CVE-2026-47141

mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.004 · 32 %ileDEEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.38% (32nd) EPSS
CVSS 6.9 · medium
Is it mine?
4 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · cert_bund · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to version 3.11.4, NodeVM exposes some process-wide observability builtins when they are allowed through require.builtin. The diagnostics_channel, async_hooks, and perf_hooks builtins are not blocked by the dangerous builtin denylist. These modules are process-wide, not sandbox-local. Sandboxed code can use them to observe host application data across the vm2 boundary. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.4.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

6.9
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · low–medium · 2.7–6.9

v4.06.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.06.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.02.7lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (4)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-1583vm2: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-05-18csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in vm2 ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren und vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.

  • GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28fNodeVM observability builtins leak host process and HTTP request data2026-05-29ghsa · osvUS

    ## Summary `NodeVM` exposes some process-wide observability builtins when they are allowed through `require.builtin`. The following builtins are not blocked by the dangerous builtin denylist: ```text diagnostics_channel async_hooks perf_hooks ``` These modules are process-wide, not sandbox-local. Sandboxed code can use them to observe host application data across the vm2 boundary. **Note**: It is a host data exposure issue. The impact depends on whether the host application allows these builtins and uses HTTP, async request context, diagnostics channels, or performance marks in the same process. ## Details Non-denied builtins are exposed to the sandbox through `lib/builtin.js`: ```js builtins.set(key, special ? special : vm => vm.readonly(hostRequire(key))); ``` `diagnostics_channel`, `async_hooks`, and `perf_hooks` are not denied. These modules expose host process state rather than sandbox-local state. Confirmed examples: 1. `diagnostics_channel` lets sandboxed code subscribe to Node.js HTTP diagnostic channels such as `http.server.request.start`. The sandbox receives host HTTP request objects and can read headers such as `Authorization` or session tokens. 2. `async_hooks.executionAsyncResource()` lets sandboxed code read the current host `AsyncResource`. If the host stores request/user data on that resource, the sandbox can read it. 3. `perf_hooks.performance.getEntriesByType('mark')` lets sandboxed code read host performance timeline entries. ## PoC Run from the vm2 repository root: ```bash node poc/observability-builtins-info-leak.js ``` [observability-builtins-info-leak.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27571259/observability-builtins-info-leak.js) The PoC uses only the specific builtin being tested in each section. It confirms: ```text diagnostics_channel: sandbox reads host HTTP request headers async_hooks: sandbox reads host AsyncResource data perf_hooks: sandbox reads host performance mark names ``` Example impact from the PoC: ```text authorization: Bearer HOST_HTTP_SECRET_... x-session-token: HOST_HTTP_SECRET_... ``` These values are sent to a host HTTP server, but the sandbox reads them through `diagnostics_channel`. <img width="997" height="566" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-10 at 1 13 20 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/36a7d600-8b53-4bfe-ab06-4e6dcfad5015" /> ## Impact An attacker who can run untrusted JavaScript inside `NodeVM` with affected builtin settings can observe data from the host process. In a real application, this may expose HTTP request headers, authorization tokens, session tokens, request context values, user identifiers, or other sensitive diagnostics data from the host application or from other users. ## Suggested fix Treat process-wide observability modules as dangerous builtins for untrusted sandboxes. At minimum, consider blocking: ```text diagnostics_channel async_hooks perf_hooks ``` These modules are not sandbox-local and can expose host process state across the vm2 boundary.

06

also known as (3)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

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published 2026-06-12modified 2026-10-26
08

references (9)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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