CVE-2026-55953

highpriority · track · 30EPSS 0.002 · 14 %ileDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.23% (14th) EPSS
CVSS 7.4 · high
Is it mine?
45 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

The Erlang/OTP ssl TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in ServerHello was among the suites offered by the client in ClientHello. The client-side tls_handshake:hello/5 handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected. An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a ServerHello selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as TLS_DH_anon_* or TLS_ECDH_anon_* that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire verify_peer and cacerts configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket}. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.15, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.4, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to ssl from 5.3.4 before 11.2.12.11, from 11.3 before 11.6.0.4, and from 11.7 before 11.7.4. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to ssl before 5.3.4, is affected is unknown.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

9.1
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–critical · 6.9–9.1

v3.17.4highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USexploitability 2.2 · impact 5.2
v3.19.1criticalAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v4.09.1criticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.09.1criticalCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary
v4.06.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (45)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

showing 20 of 45
05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-2533Erlang/OTP: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-07-27csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Erlang/OTP ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen sowie Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen.

  • EEF-CVE-2026-55953TLS 1.2 and DTLS client accepts unoffered anonymous cipher suite, bypassing server authentication2026-07-27vendor · osvUS

    ## Summary The Erlang/OTP `ssl` TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in `ServerHello` was among the suites offered by the client in `ClientHello`. The client-side `tls_handshake:hello/5` handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to `ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9`, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected. An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a `ServerHello` selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as `TLS_DH_anon_*` or `TLS_ECDH_anon_*` that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire `verify_peer` and `cacerts` configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and `ssl:connect` returns `{ok, Socket}`. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.15, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.4, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to ssl from 5.3.4 before 11.2.12.11, from 11.3 before 11.6.0.4, and from 11.7 before 11.7.4. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to ssl before 5.3.4, is affected is unknown. ## Workarounds - Restrict client connections to TLS 1.3 only by setting `versions` to `['tlsv1.3']` in the client's `ssl` options. The TLS 1.3 client path performs the required cipher suite membership check and is not affected. ## Configurations The vulnerability only affects TLS clients using TLS 1.2 (or earlier) or DTLS. TLS 1.3 client connections perform the cipher suite membership check and are not affected. Servers are not affected. Exploitation additionally requires an on-path (adversary-in-the-middle) attacker between the client and the intended server.

06

also known as (4)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

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08

references (21)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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