RHSA-2022:5344

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.

Add 'nomodeset' option as kernel boot parameter to disable frame buffering (edit /etc/default/grub, and run 'grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg' and reboot). ~~~ # cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-147.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-root ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel_rhel8u2--1-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/root rd.lvm.lv=rhel_rhel8u2-1/swap nomodeset # ls -l /dev/fb* ls: cannot access '/dev/fb*': No such file or directory ~~~

The given exploit needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to set up IPsec SA and a user namespace is used to get that capability, so disabling unprivileged user namespaces gives some protection. ~~~ On non-containerized deployments of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, you can disable user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf On containerized deployments, such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform, do not use this mitigation as the functionality is needed to be enabled. ~~~ Note: If the target system is already using IPsec and has SA configured, then no additional privileges are needed to exploit the issue.