CVE-2026-45674
criticalpriority · attend · 50OT risk · highEPSS 0.003 · 21 %ileexploit · PoCDEEURUUSEPSS · scored 2026-10-24
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
cvss
Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.
base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode⚠ sources disagree · high–critical · 8.7–10
ssvc
A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.
weaknesses
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exploits (1)
Public proof-of-concept and weaponised exploit code.
affected products (53)
Products and version ranges known to be affected.
advisories (3)
Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.
- WID-SEC-W-2026-1814Netty: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-06-07csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.
- WID-SEC-W-2026-3376Atlassian Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Fisheye/Crucible, Jira Software und Jira Service Management: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-09-15csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Fisheye/Crucible, Jira Software und Jira Service Management ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery-Angriffe (SSRF) durchzuführen, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe zu starten, sensible Informationen offenzulegen, Daten zu manipulieren oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen.
- GHSA-676x-f7gg-47vcNetty Vulnerable to DNS Cache Poisoning via Missing Bailiwick Checks in CNAME Records2026-06-08ghsa · osvUS
### Summary Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses. ### Details In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext#buildAliasMap`, the resolver processes the ANSWER section of a DNS response and blindly caches all CNAME records it finds. According to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5452#section-6 ``` Care must be taken to only accept data if it is known that the originator is authoritative for the QNAME or a parent of the QNAME. One very simple way to achieve this is to only accept data if it is part of the domain for which the query was intended. ``` ### Impact DNS Cache Poisoning (Bailiwick Bypass). Any application using Netty's DNS resolver is impacted.
also known as (4)
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sources
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references (28)
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/netty/netty/releasesPatchcnnvd
- https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Finalcnnvd
- https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Finalcnnvd
- https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-676x-f7gg-47vccnnvd
- https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Finalenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Finalenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-676x-f7gg-47vcenisa_euvd
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26017nvd
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