CVE-2026-61634
nonepriority · track · 0EPSS 0.005 · 42 %ileUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.33.0, the AMQP connection tuning path records the negotiated AMQP frame_max value, but src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/SocketFrameHandler.java and NettyFrameHandlerFactory continue to validate broker-controlled frame payload lengths against maxInboundMessageBodySize because the negotiated limit is not applied consistently through setMaxInboundFramePayloadSize. A malicious or compromised broker can send a method frame larger than the negotiated frame_max during or after connection establishment, causing the client to allocate and decode a protocol-invalid frame instead of rejecting it with MalformedFrameException. The protocol violation can disrupt the affected connection and cause client-side denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.33.0.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
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affected products (1)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (1)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- GHSA-5xwg-cfvj-gff5RabbitMQ Java client accepts broker frames larger than the negotiated AMQP frame_max2026-08-18ghsa · osvUS
## Summary The max body size was enforced to patch CVE-2023-46120, but even though that limit still works, the frame size itself still exceeds the given max size. ## Root cause The Java client records the AMQP 0-9-1 `frame_max` negotiated during connection tuning, but the socket inbound frame reader continues to validate broker-controlled payload lengths against the much larger `maxInboundMessageBodySize` limit. A broker peer can therefore send a method frame whose payload is larger than the negotiated `frame_max`, have it allocated and decoded, and complete the connection handshake instead of being rejected as a protocol violation. *Reported by Team Atlanta.*
sources
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references (6) nvd
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/08790f09686173eb17b48d08a25edcb32e71a591
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/b491075f42e89967610c40beded68d3680cfd472
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/1994
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/1995
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.33.0
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-5xwg-cfvj-gff5
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