CVE-2026-52800

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gogs ausnutzen, um erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, beliebigen Code auszuführen – sogar mit erweiterten Berechtigungen, was zur vollständigen Kontrolle über das System führen kann –, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen, Benutzer auf bösartige Websites umzuleiten oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.

## Summary In **Gogs 0.14.1**, organization team member management can be performed via **GET requests without CSRF protection**. If a victim who is an **organization owner** is logged in and is tricked into visiting a crafted link, an attacker-controlled user can be added to the **Owners** team. As a result, the attacker gains **organization owner–equivalent privileges**. --- ## Description When a victim is logged in as an organization owner, **team member management endpoints are exposed via routes reachable by GET requests**, allowing state-changing operations without a CSRF token. ### Team action route allows GET `internal/cmd/web.go:390` ```go m.Route("/teams/:team/action/:action", "GET,POST", org.TeamsAction) ``` ### CSRF validation is applied only to POST requests Because the global CSRF check is limited to POST requests, state-changing operations reached via GET bypass CSRF protection entirely. `internal/context/auth.go:56-61` ```go if !options.SignOutRequired && !options.DisableCSRF && c.Req.Method == "POST" && !isAPIPath(c.Req.URL.Path) { csrf.Validate(c.Context, c.csrf) if c.Written() { return } } ``` ### TeamsAction performs state changes regardless of HTTP method `TeamsAction` does not branch on the HTTP method. Instead, it performs state-changing operations (such as adding or removing members) based solely on query parameters (`uid`, `uname`) and the `:action` path parameter. Since the route explicitly allows GET, the `add` action can be executed via GET. `internal/route/org/teams.go:38-83` ```go func TeamsAction(c *context.Context) { uid := com.StrTo(c.Query("uid")).MustInt64() if uid == 0 { c.Redirect(c.Org.OrgLink + "/teams") return } page := c.Query("page") var err error switch c.Params(":action") { case "add": if !c.Org.IsOwner { c.NotFound() return } uname := c.Query("uname") var u *database.User u, err = database.Handle.Users().GetByUsername(c.Req.Context(), uname) // ... err = c.Org.Team.AddMember(u.ID) page = "team" } } ``` ### Adding a user to the Owners team grants organization owner privileges When a user joins the **Owners** team, `OrgUser.IsOwner` is set to `true`. Therefore, adding a user to the Owners team directly results in granting organization owner–equivalent privileges. `internal/database/org_team.go:566-576` ```go ou := new(OrgUser) if _, err = sess.Where("uid = ?", userID). And("org_id = ?", orgID).Get(ou); err != nil { return err } ou.NumTeams++ if t.IsOwnerTeam() { ou.IsOwner = true } if _, err = sess.ID(ou.ID).AllCols().Update(ou); err != nil { return err } ``` ### Related issue: organization member actions are also state-changing via GET For reference, organization member management endpoints are also exposed as GET routes that perform state changes without CSRF protection. `internal/cmd/web.go:382` ```go m.Get("/members/action/:action", org.MembersAction) ``` `MembersAction` similarly does not branch on HTTP method and performs state-changing operations (public/private toggle, remove, leave) based on query parameters and the `:action` path parameter. `internal/route/org/members.go:31-71` ```go func MembersAction(c *context.Context) { uid := com.StrTo(c.Query("uid")).MustInt64() if uid == 0 { c.Redirect(c.Org.OrgLink + "/members") return } org := c.Org.Organization var err error switch c.Params(":action") { case "private": err = database.ChangeOrgUserStatus(org.ID, uid, false) case "public": err = database.ChangeOrgUserStatus(org.ID, uid, true) case "remove": err = org.RemoveMember(uid) case "leave": err = org.RemoveMember(c.User.ID) } } ``` --- ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Prepare a target user account to be added (e.g., `attacker`). 2. Confirm that the victim user is an **owner** of the target organization (e.g., `org3`) and is logged in. 3. Cause the victim’s browser to perform a **top-level navigation** to the following URL: ``` http://localhost:10880/org/org3/teams/owners/action/add?uid=1&uname=attacker ``` <img width="2019" height="322" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/342a627a-04e8-47bd-818a-9c2b05a75446" /> 4. After the request completes, verify that the `attacker` user can access: ``` http://localhost:10880/org/org3/settings ``` confirming that organization owner privileges have been obtained. <img width="2010" height="285" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/03945bb1-e9c5-4e42-ad3a-9f6d63b7d86d" /> <img width="2016" height="893" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55d7db13-52cf-471b-a6d3-aa4186c8b547" /> --- ## Impact Successful exploitation allows an attacker to obtain **organization owner privileges**, resulting in: * Full control over organization repositories, settings, and members * Unauthorized access to private repositories (confidentiality impact) * Modification or deletion of repositories and settings (integrity impact) * Repository deletion or disruption leading to service unavailability (availability impact)

Gogs Vulnerable to CSRF Leading to Organization Owner Takeover in gogs.io/gogs. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: gogs.io/gogs before v0.14.3.