CVE-2026-68520

## Summary Glances provides `as_dict_secure()` explicitly designed for unauthenticated API access, with a docstring stating it returns "a sanitised copy of the configuration dict" where "Sensitive keys in remaining sections are replaced by '********'". However, the implementation only checks KEY names against a regex pattern and never inspects VALUE content. The documented `[ip]` config section supports `public_api` (URL), `public_username` (login), and `public_password` (password). While `public_password` is correctly masked, both `public_api` (when containing embedded credentials like `https://user:pass@host/`) and `public_username` are returned in full to unauthenticated users via `GET /api/4/config`. ## Affected Versions Glances latest (Docker: `nicolargo/glances:latest`) ## Root Cause In `glances/config.py`, `as_dict_secure()`: ```python _SECURE_SENSITIVE_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"password|token|secret|api_key|apikey|ssl_keyfile", re.IGNORECASE) def as_dict_secure(self): """Return a sanitised copy of the configuration dict. Intended for unauthenticated API access. - Sensitive keys in remaining sections are replaced by '********'. """ sanitized = {} for section, options in self.as_dict().items(): if section in _SECURE_BLOCKED_SECTIONS: continue sanitized[section] = { key: "********" if _SECURE_SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key) else value for key, value in options.items() } return sanitized ``` In `glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py`: ```python # Line 1294 args_json = self.config.as_dict() if self.args.password else self.config.as_dict_secure() ``` The `[ip]` config section documents: `public_api` (URL), `public_username` (login), `public_password` (password). - `public_password` → matches "password" → masked ✓ - `public_api` → no match → returned in full (contains `user:pass@` in URL) ✗ - `public_username` → no match → returned in full ✗ ## Impact - Unauthenticated credential disclosure via `GET /api/4/config` or `GET /api/4/config/ip` - `as_dict_secure()` exists specifically to protect credentials in no-auth mode but fails to mask `public_username` and credential-bearing URLs in `public_api` ## Prerequisites - Glances in web server mode without `--password` (default, no auth) - `glances.conf` `[ip]` section with `public_api` containing embedded credentials and/or `public_username` set ## Environment - Glances latest (Docker: `nicolargo/glances:latest`) - Remote Docker lab at `http://10.140.200.102:8080` ## Reproduction Steps ```bash docker run -d --name glances-test -p 8080:61208 -e GLANCES_OPT='-w' nicolargo/glances:latest sleep 20 docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|public_api=https://ipv4.ipleak.net/json/|public_api=https://admin:secret123@ipv4.ipleak.net/json/|' /etc/glances/glances.conf docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|#public_username=<myname>|public_username=myname|' /etc/glances/glances.conf docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|#public_password=<mysecret>|public_password=mysecret|' /etc/glances/glances.conf docker restart glances-test sleep 15 curl -s "$TARGET/api/4/config/ip" # Returns: {"public_api": "https://admin:secret123@...", "public_username": "myname", "public_password": "********"} ``` ## Evidence See `C:/Tools/glances-config-leak-evidence.txt`. ## Dedup Check - GHSA-gfc2-9qmw-w7vh covers CORS but NOT value-level credential leak - No existing GHSA covers `as_dict_secure()` value-level filtering gap - 13 published GHSA, none covering this issue ## Suggested Remediation Add "username" and "login" to sensitive key pattern, and check values for embedded credentials in URLs. ## Disclosure Timeline - 2026-07-28: Vulnerability discovered and verified via Docker deployment ## Reporter GitHub username: Todor

## Summary Glances provides `as_dict_secure()` explicitly designed for unauthenticated API access, with a docstring stating it returns "a sanitised copy of the configuration dict" where "Sensitive keys in remaining sections are replaced by '********'". However, the implementation only checks KEY names against a regex pattern and never inspects VALUE content. The documented `[ip]` config section supports `public_api` (URL), `public_username` (login), and `public_password` (password). While `public_password` is correctly masked, both `public_api` (when containing embedded credentials like `https://user:pass@host/`) and `public_username` are returned in full to unauthenticated users via `GET /api/4/config`. ## Affected Versions Glances latest (Docker: `nicolargo/glances:latest`) ## Root Cause In `glances/config.py`, `as_dict_secure()`: ```python _SECURE_SENSITIVE_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"password|token|secret|api_key|apikey|ssl_keyfile", re.IGNORECASE) def as_dict_secure(self): """Return a sanitised copy of the configuration dict. Intended for unauthenticated API access. - Sensitive keys in remaining sections are replaced by '********'. """ sanitized = {} for section, options in self.as_dict().items(): if section in _SECURE_BLOCKED_SECTIONS: continue sanitized[section] = { key: "********" if _SECURE_SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key) else value for key, value in options.items() } return sanitized ``` In `glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py`: ```python # Line 1294 args_json = self.config.as_dict() if self.args.password else self.config.as_dict_secure() ``` The `[ip]` config section documents: `public_api` (URL), `public_username` (login), `public_password` (password). - `public_password` → matches "password" → masked ✓ - `public_api` → no match → returned in full (contains `user:pass@` in URL) ✗ - `public_username` → no match → returned in full ✗ ## Impact - Unauthenticated credential disclosure via `GET /api/4/config` or `GET /api/4/config/ip` - `as_dict_secure()` exists specifically to protect credentials in no-auth mode but fails to mask `public_username` and credential-bearing URLs in `public_api` ## Prerequisites - Glances in web server mode without `--password` (default, no auth) - `glances.conf` `[ip]` section with `public_api` containing embedded credentials and/or `public_username` set ## Environment - Glances latest (Docker: `nicolargo/glances:latest`) - Remote Docker lab at `http://10.140.200.102:8080` ## Reproduction Steps ```bash docker run -d --name glances-test -p 8080:61208 -e GLANCES_OPT='-w' nicolargo/glances:latest sleep 20 docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|public_api=https://ipv4.ipleak.net/json/|public_api=https://admin:secret123@ipv4.ipleak.net/json/|' /etc/glances/glances.conf docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|#public_username=<myname>|public_username=myname|' /etc/glances/glances.conf docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|#public_password=<mysecret>|public_password=mysecret|' /etc/glances/glances.conf docker restart glances-test sleep 15 curl -s "$TARGET/api/4/config/ip" # Returns: {"public_api": "https://admin:secret123@...", "public_username": "myname", "public_password": "********"} ``` ## Evidence See `C:/Tools/glances-config-leak-evidence.txt`. ## Dedup Check - GHSA-gfc2-9qmw-w7vh covers CORS but NOT value-level credential leak - No existing GHSA covers `as_dict_secure()` value-level filtering gap - 13 published GHSA, none covering this issue ## Suggested Remediation Add "username" and "login" to sensitive key pattern, and check values for embedded credentials in URLs. ## Disclosure Timeline - 2026-07-28: Vulnerability discovered and verified via Docker deployment ## Reporter GitHub username: Todor