CVE-2026-59220

## Summary Two regexes in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` that parse `<$skillId|label>` skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains `<$` followed by a long run with no closing `>`. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on **every** chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside `re` and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern. ## Affected versions `>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0`. Fixed in **v0.10.0** (there is no 0.9.7 release). - `SKILL_MENTION_RE` (the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since **v0.9.2**; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB). - **v0.9.6** added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance. Both are fixed by the same patch. ## Affected component `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` (line numbers as of v0.9.6): ```python # line 2223 — used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625) SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>') # line 2247 — used by strip_skill_mentions(), called unconditionally (line 2662) strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>') ``` `extract_skill_ids_from_messages()` runs before the `if all_skill_ids:` block (that guard gates only skill *injection*, not the regex), and `strip_skill_mentions()` runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async `process_chat_payload` coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default `UVICORN_WORKERS=1` (`backend/start.sh`) the whole instance stalls. ## Root cause `[^|>]` is a subset of `[^>]`, so the quantifier pair `[^|>]+ \|? [^>]*` is ambiguous: on input that never closes with `>`, `[^|>]+` greedily consumes the tail, `>` fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between `[^|>]+` and `[^>]*` — O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input. ## Proof of concept Standalone (no Open WebUI required): ```python import re, time EXTRACT = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>') STRIP = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>') for n in (8_000, 16_000, 32_000, 64_000): s = '<$' + ('a' * n) for name, rx in (('extract', EXTRACT), ('strip', STRIP)): t = time.perf_counter(); rx.search(s) print(f'n={n:>6} {name:>7} = {(time.perf_counter()-t)*1000:8.1f} ms') ``` Time quadruples per doubling of `n` (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one. End-to-end against a live instance (default config): 1. `docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6` on defaults. 2. Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup). 3. Send a chat message containing `<$` followed by 50k+ characters with no `>`. 4. One CPU core pegs in `re`; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed. ## Patch Rewrite the optional `|label` as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed `<$id|label>`, `<$id|>`, and bare `<$id>` mentions. ```python SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)(?:\|[^>]*)?>') strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+(?:\|([^>]*))?>') ``` After the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0. ## Credit Reported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.

## Summary Two regexes in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` that parse `<$skillId|label>` skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains `<$` followed by a long run with no closing `>`. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on **every** chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside `re` and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern. ## Affected versions `>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0`. Fixed in **v0.10.0** (there is no 0.9.7 release). - `SKILL_MENTION_RE` (the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since **v0.9.2**; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB). - **v0.9.6** added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance. Both are fixed by the same patch. ## Affected component `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` (line numbers as of v0.9.6): ```python # line 2223 — used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625) SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>') # line 2247 — used by strip_skill_mentions(), called unconditionally (line 2662) strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>') ``` `extract_skill_ids_from_messages()` runs before the `if all_skill_ids:` block (that guard gates only skill *injection*, not the regex), and `strip_skill_mentions()` runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async `process_chat_payload` coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default `UVICORN_WORKERS=1` (`backend/start.sh`) the whole instance stalls. ## Root cause `[^|>]` is a subset of `[^>]`, so the quantifier pair `[^|>]+ \|? [^>]*` is ambiguous: on input that never closes with `>`, `[^|>]+` greedily consumes the tail, `>` fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between `[^|>]+` and `[^>]*` — O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input. ## Proof of concept Standalone (no Open WebUI required): ```python import re, time EXTRACT = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>') STRIP = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>') for n in (8_000, 16_000, 32_000, 64_000): s = '<$' + ('a' * n) for name, rx in (('extract', EXTRACT), ('strip', STRIP)): t = time.perf_counter(); rx.search(s) print(f'n={n:>6} {name:>7} = {(time.perf_counter()-t)*1000:8.1f} ms') ``` Time quadruples per doubling of `n` (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one. End-to-end against a live instance (default config): 1. `docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6` on defaults. 2. Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup). 3. Send a chat message containing `<$` followed by 50k+ characters with no `>`. 4. One CPU core pegs in `re`; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed. ## Patch Rewrite the optional `|label` as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed `<$id|label>`, `<$id|>`, and bare `<$id>` mentions. ```python SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)(?:\|[^>]*)?>') strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+(?:\|([^>]*))?>') ``` After the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0. ## Credit Reported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.