CVE-2026-57119

highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.005 · 45 %ileUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.53% (45th) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
1 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.59, the unauthenticated Jobs API accepts an absolute or traversing agent_file path in POST /api/v1/runs and passes it to the job executor without a workspace allowlist or boundary check. A remote caller can cause the server to open files accessible to the service account, exposing credentials, keys, environment variables, and other local data. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.59.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.9–7.5

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.16.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (1)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-p4pj-vh7h-6cqhPraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API2026-06-18ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the `agent_file` field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs. ### Details The `agent_file` field in `JobSubmitRequest` accepts any filesystem path with no validation: ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29 agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file") # NO path validator, NO allowlist ``` The executor reads the file directly: ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221 agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml" # passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file)) ``` ### Proof of Concept ```bash curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}' ``` Server responds with contents of `/etc/passwd`. Other exploitable paths: - `/proc/1/environ` — environment variables, API keys - `/home//.ssh/id_rsa` — SSH private keys - `/app/.env` — application secrets ### Impact Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.

  • PYSEC-2026-3516PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API2026-07-23vendor · osvUS

    ### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the `agent_file` field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs. ### Details The `agent_file` field in `JobSubmitRequest` accepts any filesystem path with no validation: ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29 agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file") # NO path validator, NO allowlist ``` The executor reads the file directly: ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221 agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml" # passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file)) ``` ### Proof of Concept ```bash curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}' ``` Server responds with contents of `/etc/passwd`. Other exploitable paths: - `/proc/1/environ` — environment variables, API keys - `/home//.ssh/id_rsa` — SSH private keys - `/app/.env` — application secrets ### Impact Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.

06

also known as (2)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-09-14modified 2026-09-16
08

references (3) nvd

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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