CVE-2026-82685
highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.007 · 52 %ileUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record. AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChange verifies the token's signature and its act claim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing the sub claim against changeset.data. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address with force_change_attributes/2 and stamping confirmed_at, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, because AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3 resolves sub to a user and targets that record. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 4.9–7.6
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.
affected products (2)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (1)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- EEF-CVE-2026-82685Confirmation token accepted on any record in AshAuthentication2026-09-17vendor · osvUS
## Summary Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record. `AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChange` verifies the token's signature and its `act` claim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing the `sub` claim against `changeset.data`. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address with `force_change_attributes/2` and stamping `confirmed_at`, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, because `AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3` resolves `sub` to a user and targets that record. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
also known as (1)
Other names and identifiers for this entity.
sources
Which sources assert this record, and when.
references (6) nvd
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82685.html
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/1d4bb00617aecae85c33f2ff5bc7e094c6449a6e
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/2a2396af131ab67e2f445b805fecce8e6ca86c0e
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d7c15c21d39c009206e010cd67e2d86370fe7a28
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-g636-26vf-2w63
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82685
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