CVE-2026-54256

mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.002 · 15 %ileUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.24% (15th) EPSS
CVSS 5.4 · medium
Is it mine?
1 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-28

Winter CMS is a content management system built on the Laravel PHP framework. In versions up to and including 1.2.12, the backend FileUpload form widget trusted an attacker-controlled file_id POST parameter when resolving the attachment it operates on, allowing an authenticated backend user to read and modify attachment records belonging to other users or records. The widget's getFileRecord() lookup resolved the posted id against the global system_files table without verifying that the file belonged to the widget's own relation, parent record, or deferred-binding session. Because all attachments share a single File model and table and attachment ids are sequential integers that are easily enumerated, a user reaching any form with a fileupload field, including the built-in My Account avatar field that requires no specific permission, could target arbitrary attachments to modify their title and description via onSaveAttachmentConfig and change their sort order via onSortAttachments, which passed posted ids straight to an unscoped update. CSRF tokens remain enforced, so exploitation requires a valid authenticated backend session with any level of access. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.13.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

5.4
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.15.4mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 2.8 · impact 2.5
v3.15.4mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.15mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (1)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-3277-h8g9-qj5fWinter: Authenticated IDOR in backend FileUpload widget allows cross-user access to attachment metadata2026-08-20ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact The backend `FileUpload` form widget trusted an attacker-controlled `file_id` POST parameter when resolving the attachment it operates on. The lookup (`FileUpload::getFileRecord()`) resolved the posted id against the global `system_files` table without verifying that the file belonged to the widget's own relation, parent record, or deferred-binding session. Any authenticated backend user who can reach a form containing a `fileupload` field — including the built-in **My Account** avatar field, which requires no specific backend permission — could therefore target a `System\Models\File` record belonging to another user or record and: - modify its `title` and `description` via `onSaveAttachmentConfig`, and - change its `sort_order` via `onSortAttachments` (which passed posted ids straight to `setSortableOrder()`, an unscoped `UPDATE ... WHERE id = ?`). The same unscoped lookup is reached by `onLoadAttachmentConfig`, `onSaveAttachmentConfig`, and `onRemoveAttachment`. Because all attachments share the single `System\Models\File` model and `system_files` table, an attacker was not limited to other users' avatars — any attachment on any model could be referenced by id. Attachment ids are sequential integers and are easily enumerated. The confirmed impact is unauthorized integrity modification of arbitrary attachment metadata and ordering. CSRF tokens are still verified on all POST requests, so an attacker must be authenticated to the backend with a valid session. To exploit this issue an attacker needs a backend account with any level of access. ### Patches The `FileUpload` widget now scopes every `file_id` lookup to the widget's own relation, including any files bound through the current deferred-binding session, so a posted id can no longer reference an unrelated `System\Models\File` record: - `getFileRecord()` resolves the id through `getRelationObject()->withDeferred($this->sessionKey)->find(...)` rather than the global file model. This covers `onLoadAttachmentConfig`, `onSaveAttachmentConfig`, and `onRemoveAttachment`. - `onSortAttachments()` intersects the posted ids with the ids that actually belong to the relation before calling `setSortableOrder()`. This security issue has been fixed as of **v1.2.13** (commit [`9cb0ae5f9d837db141ab111c6a7de8eed9603d25`](https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/9cb0ae5f9d837db141ab111c6a7de8eed9603d25)). ### Workarounds There is no supported workaround other than upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, you may apply the fix manually in `modules/backend/formwidgets/FileUpload.php`: 1. In `getFileRecord()`, replace `$this->getRelationModel()->find(post('file_id'))` with `$this->getRelationObject()->withDeferred($this->sessionKey)->find(post('file_id'))`. 2. In `onSortAttachments()`, filter the posted `sortOrder` ids to those returned by `$this->getRelationObject()->withDeferred($this->sessionKey)->pluck($keyName)` before calling `setSortableOrder()`.

06

sources

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published 2026-08-26modified 2026-08-27
07

references (2) nvd

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