CVE-2026-55513

### Summary The `nebula-mgmt` Web UI host-creation path ignores both the server-wide `enrollment_token_ttl` security setting and per-network `network_config.enrollment_token_ttl` overrides. API host creation and token-regeneration paths use the configured TTL resolver, but `POST /ui/hosts` hardcodes `now.Add(24 * time.Hour)` for newly minted agent enrollment tokens. In deployments that intentionally reduce enrollment-token lifetime, any authenticated operator who can create a host through the Web UI can still mint a bearer enrollment token valid for about 24 hours. ### Details Enrollment tokens are bearer credentials for the public `POST /api/v1/enroll` endpoint: possession of a valid token allows enrolling the pending host and receiving a signed Nebula certificate/config for that host. The server configuration documents a security knob for their default lifetime and per-network overrides: - `internal/config/server.go:82` defines `EnrollmentTokenTTL` as the default lifetime for freshly minted enrollment tokens. - `internal/config/server.go:83` documents per-network overrides in `network_config` under `enrollment_token_ttl`. The API server implements and consistently uses this resolver: - `internal/api/server.go:77` defines `tokenTTLFor`, with precedence of per-network `enrollment_token_ttl`, then server default, then 24h fallback. - `internal/api/server.go:82` reads `network_config.enrollment_token_ttl`. - `internal/api/server.go:89` falls back to the configured server default. - `internal/api/hosts.go:190` through `internal/api/hosts.go:196` use `now.Add(s.tokenTTLFor(r.Context(), host.NetworkID))` for API host creation. The Web UI sibling path does not call the resolver and instead always sets a 24-hour expiry: - `internal/web/handlers.go:874` mints the raw token for `POST /ui/hosts`. - `internal/web/handlers.go:879` sets `ExpiresAt: now.Add(24 * time.Hour)`. This creates inconsistent behavior between API and Web UI host creation and bypasses an operator-configured token lifetime policy. The issue is reachable by an authenticated Web UI operator who can create hosts. Admins can create hosts in any network; non-admin operators can create hosts in networks whose CA they own. Affected version evidence: the configurable enrollment-token TTL feature was introduced by commit `6c344a6` (`feat(api): configurable enrollment-token TTL + regenerate endpoint (#75) (#79)`), and `git tag --contains 6c344a6 --sort=version:refname` returns `v0.3.0` through `v0.3.8`. Pattern checks across all release tags showed the TTL config/API resolver and the Web UI 24-hour hardcode are present in every `v0.3.x` release from `v0.3.0` to `v0.3.8`, and are not meaningfully applicable to `v0.1.x`/`v0.2.0` because the TTL policy knob was not present there. The current checkout at commit `d92dd9a60de291e2bc1caf73b4e9a99567b31ec0` (`git describe`: `v0.3.8-1-gd92dd9a`) remains affected. ### PoC Safe local PoC run from a clean checkout at commit `d92dd9a60de291e2bc1caf73b4e9a99567b31ec0` on 2026-06-12. The PoC is a temporary Go test that uses only in-memory SQLite and `httptest`; it does not start a real server and does not contact external services. 1. Create a temporary test file `internal/web/security_audit_poc_test.go` in package `web`. 2. In the test, create an in-memory Web UI with `newTestWeb(t)`, create a network `audit-poc-net` with CIDR `10.77.0.0/24`, and set `network_config.enrollment_token_ttl` to `30m`. 3. Log in as the seeded test admin through the normal Web UI helper and obtain a CSRF token from `GET /ui/hosts/new`. 4. Submit `POST /ui/hosts` with `network_id=audit-poc-net`, `name=audit-poc-host`, `nebula_ips=10.77.0.10`, `role=host`, and `kind=agent`. 5. Parse the one-shot enrollment token from the returned host-detail page and read the token row with `GetEnrollmentToken`. 6. Compare the observed expiry to the configured 30-minute network override. Command run: ```bash go test ./internal/web -run 'TestSecurityAuditPOC' -count=1 -v ``` Observed vulnerable output from this environment: ```text === RUN TestSecurityAuditPOC_UIHostCreateIgnoresNetworkEnrollmentTokenTTL POC_UI_TTL_BYPASS observed_token_ttl=24h0m0s configured_network_ttl=30m expires_at=2026-06-13T14:51:45Z --- PASS: TestSecurityAuditPOC_UIHostCreateIgnoresNetworkEnrollmentTokenTTL (0.05s) ``` The meaningful control is the API sibling: `internal/api/hosts.go:190` through `internal/api/hosts.go:196` uses `s.tokenTTLFor(...)`, and existing tests in `internal/api/hosts_token_ttl_test.go` verify API-created/regenerated enrollment tokens honor server-default and per-network TTLs. Variant review also found API regenerate-token, API re-enroll, and signed-poll rekey token minting use the resolver rather than a hardcoded 24h value. After recording the output, the temporary test file was removed and `git status --short` returned clean. The PoC was re-run after drafting this report and produced the output shown above. ### Impact An authenticated Web UI operator can bypass a configured enrollment-token lifetime policy and obtain a token valid for approximately 24 hours even when the deployment or network is configured for a much shorter lifetime such as 30 minutes. Because enrollment tokens are bearer credentials for the public enrollment endpoint, longer-than-intended validity increases the window in which a copied, logged, shared, or otherwise exposed token can be used to enroll the pending host and obtain its Nebula certificate/config. This weakens confidentiality and integrity for deployments relying on short token lifetimes to reduce enrollment-token exposure. Suggested remediation: refactor the Web UI host-creation path to use the same TTL resolution as the API path, or move the resolver into a shared package/service used by both API and Web UI. Add a regression test under `internal/web` that sets `network_config.enrollment_token_ttl = "30m"`, creates an agent host through `POST /ui/hosts`, and asserts the persisted enrollment token expires within the configured 30-minute window rather than 24 hours.

The nebula-mesh Web UI host creation ignores the configured enrollment token TTL and instead mints 24-hour bearer enrollment tokens. This can lead to tokens remaining valid for longer than intended, increasing the window of opportunity for an attacker to use an intercepted token.