CVE-2026-45292

Red Hat heeft meerdere kwetsbaarheden verholpen in Keycloak.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM Operational Decision Manager ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsbeschränkungen zu umgehen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen und Code auszuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Keycloak ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen und dadurch Benutzerkonten zu übernehmen.

Ein entfernter, anonymer oder authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Oracle Communications ausnutzen, um die Vertraulichkeit, Integrität und Verfügbarkeit zu gefährden.

## Overview A vulnerability affects the baggage propagation implementation in `opentelemetry-api` and `opentelemetry-extension-trace-propagators`. Parsing oversized baggage causes unbounded memory allocation and CPU consumption. Because baggage is automatically re-injected into every outgoing request, the effect can fan out to downstream services that never received the original malicious request. ## Technical Details - `W3CBaggagePropagator` did not enforce any limit on the total size or entry count of the `baggage` header. The parser iterated character-by-character through the entire value regardless of length. - `JaegerPropagator` and `OtTracePropagator` had the same gap in their respective baggage extraction paths. - The W3C Baggage specification recommends a maximum of 8,192 bytes and 180 entries; none of these limits were enforced. ## Impact The practical availability impact for most deployments is limited. Every major Java HTTP server enforces its own header size limit (Tomcat, Jetty, Netty, Vert.x, and gRPC-Java all default to 8 KiB), constraining what an external attacker can deliver before the application is reached. The risk is higher when transport-layer limits are absent — e.g., a compromised internal service communicating over a non-HTTP or custom transport. ## Remediation Update to version 1.62.0 or later ([#8380](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java/pull/8380)). The fix enforces limits consistent with the W3C Baggage specification at the propagator level: - Maximum total baggage size: 8,192 bytes across all `baggage` header values - Maximum number of entries: 64 Headers that would exceed either limit are dropped at the point the limit is reached; already-extracted valid entries are retained. ## Workarounds Ensure HTTP header size limits are configured at the server or gateway level. Most Java HTTP servers enforce an 8 KiB header limit by default, which mitigates external attack vectors independently of this fix. ## References - [W3C Baggage Specification §Limits](https://www.w3.org/TR/baggage/#limits)