio-tar`](https://crates.io/crates/astral-tokio-tar)