CVE-2022-27666

mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 43EPSS 0.055 · 93. PerzentilExploit · PoCDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP1 · Urgent
Exploitable?
Public exploit
3 exploits · PoC
Likely / severe?
5.52% (93rd) EPSS
CVSS 4.6 · medium
Is it mine?
154 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
6 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

A heap buffer overflow flaw was found in IPsec ESP transformation code in net/ipv4/esp4.c and net/ipv6/esp6.c. This flaw allows a local attacker with a normal user privilege to overwrite kernel heap objects and may cause a local privilege escalation threat.

01

Behebungen

Hersteller-Fix, Mitigation oder Workaround, wie von den Quellen veröffentlicht.

Ein Hersteller-Fix ist verfügbar.

  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debuginfo-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debuginfo-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debugsource-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debugsource-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debuginfo-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debuginfo-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debugsource-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debugsource-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debuginfo-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debuginfo-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debugsource-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debugsource-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debuginfo-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debuginfo-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debugsource-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debugsource-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debuginfo-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debuginfo-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debugsource-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debugsource-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debuginfo-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debuginfo-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debugsource-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debugsource-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:4942
  • Behobenkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-kvm-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debug-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debuginfo-common-x86_64-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-debuginfo-common-x86_64-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-kvm-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Behobenkernel-rt-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

    https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:5344
  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debuginfo-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debuginfo-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debugsource-0:1-8.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_1-debugsource-0:1-8.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debuginfo-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debuginfo-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debugsource-0:1-7.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_51_2-debugsource-0:1-7.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debuginfo-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debuginfo-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debugsource-0:1-6.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_52_1-debugsource-0:1-6.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_54_2-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debuginfo-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_56_1-debugsource-0:1-5.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debuginfo-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debuginfo-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debugsource-0:1-4.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_57_1-debugsource-0:1-4.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_58_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debuginfo-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_59_1-debugsource-0:1-3.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debuginfo-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debuginfo-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debugsource-0:1-2.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_64_1-debugsource-0:1-2.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debuginfo-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debuginfo-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debugsource-0:1-1.el8_1.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkpatch-patch-4_18_0-147_65_1-debugsource-0:1-1.el8_1.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v. 8.1)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-core-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-kvm-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debug-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debuginfo-common-x86_64-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-debuginfo-common-x86_64-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-devel-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-kvm-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-modules-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux NFV (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

  • Workaroundkernel-rt-modules-extra-0:4.18.0-372.13.1.rt7.170.el8_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8)redhat_csaf

    The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

02

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

7.8
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 4.6–7.8

v2.04.6mediumAV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:Pprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 6.4
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 1.8 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.17.8highAV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.17.4highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Psecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · Red Hat Product Security US
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

CWE-787USprimärCWE-119USCWE-122USCWE-787US
04

Exploits (3)

Öffentlicher Proof-of-Concept- und Exploit-Code.

05

betroffene Produkte (154)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

20 von 154 angezeigt
06

Advisories (5)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • RHSA-2022:4942Red Hat Security Advisory: kpatch-patch security update2022-06-08csaf · redhat_csafUS

    An update is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.1 Update Services for SAP Solutions. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.

  • RHSA-2022:5344Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel-rt security and bug fix update2022-06-28csaf · redhat_csafUS

    An update for kernel-rt is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.

  • WID-SEC-W-2022-0157Linux Kernel: Schwachstelle ermöglicht nicht spezifizierten AngriffDeutsch2022-03-22csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2022-0887Android Patchday August 2022Deutsch2022-08-02csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Google Android ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erweitern, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen und beliebigen Code auszuführen.

  • PUB-A-2274528562022-08-01vendor · osvUS
07

auch bekannt als (5)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

08

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

cnnvdenisa_euvdfstec_bduosvcert_bundredhat_csafNVDCVE.orgMITRE
veröffentlicht 2022-03-23geändert 2026-09-01
10

Referenzen (60)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

scry

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