CVE-2026-55530

**Target:** PraisonAI (`MervinPraison/PraisonAI`) **Affected component:** `praisonaiagents/tools/ast_grep_tool.py` — `ast_grep_rewrite` **Affected versions:** master at `ce97667156a116c50b4a3d1aa21e09f048903fda`; reproduced against the current `praisonaiagents` PyPI release (`praisonaiagents` <= 1.6.52). ## Summary Tools in `praisonaiagents/tools/` that modify on-disk state or run code are uniformly wrapped with `@require_approval`, which routes the call through an interactive approval flow before the body runs and fails closed — on denial (or with no approval backend configured) it raises `PermissionError` and the side effect does not occur. This is applied at every sibling mutation entry point: | File | Line | Symbol | Risk level | |---|---|---|---| | `file_tools.py` | 212 | `copy_file` | high | | `file_tools.py` | 239 | `move_file` | high | | `file_tools.py` | 266 | `delete_file` | high | | `edit_tools.py` | 38 | `EditTools.edit_file` | high | | `edit_tools.py` | 155 | `edit_file` | high | | `shell_tools.py` | 32 | `execute_command` | critical | | `python_tools.py` | 352 | `execute_code` | critical | `ast_grep_tool.py:149` `ast_grep_rewrite` is structurally a sibling of these but has no decorator and no `from ..approval import require_approval` import. With `dry_run=False` (LLM-controllable), it builds `sg --pattern <P> --rewrite <R> --lang <L> --update-all <path>` (lines 204–211) and calls `subprocess.run(cmd, ...)` (line 215), modifying every file under `path` matching the pattern. There is no approval gate, no `_validate_path` workspace check, and no `cwd=` sandboxing. The function is registered as a top-level tool (`__init__.py:182`) and exposed via the `code_intelligence` built-in profile (`profiles.py`). A secondary defect: on the `dry_run=False` path `ast_grep_rewrite` returns the literal string `No changes made` to the caller even when it modified files (the "No changes made" return at `ast_grep_tool.py:230` is reached on this path), so an operator inspecting tool output sees no record that a write occurred. ## Proof of concept Single script, clean venv, `praisonaiagents` from PyPI, `ast-grep` CLI installed. `PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE` is removed from the environment first, so no env-bypass is in play. ```python import os, tempfile, textwrap os.environ.pop("PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE", None) workdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc-") target = os.path.join(workdir, "target.py") open(target, "w").write(textwrap.dedent(""" def safe_function(x): return x + 1 def hello(name): return 'hi ' + name """)) # Positive: undecorated tool rewrites the file. from praisonaiagents.tools.ast_grep_tool import ast_grep_rewrite ast_grep_rewrite( pattern="def $FN($$$): return $$$", replacement="def $FN($$$): import os; os.environ['POC_CANARY']='1'; return $$$", lang="python", path=workdir, dry_run=False, ) # Negative control: decorated sibling triggers the approval flow. from praisonaiagents.tools.edit_tools import edit_file edit_file(file_path=target, old_text="def hello(name):", new_text="def hello(name): # X") ``` Result, verified: `ast_grep_rewrite` rewrote `target.py` to contain the injected `import os; os.environ['POC_CANARY']='1'` payload, no approval prompt fired, and the call returned `No changes made`. The subsequent `edit_file` call in the same process rendered the Tool Approval Required panel and, on denial, raised `PermissionError("Execution of edit_file denied: User denied")` without modifying its target. Same process, same approval backend — the only difference is the missing decorator on `ast_grep_rewrite`. ## Threat model An LLM agent running locally whose tool surface includes `ast_grep_rewrite` (via the `code_intelligence` profile or direct import). Triggers: the operator asks the agent to refactor code, or prompt-injection in fetched docs / RAG context / any LLM-visible input steers the agent to call `ast_grep_rewrite` with attacker-chosen `pattern`, `replacement`, and `path` (the `dry_run` field is in the LLM-visible tool schema, so `dry_run=False` is requestable). The agent can then rewrite any file the host process can write — source trees, build configs, dotfiles, the agent's own source. With `path="/"` the rewrite is filesystem-wide. Because the rewrite injects arbitrary text, pointing it at a file that is later imported or executed turns this write primitive into code execution — the basis for the escalation noted in the CVSS line. No operator prompt and no audit record of the modification. ## Suggested fix ```diff --- a/praisonaiagents/tools/ast_grep_tool.py +++ b/praisonaiagents/tools/ast_grep_tool.py @@ from praisonaiagents._logging import get_logger from typing import Optional, List +from ..approval import require_approval @@ +@require_approval(risk_level="high") def ast_grep_rewrite( pattern: str, replacement: str, ``` `high` matches the file-modifying siblings; `critical` is defensible given the write→exec escalation. In the same patch: add a `_validate_path` workspace boundary check (cf. `edit_tools.py:27`); fix the `No changes made` return so it reflects actual modifications; apply the decorator to `ast_grep_scan` (`ast_grep_tool.py:243`) if it can write. `ast_grep_search` is read-only and can stay undecorated. A regression test asserting `ast_grep_rewrite` requires approval (alongside the other mutation tools) would have caught this at review time. ## Coordinated disclosure - Kai Aizen / SnailSploit — `kai@snailsploit.com` — PGP on request.

