CVE-2026-9098

criticalpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.002 · 14 %ileEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.23% (14th) EPSS
CVSS 9.1 · critical
Is it mine?
3 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
3 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-26

In Casdoor versions 2.362.0 and earlier, the SAML callback handler in controllers/auth.go accepts any well-formed SAMLResponse sent to /api/acs without verifying that it corresponds to an AuthnRequest previously issued by Casdoor. Additionally, if an administrator disables or deletes an IdP (Identity Provider) after a SAML flow has started, the handler still processes the response using the provider snapshot loaded at the start of the request. As a result, an attacker controlling a registered upstream IdP can send unsolicited SAML responses, or replay a legitimately captured response in a different session or after the original flow has ended. In both cases, Casdoor accepts the response and issues a session, enabling persistent unauthorized access.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

9.1
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · high–critical · 8.3–9.1

v3.19.1criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.19.1criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondaryexploitability 3.9 · impact 5.2
v3.19.1criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.18.3highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (3)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-mfvp-7p3v-x9mhCasdoor SAML callback handler accepts any well-formed SAMLResponse sent to /api/acs without verifying that it corresponds to an AuthnRequest2026-05-28ghsa · osvUS

    In Casdoor versions 2.362.0 and earlier, the SAML callback handler in controllers/auth.go accepts any well-formed SAMLResponse sent to /api/acs without verifying that it corresponds to an AuthnRequest previously issued by Casdoor. Additionally, if an administrator disables or deletes an IdP (Identity Provider) after a SAML flow has started, the handler still processes the response using the provider snapshot loaded at the start of the request. As a result, an attacker controlling a registered upstream IdP can send unsolicited SAML responses, or replay a legitimately captured response in a different session or after the original flow has ended. In both cases, Casdoor accepts the response and issues a session, enabling persistent unauthorized access.

  • GO-2026-5898Casdoor SAML callback handler accepts any well-formed SAMLResponse sent to /api/acs without verifying that it corresponds to an AuthnRequest in github.com/casdoor/casdoor2026-07-07vendor · osvUS

    Casdoor SAML callback handler accepts any well-formed SAMLResponse sent to /api/acs without verifying that it corresponds to an AuthnRequest in github.com/casdoor/casdoor

06

also known as (5)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-05-28modified 2026-06-17
08

references (5)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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