CVE-2026-49284

Oracle heeft 31 kwetsbaarheden verholpen in diverse Oracle Communications-producten, waaronder Oracle Communications Unified Assurance, Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Security Edge Protection Proxy, Oracle Communications MetaSolv Solution Module - ASR, Oracle Communications Service Catalog and Design en Oracle Communications Operations Monitor.

Ein entfernter, anonymer oder authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Oracle Communications ausnutzen, um die Vertraulichkeit, Integrität und Verfügbarkeit zu gefährden.

## Summary SimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains `ExpectedIssuer = IdP A`, but the ACS receives a valid response from `IdP B`, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response. That behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned `samlp:Response/@InResponseTo` outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData` does not carry its own `InResponseTo`. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP. ## Impact In a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set `enable_unsolicited` to `false` to prevent IdP-initiated logins. The impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentication/authorization bypass candidate. Impact strongly depends on whether an attacker can obtain a signed IdP-initiated assertion from a lower-trust trusted IdP and whether the downstream application maps identifiers globally.