CVE-2026-54176

## Summary `MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update the authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password. Because email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after the attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password reset from outside the system. The password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password` verification, so the gap is asymmetric. ## Details The `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request->validated()` directly to `$user->update()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column (`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with `ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before allowing any change. Scenarios where this is exploitable include: - A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel) - An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving ## Patch Fixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/pull/5990) — the authentication column is now protected by a `current_password` check (mirroring `ChangePasswordRequest`) whenever its value changes. A stronger mitigation — sending a verification link to the new address before persisting the change — can be layered on top using Laravel's `MustVerifyEmail` flow. ## Affected versions All versions prior to 6.8.14 / 7.0.38. ## Fixed versions - 6.x: 6.8.14 - 7.x: 7.0.38