CVE-2026-6420

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Red Hat Enterprise Linux (keylime) ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

## CVE-2026-6420: Hardcoded attestation challenge nonce allows replay attacks ### Impact The `CertificationParameters.generate_challenge()` method in the push attestation protocol uses a hardcoded challenge nonce instead of generating a cryptographically random value. This removes the nonce-based replay protection from TPM quote attestation. An attacker with root access on a monitored agent node can exploit this by stockpiling valid TPM quotes (using `tpm2_quote` with the known nonce) before compromising the system, then replaying them to evade detection by the verifier. The push attestation timeout (~10s) constrains the generation window, but TPM throughput allows stockpiling ~50-200 quotes, enabling approximately 8-33 minutes of undetected compromise with default settings. The attack is limited to a single agent node (AK signature binding prevents cross-agent replay). The pull-mode (legacy) attestation path is not affected. **Affected versions:** >= 7.14.0, <= 7.14.1 **CVSS:** 6.3 Medium (`CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L`) | Metric | Value | Rationale | |---|---|---| | AV | Local | Exploitation requires local access to the agent machine (stop agent, access TPM, run replacement). The network transmission of quotes to the verifier is normal protocol operation. | | AC | Low | Deterministic attack: publicly visible nonce, standard `tpm2-tools`, no race conditions. | | PR | High | Root on a legitimate enrolled node is required. The vulnerability does not help gain access -- it only helps evade detection after root is obtained. No value against a machine the attacker already controls. | | UI | None | Fully automated after initial setup. | | S | Unchanged | AK signature binding confines impact to the single compromised agent. | | C | High | Compromised node continues receiving bootstrap keys, payloads, and secrets intended for trusted nodes. | | I | High | Verifier cannot distinguish a healthy system from a fully compromised one during the evasion window. | | A | Low | Only the compromised agent's revocation and incident response are suppressed; the system as a whole remains operational. | The base score does not fully capture the operational severity: Keylime exists to detect machine compromise, so 8-33 minutes of undetected compromise is operationally critical. The fix is a one-line change and should be applied immediately regardless of the base score. ### Patches The fix restores the original random nonce generation (one-line change in `keylime/models/verifier/evidence.py`): ```python # Before (vulnerable): def generate_challenge(self, bit_length): # self.challenge = Nonce.generate(bit_length) self.challenge = bytes.fromhex("49beed365aac777dae23564f5ad0ec") # After (fixed): def generate_challenge(self, bit_length): self.challenge = Nonce.generate(bit_length) ``` Users should upgrade to the version containing this fix (7.14.2). ### Workarounds There is no complete workaround. The following existing mechanisms provide partial mitigation and are already active by default (no configuration needed): 1. **TPM clock monotonicity check** limits each distinct stockpiled quote to a single use, bounding the total evasion time. 2. **Push attestation timeout** (default 10s) prevents the attacker from going silent and constrains the quote generation window. Reducing `quote_interval` increases the attestation frequency but does not prevent the stockpiling attack. ### References - CWE-329: Generation of Predictable IV/Nonce (primary -- hardcoded nonce in cryptographic attestation protocol) - CWE-547: Use of Hard-Coded, Security-relevant Constants (hardcoded constant left in production code) - CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay (consequence -- enables replay attacks) - CWE-1241: Use of Predictable Algorithm in Random Number Generator - Introducing commit: [`2bf91197`](https://github.com/keylime/keylime/commit/2bf91197) via [PR #1814](https://github.com/keylime/keylime/pull/1814) - TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification, Part 1, Section 18.4 (TPM2_Quote) - IETF RATS Architecture (RFC 9334), Section 8 (Freshness)

## CVE-2026-6420: Hardcoded attestation challenge nonce allows replay attacks ### Impact The `CertificationParameters.generate_challenge()` method in the push attestation protocol uses a hardcoded challenge nonce instead of generating a cryptographically random value. This removes the nonce-based replay protection from TPM quote attestation. An attacker with root access on a monitored agent node can exploit this by stockpiling valid TPM quotes (using `tpm2_quote` with the known nonce) before compromising the system, then replaying them to evade detection by the verifier. The push attestation timeout (~10s) constrains the generation window, but TPM throughput allows stockpiling ~50-200 quotes, enabling approximately 8-33 minutes of undetected compromise with default settings. The attack is limited to a single agent node (AK signature binding prevents cross-agent replay). The pull-mode (legacy) attestation path is not affected. **Affected versions:** >= 7.14.0, <= 7.14.1 **CVSS:** 6.3 Medium (`CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L`) | Metric | Value | Rationale | |---|---|---| | AV | Local | Exploitation requires local access to the agent machine (stop agent, access TPM, run replacement). The network transmission of quotes to the verifier is normal protocol operation. | | AC | Low | Deterministic attack: publicly visible nonce, standard `tpm2-tools`, no race conditions. | | PR | High | Root on a legitimate enrolled node is required. The vulnerability does not help gain access -- it only helps evade detection after root is obtained. No value against a machine the attacker already controls. | | UI | None | Fully automated after initial setup. | | S | Unchanged | AK signature binding confines impact to the single compromised agent. | | C | High | Compromised node continues receiving bootstrap keys, payloads, and secrets intended for trusted nodes. | | I | High | Verifier cannot distinguish a healthy system from a fully compromised one during the evasion window. | | A | Low | Only the compromised agent's revocation and incident response are suppressed; the system as a whole remains operational. | The base score does not fully capture the operational severity: Keylime exists to detect machine compromise, so 8-33 minutes of undetected compromise is operationally critical. The fix is a one-line change and should be applied immediately regardless of the base score. ### Patches The fix restores the original random nonce generation (one-line change in `keylime/models/verifier/evidence.py`): ```python # Before (vulnerable): def generate_challenge(self, bit_length): # self.challenge = Nonce.generate(bit_length) self.challenge = bytes.fromhex("49beed365aac777dae23564f5ad0ec") # After (fixed): def generate_challenge(self, bit_length): self.challenge = Nonce.generate(bit_length) ``` Users should upgrade to the version containing this fix (7.14.2). ### Workarounds There is no complete workaround. The following existing mechanisms provide partial mitigation and are already active by default (no configuration needed): 1. **TPM clock monotonicity check** limits each distinct stockpiled quote to a single use, bounding the total evasion time. 2. **Push attestation timeout** (default 10s) prevents the attacker from going silent and constrains the quote generation window. Reducing `quote_interval` increases the attestation frequency but does not prevent the stockpiling attack. ### References - CWE-329: Generation of Predictable IV/Nonce (primary -- hardcoded nonce in cryptographic attestation protocol) - CWE-547: Use of Hard-Coded, Security-relevant Constants (hardcoded constant left in production code) - CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay (consequence -- enables replay attacks) - CWE-1241: Use of Predictable Algorithm in Random Number Generator - Introducing commit: [`2bf91197`](https://github.com/keylime/keylime/commit/2bf91197) via [PR #1814](https://github.com/keylime/keylime/pull/1814) - TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification, Part 1, Section 18.4 (TPM2_Quote) - IETF RATS Architecture (RFC 9334), Section 8 (Freshness)