CVE-2026-81637
lowpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.006 · 49 %ileUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker who obtains a victim's OAuth2 state value to replay the callback and sign that victim into an attacker-controlled account. AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.Plug.callback/2 clears the stored session_params through a rebinding step inside its with chain, conn <- delete_session(conn, session_key). Elixir evaluates the else block in the scope enclosing the with, so every failure path (the provider returning ?error=access_denied, an invalid code, a token-exchange error, or a registration or sign-in failure) reaches store_authentication_result/2 holding the original connection and the session entry is never removed. The value the module's own comment describes as protection against a CSRF-related attack is therefore consumed only when authentication succeeds, and survives a cancelled or failed attempt until the next request phase or session expiry. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.6.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
cvss
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base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode
ssvc
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weaknesses
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affected products (2)
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advisories (1)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- EEF-CVE-2026-81637Replayable OAuth2 CSRF state retained after a failed callback in AshAuthentication2026-09-17vendor · osvUS
## Summary Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker who obtains a victim's OAuth2 `state` value to replay the callback and sign that victim into an attacker-controlled account. `AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.Plug.callback/2` clears the stored `session_params` through a rebinding step inside its `with` chain, `conn <- delete_session(conn, session_key)`. Elixir evaluates the `else` block in the scope enclosing the `with`, so every failure path (the provider returning `?error=access_denied`, an invalid code, a token-exchange error, or a registration or sign-in failure) reaches `store_authentication_result/2` holding the original connection and the session entry is never removed. The value the module's own comment describes as protection against a CSRF-related attack is therefore consumed only when authentication succeeds, and survives a cancelled or failed attempt until the next request phase or session expiry. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.6.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
also known as (1)
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sources
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references (6) nvd
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-81637.html
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/bd4352303bc9d72d007f6818775267585a4bcc2f
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/c5f589058e04239263f50a1430eb17ea6d5dd1a2
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d7f939cd02bd618bcaa304631846fa75ffc419d7
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-3vcj-gxx8-3p44
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-81637
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