CVE-2026-59871

Atlassian heeft kwetsbaarheden verholpen in diverse producten zoals Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Jira, Crowd en Fisheye. De kwetsbaarheden bevinden zich in diverse Third-Party producten waar eerder updates voor zijn verschenen. Atlassian heeft deze updates verwerkt in de eigen producten.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Atlassian Bitbucket, Atlassian Confluence, Atlassian Crucible, Atlassian Fisheye und Atlassian Jira ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Daten zu manipulieren und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

### Summary A crafted 2.5KB tar archive crashes any Node.js process that extracts it. The PAX header parser coerces all-digit path values to JavaScript numbers, which causes an uncaught TypeError when downstream code calls `.split('/')` on the numeric value. Error handlers and `strict: false` cannot intercept the crash. ### Details In `pax.ts` line 180, `parseKV` converts PAX values matching `/^[0-9]+$/` to numbers via `+v`. This applies to all fields including `path` and `linkpath`. When a PAX header sets `path` to an all-digit string like `"12345"`, the value becomes the number `12345`. This number flows through Header -> ReadEntry -> Unpack.CHECKPATH, where `normalizeWindowsPath(entry.path).split('/')` throws a TypeError because numbers don't have `.split()`. The throw is synchronous during event emission and bypasses all error handling: - `strict: false` does not help - `'error'` event handlers do not catch it - `'warn'` handlers do not catch it - The TypeError propagates through the event emitter stack as an uncaughtException Directory, SymbolicLink, and Link type entries reach CHECKPATH and crash. File type entries crash earlier in Header constructor at `this.path.slice(-1)`, but that throw is caught and emitted as a warning only. ### PoC Create a tar archive with a PAX extended header containing an all-digit path: ``` PAX header body: "18 path=12345\n" Entry type: Directory (type '5') ``` Extract it: ```js const tar = require('tar'); // All of these crash with TypeError: t.split is not a function tar.extract({ file: 'malicious.tar', cwd: '/tmp/test' }); // Error handlers don't help: tar.extract({ file: 'malicious.tar', cwd: '/tmp/test', strict: false }) .on('error', (err) => { /* never reached */ }) .on('warn', (code, msg) => { /* never reached */ }); ``` The archive is ~2.5KB. The crash is deterministic on every attempt. ### Impact Denial of service. Any application or tool that extracts untrusted tar archives crashes from a single small file. This includes npm (which uses node-tar to extract packages), CI/CD pipelines, file upload processors, and backup tools. The crash cannot be caught by application-level error handling.