CVE-2026-90936

mediumpriority · track · 17EPSS 0.003 · 23 %ileUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.31% (23rd) EPSS
CVSS 4.3 · medium
Is it mine?
1 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-28

Froxlor before 2.3.7 fails to properly scope sender alias lookups to the current customer in customer_email.php. Authenticated attackers can enumerate global sender alias IDs and read other customers' allowed sender values by supplying arbitrary senderid parameters in delete confirmation requests.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

5.3
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 1.3–5.3

v3.14.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nprimary · disclosure@vulncheck.comexploitability 2.8 · impact 1.4
v3.14.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v4.05.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · disclosure@vulncheck.com
v4.01.3lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (1)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-mr9h-45p9-fg8hFroxlor: Authenticated customers can read other customers' allowed sender aliases2026-07-02ghsa · osvUS

    ## Summary An authenticated customer can read other customers' allowed sender aliases from Froxlor's sender-delete confirmation page when `mail.enable_allow_sender` is enabled. `customer_email.php` loads `allowed_sender` by global auto-increment `senderid` alone, so a customer can enumerate foreign sender alias IDs and make Froxlor disclose those values in the confirmation dialog for the attacker's own mailbox. ## Details The vulnerable read lives in `customer_email.php`: ```php $senderid = Request::any('senderid', 0); ... $sel_stmt = Database::prepare("SELECT `allowed_sender` FROM `" . TABLE_MAIL_SENDER_ALIAS . "` WHERE `id` = :sid"); $sender_data = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['sid' => $senderid]); HTML::askYesNo('email_reallydelete_sender', $filename, [ 'id' => $id, 'senderid' => $senderid, 'page' => $page, 'domainid' => $email_domainid, 'action' => $action ], $idna_convert->decode($result['email_full']) . ' -> ' . $sender_data['allowed_sender']); ``` The query does not scope `senderid` to the current customer or to the mailbox being edited. `mail_sender_aliases.id` is a global `AUTO_INCREMENT` primary key: ```sql CREATE TABLE `mail_sender_aliases` ( `id` int(11) NOT NULL auto_increment, `email` varchar(255) NOT NULL, `allowed_sender` varchar(255) NOT NULL, PRIMARY KEY (`id`) ) ``` That makes sender alias IDs enumerable. A customer who owns any mailbox with sender-alias management enabled can request the delete-confirmation page for their own mailbox while supplying foreign `senderid` values. Froxlor then renders the foreign `allowed_sender` string in the confirmation prompt. ## Proof of Concept Verified against Froxlor `2.3.6` on a fresh test install with `mail.enable_allow_sender=1`. 1. Create two customers, `victim` and `attacker`. 2. Give each customer one mailbox. 3. Add a sender alias for the victim mailbox: ```text info@victim.local -> leaked-sender@example.org ``` 4. Log in as the attacker and request the delete-confirmation page for the attacker's own mailbox while supplying the victim's sender alias ID: ```text /customer_email.php?page=senders&domainid=4&action=delete&id=2&senderid=1 ``` Observed in the live test instance: ```text Do you really want to delete the allowed sender info@attacker.local -> leaked-sender@example.org? ``` The attacker-controlled mailbox identifier stayed `info@attacker.local`, but the disclosed sender alias text came from the victim-owned row identified by `senderid=1`. ## Impact An authenticated customer can enumerate global sender alias IDs and read other customers' allowed sender values. This is a cross-tenant information disclosure. It does not let the attacker delete the foreign alias because the delete action revalidates ownership. ## Recommended Fix Scope the sender alias lookup to the current customer and mailbox before rendering the confirmation page. The confirmation flow should fetch the sender alias through the same ownership checks used by `EmailSender::delete()`. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*

06

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-09-14modified 2026-10-08
07

references (2) nvd

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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