CVE-2026-53638

mediumpriority · track · 0OT risk · elevatedEPSS 0.003 · 21 %ileUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.28% (21st) EPSS
CVSS 4.3 · medium
Is it mine?
3 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Sylius is an Open Source eCommerce Framework on Symfony. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.0.18, 2.1.15, and 2.2.6, an authorization bypass vulnerability exists in the shop account API. The `PATCH /api/v2/shop/account/orders/{tokenValue}/payments/{paymentId}` endpoint, used by an authenticated shop customer to change the payment method of an order that has been placed but not yet paid (state `STATE_NEW`), does not validate that the chosen payment method is enabled for the order's channel. The equivalent checkout endpoint (`PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payments/{paymentId}`) correctly rejects out-of-channel payment methods with `HTTP 422`; the account endpoint silently accepts them and returns `HTTP 200`. An authenticated customer can therefore assign any globally enabled payment method to their own placed order, including methods that the store operator has explicitly excluded from that channel. The issue is fixed in versions: 2.0.18, 2.1.15, 2.2.6 and above. As a workaround, decorate the `Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\Changer\PaymentMethodChangerInterface` service in the application.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

4.3
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.14.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 2.8 · impact 1.4
v3.14.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.14mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (3)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (1)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-6955-hrm5-c4qpSylius: Channel-based payment method restriction bypass on shop account orders API endpoint2026-07-09ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in the shop account API. The `PATCH /api/v2/shop/account/orders/{tokenValue}/payments/{paymentId}` endpoint, used by an authenticated shop customer to change the payment method of an order that has been placed but not yet paid (state `STATE_NEW`), does not validate that the chosen payment method is enabled for the order's channel. The equivalent checkout endpoint (`PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payments/{paymentId}`) correctly rejects out-of-channel payment methods with `HTTP 422`; the account endpoint silently accepts them and returns `HTTP 200`. An authenticated customer can therefore assign any globally enabled payment method to their own placed order, including methods that the store operator has explicitly excluded from that channel. ### Patches The issue is fixed in versions: 2.0.18, 2.1.15, 2.2.6 and above. ### Workarounds If users cannot bump Sylius right now, decorate the `Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\Changer\PaymentMethodChangerInterface` service in their applications. #### Step 1. Create the decorator `src/Decorator/ChannelCheckingPaymentMethodChanger.php`: ```php <?php declare(strict_types=1); namespace App\Decorator; use ApiPlatform\Validator\Exception\ValidationException; use Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\Changer\PaymentMethodChangerInterface; use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\OrderInterface; use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\PaymentMethodInterface; use Sylius\Component\Core\Repository\PaymentMethodRepositoryInterface; use Sylius\Component\Core\Repository\PaymentRepositoryInterface; use Sylius\Component\Payment\Resolver\PaymentMethodsResolverInterface; use Symfony\Component\Validator\ConstraintViolation; use Symfony\Component\Validator\ConstraintViolationList; use Symfony\Contracts\Translation\TranslatorInterface; final readonly class ChannelCheckingPaymentMethodChanger implements PaymentMethodChangerInterface { public function __construct( private PaymentMethodChangerInterface $decorated, private PaymentRepositoryInterface $paymentRepository, private PaymentMethodRepositoryInterface $paymentMethodRepository, private PaymentMethodsResolverInterface $paymentMethodsResolver, private TranslatorInterface $translator, ) { } public function changePaymentMethod(string $paymentMethodCode, mixed $paymentId, OrderInterface $order): OrderInterface { /** @var PaymentMethodInterface|null $paymentMethod */ $paymentMethod = $this->paymentMethodRepository->findOneBy(['code' => $paymentMethodCode]); $payment = $this->paymentRepository->findOneByOrderId($paymentId, $order->getId()); if ( $paymentMethod !== null && $payment !== null && !in_array($paymentMethod, $this->paymentMethodsResolver->getSupportedMethods($payment), true) ) { $template = 'sylius.payment_method.not_available'; $parameters = ['%name%' => (string) $paymentMethod->getName()]; throw new ValidationException(new ConstraintViolationList([ new ConstraintViolation( message: $this->translator->trans($template, $parameters, 'validators'), messageTemplate: $template, parameters: $parameters, root: $paymentMethodCode, propertyPath: '', invalidValue: $paymentMethodCode, ), ])); } return $this->decorated->changePaymentMethod($paymentMethodCode, $paymentId, $order); } } ``` #### Step 2. Register the decorator `config/services.yaml` (append to the application's existing `services:` block): ```yaml services: App\Decorator\ChannelCheckingPaymentMethodChanger: decorates: sylius_api.changer.payment_method arguments: - '@.inner' - '@sylius.repository.payment' - '@sylius.repository.payment_method' - '@sylius.resolver.payment_methods' - '@translator' ``` `@.inner` references the original `PaymentMethodChangerInterface` implementation, so any future Sylius change to the changer keeps working through the decorator. #### Step 3. Clear the cache ```bash bin/console cache:clear ``` ### Reporters We would like to extend our gratitude to the following individuals for their detailed reporting and responsible disclosure of this vulnerability: - Fredrik Dietrichson (@FredrikEV) ### For more information If there are any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open an issue in [Sylius issues](https://github.com/Sylius/Sylius/issues?q=sort%3Aupdated-desc+is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen) - Send an email to [security@sylius.com](mailto:security@sylius.com)

06

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-09-08modified 2026-09-14
07

references (1) nvd

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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