CVE-2026-45666

mediumpriority · track · 0EPSS 0.003 · 20 %ileEURUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.28% (20th) EPSS
CVSS 6.5 · medium
Is it mine?
4 products
Check your exposure
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · scored 2026-10-27

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.8.11, the API /api/v1/notes/{note_id} endpoint lacks proper authorization checks, allowing authenticated users to retrieve notes belonging to other users by guessing or enumerating UUIDs. This results in unauthorized disclosure of potentially sensitive or private user data. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.11.

01

cvss

Technical severity, 0–10. One row per scoring source.

6.5
010

base score 0–10 · higher = more severe · hover a vector to decode

v3.16.5mediumAV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comexploitability 2.8 · impact 3.6
v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.16mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

ssvc

A stakeholder decision — act, attend, or track — from exploitation and impact.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

weaknesses

The CWE weakness classes this flaw belongs to.

04

affected products (4)

Products and version ranges known to be affected.

05

advisories (2)

Vendor and ecosystem advisories describing this.

  • GHSA-x3qm-p8hr-3c3hOpen WebUI has an Indirect Object Reference (IDOR) in user notes2026-05-14ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary The API /api/v1/notes/{note_id} endpoint lacks proper authorization checks, allowing authenticated users to retrieve notes belonging to other users by guessing or enumerating UUIDs. This results in unauthorized disclosure of potentially sensitive or private user data. ### Details - if notes is enabled from UI (Settings >> General >> Features >> Notes (Beta)) - From API, attacker can access other user notes - if notes is disabled from UI (Settings >> General >> Features >> Notes (Beta)) - Then attacker can enable the notes from /api/config and access other user notes ### PoC - Step 1: Log in to the application as a valid user (User A). ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3c4625f9-6e51-4cd1-942e-6a3f467520c0) - Step 2: Intercept or inspect the response from the endpoint GET /api/config. ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7c4fe716-314c-4640-bc9f-1e11ddc2273d) - Step 3: Observe the field "enable_notes": false in the JSON response. - Step 4: Manually change "enable_notes" to true using browser DevTools or by intercepting and modifying the response via a proxy like Burp Suite. (Please note, the occurrence of this API comes twice, hence modification needs to be made twice as well.) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/99575570-a673-4508-b149-9a2480d8f62e) - Step 5: Observe the loaded frontend application; the previously hidden notes form will now be visible. ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4059b1f-2e77-4f29-88a3-431e82b7c41d) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55e601d7-b013-43e3-a070-3a80f166e777) - Step 6: Again, click on any note, intercept the request, and Replace the note_id in the URL with a different note ID known to belong to another user (e.g., by guessing or bruteforcing). - Step 7: Send the modified request while remaining logged in as User A. - Step 8: Observe that the server returns the content of another user's note, confirming unauthorized access. ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cbec4ab5-a8a8-488a-a984-03e8de5b22f7) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/046cd925-7299-44ba-bfc3-d6e7071d29d1) ### Impact 1. Unauthorized access to user-created notes 2. Possible exposure of confidential or sensitive uploaded data 3. Violation of user privacy and data isolation 4. High risk of legal or compliance breaches in regulated environments ## Resolution Fixed in commit [de3317e26](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/de3317e26bb67a2a7ea015a183bbd1d369880ebd), first released in **v0.8.11** (Mar 2026). All per-id note endpoints (`GET /api/v1/notes/{id}`, `POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/update`, `POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/access/update`, deletion) now enforce ownership: the handler fetches the note, then requires the caller to be admin, the note owner, or have an `AccessGrants` grant for the appropriate permission (`read` for retrieval, `write` for mutation). A non-owner with no grant receives 403. Users on `>= 0.8.11` are not affected.

  • PYSEC-2026-2768Open WebUI has an Indirect Object Reference (IDOR) in user notes2026-07-13vendor · osvUS

    ### Summary The API /api/v1/notes/{note_id} endpoint lacks proper authorization checks, allowing authenticated users to retrieve notes belonging to other users by guessing or enumerating UUIDs. This results in unauthorized disclosure of potentially sensitive or private user data. ### Details - if notes is enabled from UI (Settings >> General >> Features >> Notes (Beta)) - From API, attacker can access other user notes - if notes is disabled from UI (Settings >> General >> Features >> Notes (Beta)) - Then attacker can enable the notes from /api/config and access other user notes ### PoC - Step 1: Log in to the application as a valid user (User A). ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3c4625f9-6e51-4cd1-942e-6a3f467520c0) - Step 2: Intercept or inspect the response from the endpoint GET /api/config. ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7c4fe716-314c-4640-bc9f-1e11ddc2273d) - Step 3: Observe the field "enable_notes": false in the JSON response. - Step 4: Manually change "enable_notes" to true using browser DevTools or by intercepting and modifying the response via a proxy like Burp Suite. (Please note, the occurrence of this API comes twice, hence modification needs to be made twice as well.) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/99575570-a673-4508-b149-9a2480d8f62e) - Step 5: Observe the loaded frontend application; the previously hidden notes form will now be visible. ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4059b1f-2e77-4f29-88a3-431e82b7c41d) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55e601d7-b013-43e3-a070-3a80f166e777) - Step 6: Again, click on any note, intercept the request, and Replace the note_id in the URL with a different note ID known to belong to another user (e.g., by guessing or bruteforcing). - Step 7: Send the modified request while remaining logged in as User A. - Step 8: Observe that the server returns the content of another user's note, confirming unauthorized access. ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cbec4ab5-a8a8-488a-a984-03e8de5b22f7) ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/046cd925-7299-44ba-bfc3-d6e7071d29d1) ### Impact 1. Unauthorized access to user-created notes 2. Possible exposure of confidential or sensitive uploaded data 3. Violation of user privacy and data isolation 4. High risk of legal or compliance breaches in regulated environments ## Resolution Fixed in commit [de3317e26](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/de3317e26bb67a2a7ea015a183bbd1d369880ebd), first released in **v0.8.11** (Mar 2026). All per-id note endpoints (`GET /api/v1/notes/{id}`, `POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/update`, `POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/access/update`, deletion) now enforce ownership: the handler fetches the note, then requires the caller to be admin, the note owner, or have an `AccessGrants` grant for the appropriate permission (`read` for retrieval, `write` for mutation). A non-owner with no grant receives 403. Users on `>= 0.8.11` are not affected.

06

also known as (7)

Other names and identifiers for this entity.

07

sources

Which sources assert this record, and when.

published 2026-05-15modified 2026-06-17
08

references (5)

External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.

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