CVE-2026-53821

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen, erhöhte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Informationen offenzulegen, Konfigurationen zu manipulieren, beliebige Befehle oder Code auszuführen sowie interne Systeme über SSRF anzugreifen.

### Summary In trusted-proxy Control UI mode, OpenClaw accepted a WebSocket client's declared operator scopes before those scopes were bound to a server-approved pairing or trusted-proxy authorization baseline. This issue affects trusted-proxy Control UI deployments. It does not apply to shared-secret Control UI sessions, which are treated as trusted operator sessions by design. ### Affected configurations This affects deployments using `gateway.auth.mode: "trusted-proxy"` for Control UI access where a restricted trusted-proxy user could open a Control UI WebSocket and present a fresh, unpaired device identity with elevated requested scopes. ### Impact An unpaired or restricted trusted-proxy Control UI client could obtain cached `operator.admin` authority on its live WebSocket connection. That authority could then be used for admin-gated Gateway RPCs until the connection was closed or revalidated. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`. ### Mitigations Upgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.18` or later. Before upgrading, restrict trusted-proxy Control UI access to users who should have the scopes they can request, and restart the gateway after changing trusted-proxy authorization policy.