CVE-2026-53550
mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 36 %ileDEEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
js-yaml is a JavaScript YAML parser and dumper. Prior to 4.2.0 and 3.15.0, a crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence. This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service. The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.0 and 3.15.0.
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affected products (10)
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advisories (2)
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- WID-SEC-W-2026-2618IBM App Connect Enterprise: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-08-02csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, und um Daten zu manipulieren.
- GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases2026-06-15ghsa · osvUS
### Summary A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in `js-yaml` merge-key processing (`<<`) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence. This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service. ### Details The issue is in merge handling inside `lib/loader.js`: - `storeMappingPair(...)` iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is `tag:yaml.org,2002:merge`. - For each element, it calls `mergeMappings(...)`. - `mergeMappings(...)` computes `Object.keys(source)` and performs `_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)` checks for each key. When input is of the form: a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0} b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]} all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time. Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows. Relevant code path: lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...) ### Root cause File: lib/loader.js Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode, valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos) Lines: ~359-366 if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') { if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) { for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) { mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys); } } else { mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys); } } When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does sourceKeys = Object.keys(source); for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) { key = sourceKeys[index]; if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) { setProperty(destination, key, source[key]); overridableKeys[key] = true; } } Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs: * one Object.keys(source) call (O(K)) * K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge. YAML semantics for `<<:` are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources, so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off. ### PoC Environment: js-yaml version: 4.1.1 Node.js: v24.5.0 Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently) Reproduction script: Create many keys in one anchored map (&a). Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...]. Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a). Observed repeated runs (same machine): K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms Control (single merge, similar key counts): K=2000: ~1–2 ms K=4000: ~3 ms K=8000: ~5 ms Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation. ### Impact This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity). Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability. ### Suggested fix: Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics: dedupe in storeMappingPair: if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') { if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) { var seen = new Set(); for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) { var src = valueNode[index]; if (seen.has(src)) continue; // idempotent; skip redundant alias seen.add(src); mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys); } } else { mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys); } }
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references (3)
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