**Target:** PraisonAI (`MervinPraison/PraisonAI`) **Affected component:** `praisonaiagents/tools/ast_grep_tool.py` — `ast_grep_rewrite` **Affected versions:** master at `ce97667156a116c50b4a3d1aa21e09f048903fda`; reproduced against the current `praisonaiagents` PyPI release (`praisonaiagents` <= 1.6.52). ## Summary Tools in `praisonaiagents/tools/` that modify on-disk state or run code are uniformly wrapped with `@require_approval`, which routes the call through an interactive approval flow before the body runs and fails closed — on denial (or with no approval backend configured) it raises `PermissionError` and the side effect does not occur. This is applied at every sibling mutation entry point: | File | Line | Symbol | Risk level | |---|---|---|---| | `file_tools.py` | 212 | `copy_file` | high | | `file_tools.py` | 239 | `move_file` | high | | `file_tools.py` | 266 | `delete_file` | high | | `edit_tools.py` | 38 | `EditTools.edit_file` | high | | `edit_tools.py` | 155 | `edit_file` | high | | `shell_tools.py` | 32 | `execute_command` | critical | | `python_tools.py` | 352 | `execute_code` | critical | `ast_grep_tool.py:149` `ast_grep_rewrite` is structurally a sibling of these but has no decorator and no `from ..approval import require_approval` import. With `dry_run=False` (LLM-controllable), it builds `sg --pattern <P> --rewrite <R> --lang <L> --update-all <path>` (lines 204–211) and calls `subprocess.run(cmd, ...)` (line 215), modifying every file under `path` matching the pattern. There is no approval gate, no `_validate_path` workspace check, and no `cwd=` sandboxing. The function is registered as a top-level tool (`__init__.py:182`) and exposed via the `code_intelligence` built-in profile (`profiles.py`). A secondary defect: on the `dry_run=False` path `ast_grep_rewrite` returns the literal string `No changes made` to the caller even when it modified files (the "No changes made" return at `ast_grep_tool.py:230` is reached on this path), so an operator inspecting tool output sees no record that a write occurred. ## Proof of concept Single script, clean venv, `praisonaiagents` from PyPI, `ast-grep` CLI installed. `PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE` is removed from the environment first, so no env-bypass is in play. ```python import os, tempfile, textwrap os.environ.pop("PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE", None) workdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc-") target = os.path.join(workdir, "target.py") open(target, "w").write(textwrap.dedent(""" def safe_function(x): return x + 1 def hello(name): return 'hi ' + name """)) # Positive: undecorated tool rewrites the file. from praisonaiagents.tools.ast_grep_tool import ast_grep_rewrite ast_grep_rewrite( pattern="def $FN($$$): return $$$", replacement="def $FN($$$): import os; os.environ['POC_CANARY']='1'; return $$$", lang="python", path=workdir, dry_run=False, ) # Negative control: decorated sibling triggers the approval flow. from praisonaiagents.tools.edit_tools import edit_file edit_file(file_path=target, old_text="def hello(name):", new_text="def hello(name): # X") ``` Result, verified: `ast_grep_rewrite` rewrote `target.py` to contain the injected `import os; os.environ['POC_CANARY']='1'` payload, no approval prompt fired, and the call returned `No changes made`. The subsequent `edit_file` call in the same process rendered the Tool Approval Required panel and, on denial, raised `PermissionError("Execution of edit_file denied: User denied")` without modifying its target. Same process, same approval backend — the only difference is the missing decorator on `ast_grep_rewrite`. ## Threat model An LLM agent running locally whose tool surface includes `ast_grep_rewrite` (via the `code_intelligence` profile or direct import). Triggers: the operator asks the agent to refactor code, or prompt-injection in fetched docs / RAG context / any LLM-visible input steers the agent to call `ast_grep_rewrite` with attacker-chosen `pattern`, `replacement`, and `path` (the `dry_run` field is in the LLM-visible tool schema, so `dry_run=False` is requestable). The agent can then rewrite any file the host process can write — source trees, build configs, dotfiles, the agent's own source. With `path="/"` the rewrite is filesystem-wide. Because the rewrite injects arbitrary text, pointing it at a file that is later imported or executed turns this write primitive into code execution — the basis for the escalation noted in the CVSS line. No operator prompt and no audit record of the modification. ## Suggested fix ```diff --- a/praisonaiagents/tools/ast_grep_tool.py +++ b/praisonaiagents/tools/ast_grep_tool.py @@ from praisonaiagents._logging import get_logger from typing import Optional, List +from ..approval import require_approval @@ +@require_approval(risk_level="high") def ast_grep_rewrite( pattern: str, replacement: str, ``` `high` matches the file-modifying siblings; `critical` is defensible given the write→exec escalation. In the same patch: add a `_validate_path` workspace boundary check (cf. `edit_tools.py:27`); fix the `No changes made` return so it reflects actual modifications; apply the decorator to `ast_grep_scan` (`ast_grep_tool.py:243`) if it can write. `ast_grep_search` is read-only and can stay undecorated. A regression test asserting `ast_grep_rewrite` requires approval (alongside the other mutation tools) would have caught this at review time. ## Coordinated disclosure - Kai Aizen / SnailSploit — `kai@snailsploit.com` — PGP on request.