CVE-2026-59896
mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.003 · 22 %ileEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.11.8 before 4.12.27, hono/jsx did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering, allowing createContext, useContext, jsxRenderer, or useRequestContext data from a different in-flight request to be used after an await in an async component. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.27.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.
affected products (3)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (1)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfjhono/jsx does not isolate context per request, leading to cross-request data disclosure2026-07-21ghsa · osvUS
### Summary `hono/jsx` did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering. While an async component was suspended on `await`, its provided context value stayed observable to other requests rendering concurrently, so `useContext()` could return a value from a different in-flight request. ### Details During server-side rendering, context values were kept in a process-wide structure rather than scoped to each request's render. While an async component awaited, another request entering the same provider could observe or replace the value; when the first render resumed, it could read the other request's context. This affects the usual ways request-scoped data is passed through a server-rendered JSX tree: - `createContext()` / `useContext()` - the `jsxRenderer` middleware and `useRequestContext()` It arises only when context is read after an `await` inside an async component while requests render concurrently. Reading context synchronously (before any `await`), purely synchronous rendering, and client-side (DOM) rendering are not affected. ### Impact Under concurrent requests, a response could be rendered with another request's context. A user may receive HTML rendered for a different user, and an authorization check performed after an `await` may be evaluated against another user's data. This may lead to: - disclosure of rendered output intended for another user - authorization decisions made with the wrong request's context - cross-request mixing of session or other request-scoped state
also known as (3)
Other names and identifiers for this entity.
sources
Which sources assert this record, and when.
references (10)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/fab3b13639339cbd5ba1166a5b23d9ac30c5f64fcnnvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/releasesPatchcnnvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.12.27cnnvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfjcnnvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/fab3b13639339cbd5ba1166a5b23d9ac30c5f64fenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.12.27enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-hvrm-45r6-mjfjenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/fab3b13639339cbd5ba1166a5b23d9ac30c5f64fPatchnvd
Attackers weaponise vulnerabilities like this against internet-exposed services. See what is exposed on your perimeter with a free passive scan.
Free scan